Robin Van Den Honert
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Robin Van Den Honert has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Frank Thomalla
Climate and Disaster Risk Research and Consulting, Sydney, Australia
1 shared publication - John McAneney
Risk Frontiers, Macquarie University, North Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia
1 shared publication - Pamela Box
Department of Environment and Geography, Macquarie University, Sydney 2109, Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Flood Risk in Australia: Whose Responsibility Is It, Anyway?
This paper presents research into four key stakeholders in flood risk management in Australia: local councils, the insurance industry, the State Emergency Service (SES), and local residents; examining the perception of their own roles and responsibilities, and those of the other stakeholders. Key informant interviews were conducted in four locations—Brisbane and Emerald, in Queensland, Dora Creek, in New South Wales, and Benalla, in Victoria. We find that understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder varied considerably between research participants. Insurance representatives felt their concerns about increasing flood risk costs were unheeded until the 2010–2011 floods made them the “canary in the coal mine”. Councils felt they had limited options for reducing flood risk. SES representatives felt they were too relied upon for event response, with requests for assistance outstripping their capacity to assist, and many residents were uncertain how to prepare for flood, relying on emergency agencies and the local council to protect them. Key lessons for flood risk management in Australia are (a) an urgent need for all stakeholders to better understand each others’ roles and responsibilities; and (b) residents must take greater responsibility for their own personal protection. Only then can the vision of shared responsibility presented by the 2009 National Strategy for Disaster Resilience be achieved.
Open AccessFlood Risk in Australia: Whose Responsibility Is It, Anyway?
This paper presents research into four key stakeholders in flood risk management in Australia: local councils, the insurance industry, the State Emergency Service (SES), and local residents; examining the perception of their own roles and responsibilities, and those of the other stakeholders. Key informant interviews were conducted in four locations—Brisbane and Emerald, in Queensland, Dora Creek, in New South Wales, and Benalla, in Victoria. We find that understanding of the roles and responsibilities of each stakeholder varied considerably between research participants. Insurance representatives felt their concerns about increasing flood risk costs were unheeded until the 2010–2011 floods made them the “canary in the coal mine”. Councils felt they had limited options for reducing flood risk. SES representatives felt they were too relied upon for event response, with requests for assistance outstripping their capacity to assist, and many residents were uncertain how to prepare for flood, relying on emergency agencies and the local council to protect them. Key lessons for flood risk management in Australia are (a) an urgent need for all stakeholders to better understand each others’ roles and responsibilities; and (b) residents must take greater responsibility for their own personal protection. Only then can the vision of shared responsibility presented by the 2009 National Strategy for Disaster Resilience be achieved.
- 9 August 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Sports Sciences
- Vol. 30 (13) , 1365-1374
Evidence of the relative age effect in football in Australia
The birth date distributions of elite male and female footballers in Australia, from junior youth (age 14 and upwards) to senior (professional) players, were examined. A statistically significant relative age effect was found among junior male players, reducing in effect with increasing age. An inter-year relative age effect that became apparent among the players at national level in the Under-17 and Under-20 age groups, due to the timing of the respective World Cups for those age groups, was also identified. It is conjectured that this might lead to players born in certain years having a curtailed pathway in the elite game, leading to drop-out among this very elite group. In the case of women elite players, no significant relative age effect was found among youth players, possibly due to less fierce competition for places, although a significant effect was found to exist at senior elite level.
- 9 August 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Sports Sciences
- Vol. 30 (13) , 1365-1374
Evidence of the relative age effect in football in Australia
The birth date distributions of elite male and female footballers in Australia, from junior youth (age 14 and upwards) to senior (professional) players, were examined. A statistically significant relative age effect was found among junior male players, reducing in effect with increasing age. An inter-year relative age effect that became apparent among the players at national level in the Under-17 and Under-20 age groups, due to the timing of the respective World Cups for those age groups, was also identified. It is conjectured that this might lead to players born in certain years having a curtailed pathway in the elite game, leading to drop-out among this very elite group. In the case of women elite players, no significant relative age effect was found among youth players, possibly due to less fierce competition for places, although a significant effect was found to exist at senior elite level.
- Open Access
The 2011 Brisbane Floods: Causes, Impacts and Implications
On 13th January 2011 major flooding occurred throughout most of the Brisbane River catchment, most severely in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Creek catchment (where 23 people drowned), the Bremer River catchment and in Brisbane, the state capital of Queensland. Some 56,200 claims have been received by insurers with payouts totalling $2.55 billion. This paper backgrounds weather and climatic factors implicated in the flooding and the historical flood experience of Brisbane. We examine the time history of water releases from the Wivenhoe dam, which have been accused of aggravating damage downstream. The dam was built in response to even worse flooding in 1974 and now serves as Brisbane’s main water supply. In our analysis, the dam operators made sub-optimal decisions by neglecting forecasts of further rainfall and assuming a ‘no rainfall’ scenario. Questions have also been raised about the availability of insurance cover for riverine flood, and the Queensland government’s decision not to insure its infrastructure. These and other questions have led to Federal and State government inquiries. We argue that insurance is a form of risk transfer for the residual risk following risk management efforts and cannot in itself be a solution for poor land-use planning. With this in mind, we discuss the need for risk-related insurance premiums to encourage flood risk mitigating behaviours by all actors, and for transparency in the availability of flood maps. Examples of good flood risk management to arise from this flood are described.
Open AccessThe 2011 Brisbane Floods: Causes, Impacts and Implications
On 13th January 2011 major flooding occurred throughout most of the Brisbane River catchment, most severely in Toowoomba and the Lockyer Creek catchment (where 23 people drowned), the Bremer River catchment and in Brisbane, the state capital of Queensland. Some 56,200 claims have been received by insurers with payouts totalling $2.55 billion. This paper backgrounds weather and climatic factors implicated in the flooding and the historical flood experience of Brisbane. We examine the time history of water releases from the Wivenhoe dam, which have been accused of aggravating damage downstream. The dam was built in response to even worse flooding in 1974 and now serves as Brisbane’s main water supply. In our analysis, the dam operators made sub-optimal decisions by neglecting forecasts of further rainfall and assuming a ‘no rainfall’ scenario. Questions have also been raised about the availability of insurance cover for riverine flood, and the Queensland government’s decision not to insure its infrastructure. These and other questions have led to Federal and State government inquiries. We argue that insurance is a form of risk transfer for the residual risk following risk management efforts and cannot in itself be a solution for poor land-use planning. With this in mind, we discuss the need for risk-related insurance premiums to encourage flood risk mitigating behaviours by all actors, and for transparency in the availability of flood maps. Examples of good flood risk management to arise from this flood are described.