Prevention of malware propagation in AMI
Authors:
- 1 October 2013
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 474-479
Abstract
Malware can disrupt the operation of services in advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), which is at risk due to connectivity with the global Internet. In motion, malware may hide within the data payloads of legitimate AMI control traffic, implying the need for deep packet inspection. Some of the inspections one may make look for consistency with respect to data available only at the application layer, requiring one to position the analysis high in the protocol stack. Towards this end we propose a policy engine that examines both ingress and egress traffic to the AMI application layer. Policy engine rules may refer to the structure and behavior of the AMI protocol, and may also perform multi-stage analysis of data payloads looking for evidence that executable code is carried, rather than data. Our experimental results demonstrate that the policy engine is able to accurately distinguish between legitimate traffic and malware bearing traffic.Keywords
This publication has 16 references indexed in Scilit:
- Neighborhood watch2012
- Specification-Based Intrusion Detection for Advanced Metering Infrastructures2011
- Entropy Estimation for Real-Time Encrypted Traffic Identification (Short Paper)2011
- False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids2009
- Embedded Malware Detection Using Markov n-GramsLecture Notes in Computer Science, 2009
- McBoost: Boosting Scalability in Malware Collection and Analysis Using Statistical Classification of Executables2008
- Classification of packed executables for accurate computer virus detectionPattern Recognition Letters, 2008
- A survey on automated dynamic malware-analysis techniques and toolsACM Computing Surveys, 2008
- Using Entropy Analysis to Find Encrypted and Packed MalwareIEEE Security & Privacy, 2007
- Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-timeComputer Networks, 1999