Lawyers and the Structure of Influence in Washington

Authors:
  • RNRobert L. Nelson
    Robert L. Nelson
  • JHJohn P. Heinz
    John P. Heinz
  • ELEdward O. Laumann
    Edward O. Laumann
  • RSRobert H. Salisbury
    Robert H. Salisbury
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Abstract
Despite the widespread perception that lawyers exercise considerable influence over national policy making in the United States, their participation in the process has previously received little systematic empirical analysis. Based on a variety of evidence gathered in interviews with more than eight hundred Washington representatives, including data on their work, careers, contacts with government agencies, networks of acquaintance, and relationships with clients, we argue that lawyers are not as prevalent, active, or influential in national policy making as the popular image suggests. Rather, the findings indicate that lawyers occupy a relatively specialized niche in the system of interest representation, one that allows them to command substantial economic rewards and to maintain a measure of independence and autonomy in their work, but that limits their influence in policy formation.