The highs and the lows: bank failures in Sweden through inflation and deflation, 1914–1926
Open Access
- 7 March 2023
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in European Review of Economic History
- Vol. 27 (2) , 223-249
Abstract
This paper revisits the Swedish banking crisis (1919–1926) that materialized as post-war deflation replaced wartime inflation (1914–1918). Inspired by Fisher’s “debt deflation theory,” we employ survival analysis to “predict” which banks would fail, given certain ex-ante bank characteristics. Our tests support the theory; maturity structures mattered most in a regime of falling prices, with vulnerable shorter-term customer loans and bank liabilities representing the most consistent cause of bank distress in the crisis. Similarly, stronger growth in (1) leverage, (2) weaker collateral loans, and (3) foreign borrowing during the boom were all associated with bank failure.Keywords
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