Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis
Authors:
Preprint
- 1 January 2009
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Recent academic studies indicate that acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) decline from deal to deal in acquisitions programs. Does this pattern suggest hubristic CEO behaviors are significant enough to influence average CAR patterns during acquisitions programs? An alternative explanation is CEO learning. This study therefore tests for learning using successive acquisitions of large U.S. public targets undertaken by U.S. acquirers. A dynamic framework reveals that both rational and hubristic CEOs take on average investor reactions to their previous deals into account and adjust their bidding behavior accordingly. These results are consistent with a learning hypothesis.Keywords
This publication has 55 references indexed in Scilit:
- Learning, hubris and corporate serial acquisitionsJournal of Corporate Finance, 2009
- Merger negotiations and the toehold puzzleJournal of Financial Economics, 2009
- Legal insider trading and market efficiencyJournal of Banking & Finance, 2008
- Are Overconfident CEOs Born or Made? Evidence of Self-Attribution Bias from Frequent AcquirersManagement Science, 2008
- The Returns to Repeat AcquirersSSRN Electronic Journal, 2008
- Corporate Takeovers**Surveying the vast area of corporate takeovers is a daunting task, and we have undoubtedly missed many interesting contributions. We apologize to those who feel their research has been left out or improperly characterized, and welcome reactions and comments. Some of the material in Section 3 is also found in Eckbo (2008).2008
- Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm PoliciesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2003
- Breaking up is hard to do? An analysis of termination fee provisions and merger outcomesJournal of Financial Economics, 2003
- Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in TakeoversThe Review of Financial Studies, 2000
- Corporate policies restricting trading by insidersJournal of Financial Economics, 2000