Fear and greed: The evolution of double liability in American banking, 1865–1930
Author:
- Richard S. GrossmanRGRichard S. Grossman
- 1 January 2007
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Explorations in Economic History
- Vol. 44 (1) , 59-80
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
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