FHFrank Hindriks

Frank Hindriks

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Frank Hindriks has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Threshold contractualism

    by Frank Hindriks

    The Inefficacy Problem concerns morally significant outcomes that require contributions from several agents. The worry is that, insofar as none of the agents makes a difference to the outcome, their contributions lack moral significance. Existing solutions to this problem are Kantian or consequentialist. This chapter proposes a contractualist solution, called ‘Threshold Contractualism.’ It revolves around the probability with which an action makes a difference to a morally desirable outcome. If this probability exceeds a threshold, agents have a pro tanto obligation to contribute to it. It is argued that this solution is plausible, novel, and distinct. In particular, Threshold Contractualism does not allow for interpersonal aggregation but respects the separateness of persons.

  • Open Access

    In Praise of Collective Agents

    by Frank Hindriks, Niels De Haan

    Collective agents can be praiseworthy without any of their members being praiseworthy. To support this “discontinuity thesis,” we consider the role that motivation plays in the attribution of moral responsibility. An agent who is praiseworthy must have had the appropriate moral motivation. We argue that it is possible that the collective agent was appropriately motivated, while its members were not. Subsequently, we develop an account of corporate moral concern, which gives substance to this second discontinuity thesis, about the moral motivation of collective agents.


  • Social Practices

    by Frank Hindriks

    Social practices consist of behavioral regularities. These are generated by interdependent rules that are generally acknowledged. Furthermore, social practices constrain and enable. In particular, conventions create new ways of coordinating behaviors with mutually beneficial outcomes. They do so by means of signaling rules, which feature signaling devices, such as traffic lights or wedding rings. In addition to this, social practices and social groups are two sides of the same coin. For instance, signaling rules that constitute social practices also give rise to social groups, such as traffic participants and married people. Finally, both social practices and social groups are irreducibly collective. They can persist through individual change and they can enter into causal relations.

  • Introduction

    by Frank Hindriks

    A society should be such that human beings are free, equal, and autonomous. To investigate how these values are to be realized, this chapter develops a social ontology of society and the social structures of which it consists. They are irreducibly collective and constrain their participants. This Introduction presents the two main questions of the book. First, do structural constraints preclude individual autonomy? Second, do autonomous collective agents pose a threat to the idea that human beings have distinct and unique value? It answers these questions against the ideal of a liberal democracy. If it is to realize the three core liberal values in a robust manner, such a democracy should be an open society. This does not only require a liberal structure but also a liberal culture. People must respect each other as equals and accept each other’s interests and identities as politically legitimate. Furthermore, at least a sizeable proportion of them must have an inclusive and tolerant mentality. This open mentality serves to counter the tribal tendencies that threaten to undermine the open society.

  • Social Institutions

    by Frank Hindriks

    An institution is a social norm that governs a social practice. For a norm to be in force, its participants have to acknowledge a deontic rule, which features rights or obligations. But they do not have to regard it as valid. Furthermore, a norm can govern a practice even if the agents do not comply with it. All that is required is that the norm motivates them to do so to a nontrivial extent. So, institutions differ from ordinary social practices in that their rules need not be in equilibrium. Institutional or status objects, such as dollar bills and wedding rings, are social constructs. They arise from the interplay between attitudes and actions that concern pieces of paper and metal. Furthermore, the latter constitute the former. This means that status objects are irreducibly social. Finally, they can solve multiple closely intertwined collective action problems at the same time. If they do so, status kinds are natural or real kinds.

  • Conclusion

    by Frank Hindriks

    In a liberal and open society, moral persons are free, equal, and autonomous. Such a society consists of social structures that secure basic rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of religion. I have developed the Rules-and-Equilibria Framework for social structures. Because it supports Ontological Holism, I have asked whether it undermines Normative Individualism, the core commitment of liberalism. However, even though they are irreducibly collective, social structures can enable individual actions and sustain human autonomy. Furthermore, although they can be moral agents, collective agents cannot be moral persons. And this rules out corporate autonomy. But there are other threats to the open society, including tribal communities and structural injustices. To avert them, individuals can embrace a liberal ethos and adopt an open mentality.

  • Collective Agents

    by Frank Hindriks

    Collective agents consist of individuals who engage in centrally coordinated cooperation for the collective production of goods. To this end, they rely on a trio of constitutive rules: a collective decision procedure, a system of roles, and a membership rule. Those rules give rise to new equilibria that generate collective benefits. This explains why collective agents tend to persist over time and why they have causal powers of their own. I go on to discuss collective agents that have legal statuses, such as that of a corporation or a university. They pose two problems. First, it seems that such ‘status agents’ can be where their members are not. If so, they cannot be constituted by them, as constituted and constituting objects have the same location. Second, legal persons can come into existence before their founders have organized themselves. This challenges the idea that they are agents. This chapter argues that, in spite of this, status agents have a robust ontological standing. This chapter completes the Rules-and-Equilibria Framework and supports the claim that all social structures can be analyzed in terms of rules and equilibria.