Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
Authors:
- Claudio MezzettiCMClaudio Mezzetti
- 1 February 2006
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 54 (2) , 261-292
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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