A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
Authors:
- Sarvesh BandhuSBSarvesh Bandhu
- Abhinaba LahiriALAbhinaba Lahiri
- Anup PramanikAPAnup Pramanik
- 1 June 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 191
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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