Breaking the elected rules in a field experiment on forestry resources
Authors:
- Marco A. JanssenMJMarco A. Janssen
- François BousquetFBFrançois Bousquet
- Juan-Camilo CardenasJCJuan-Camilo Cardenas
- Daniel CastilloDCDaniel Castillo
- Kobchai WorrapimphongKWKobchai Worrapimphong
- 1 June 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 90, 132-139
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (BCS-0432894)
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