Office and Policy Payoffs in Coalition Governments
Author:
- 1 September 2008
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 14 (5) , 515-538
Abstract
According to theories on coalition formation, parties with a key position in the coalition game receive higher office and policy payoffs than their coalition partners. In this article, I use two models of government-formation — the portfolio allocation model and the political heart model — to identify key players in the coalition game. Both models are modified to incorporate institutional and political constraints on coalition-formation, and the predictions of key parties from the four models are compared with the governments that actually formed in five European countries: Austria (1983—2002), Belgium (1985—2003), Germany (1980— 2005), Ireland (1982—2002) and The Netherlands (1977—2003). I argue that the modified models are preferred to the original ones on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Using the key parties identified by the modified models, I find that if a coalition member is a key party, then it is able to assert its policy views more effectively than its coalition partners can, but, contrary to expectations in the literature, that it is unable to capture a surpassing share of cabinet offices.Keywords
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