Bernoulli Factories and Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design
Authors:
Preprint
Abstract
We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces. The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior black-box reductions is that repairing violations of incentive constraints requires understanding the distribution of the mechanism's output. Reductions that instead estimate the output distribution by sampling inevitably suffer from sampling error, which typically precludes exact incentive compatibility. We overcome this barrier by employing and generalizing the computational model in the literature on Bernoulli Factories. In a Bernoulli factory problem, one is given a function mapping the bias of an "input coin" to that of an "output coin", and the challenge is to efficiently simulate the output coin given sample access to the input coin. We generalize this to the "expectations from samples" computational model, in which an instance is specified by a function mapping the expected values of a set of input distributions to a distribution over outcomes. The challenge is to give a polynomial time algorithm that exactly samples from the distribution over outcomes given only sample access to the input distributions. In this model, we give a polynomial time algorithm for the exponential weights: expected values of the input distributions correspond to the weights of alternatives and we wish to select an alternative with probability proportional to an exponential function of its weight. This algorithm is the key ingredient in designing an incentive compatible mechanism for bipartite matching, which can be used to make the approximately incentive compatible reduction of Hartline et al. (2015) exactly incentive compatible.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
- Optimal Linear Bernoulli Factories for Small Mean ProblemsMethodology and Computing in Applied Probability, 2016
- Non-Optimal Mechanism DesignAmerican Economic Review, 2015
- Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchingsGames and Economic Behavior, 2015
- A Dynamic Near-Optimal Algorithm for Online Linear ProgrammingOperations Research, 2014
- An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter AgentsInternet Mathematics, 2004