Common Causes and Decision Theory
Authors:
- Ellery EellsEEEllery Eells
- Elliott SoberESElliott Sober
- 1 June 1986
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 53 (2) , 223-245
Abstract
One of us (Eells 1982) has defended traditional evidential decision theory against prima facie Newcomb counterexamples by assuming that a common cause forms a conjunctive fork with its joint effects. In this paper, the evidential theory is defended without this assumption. The suggested rationale shows that the theory's assumptions are not about the nature of causality, but about the nature of rational deliberation. These presuppositions are weak enough for the argument to count as a strong justification of the evidential theory.Keywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Metatickles and the dynamics of deliberationTheory and Decision, 1984
- Common Cause ExplanationPhilosophy of Science, 1984
- Newcomb's many solutionsTheory and Decision, 1984
- Probabilistic Causality and the Question of TransitivityPhilosophy of Science, 1983
- Causal decision theoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy, 1981
- Acts and conditional probabilitiesTheory and Decision, 1980
- Causal Laws and Effective StrategiesNoûs, 1979
- Why Ask, "Why?"? An Inquiry concerning Scientific ExplanationProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1978
- Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility1978
- The Direction of TimePhysics Today, 1956