Negative Reason Existentials
- 1 June 2013
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Philosophy Documentation Center in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 2 (2) , 108-116
Abstract
(Schroeder 2007) presents a puzzle about negative reason existentials—claims like ‘There's no reason to cry over spilled milk’. Some of these claims are intuitively true, but we also seem to be committed to the existence of the very reasons that are said not to exist. I argue that Schroeder's own pragmatic solution to this puzzle is unsatisfactory, and propose my own based on a contrastive account of reasons, according to which reasons are fundamentally reasons for one thing rather than another, instead of reasons for things simpliciter, as has been traditionally held.Keywords
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