Luo-Luo Jiang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Luo-Luo Jiang has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Bing-Hong Wang
Wenzhou University
3 shared publications- Matjaž Perc
University of Maribor
3 shared publications Sen Nie
School of Electrical and Automation Engineering, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang, Jiangxi 330013, People's Republic of China
3 shared publications- Xu-Wen Wang
Harvard Medical School Channing Division of Network Medicine, Department of Medicine, Brigham and Women’s Hospital Boston, MA 02115
3 shared publications - Bing-Hong Wang
Department of Modern Physics University of Science and Technology of China 230026 Hefei P. R. China
2 shared publications Attila Szolnoki
Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science Research Centre for Natural Sciences Hungarian Academy of Sciences Budapest Hungary
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Loss impresses human beings more than gain in the decision-making game
What happen in the brain when human beings play games with computers? Here a simple zero-sum game was conducted to investigate how people make decision via their brain even they know that their opponent is a computer. There are two choices (a low or high number) for people and also two strategies for the computer (red color or green color). When the number selected by the human subject meet the red color, the person loses the score which is equal to the number. On the contrary, the person gains the number of score if the computer chooses a green color for the number selected by the human being. Both the human subject and the computer give their choice at the same time, and subjects have been told that the computer make its decision randomly on the red color or green color. During the experiments, the signal of electroencephalograph (EEG) obtained from brain of subjects was recorded. From the analysis of EEG, we find that people mind the loss more than the gain, and the phenomenon becoming obvious when the gap between loss and gain grows. In addition, the signal of EEG is clearly distinguishable before making different decisions. It is observed that significant negative waves in the entire brain region when the participant has a greater expectation for the outcome, and these negative waves are mainly concentrated in the forebrain region in the brain of human beings.
Open AccessLoss impresses human beings more than gain in the decision-making game
What happen in the brain when human beings play games with computers? Here a simple zero-sum game was conducted to investigate how people make decision via their brain even they know that their opponent is a computer. There are two choices (a low or high number) for people and also two strategies for the computer (red color or green color). When the number selected by the human subject meet the red color, the person loses the score which is equal to the number. On the contrary, the person gains the number of score if the computer chooses a green color for the number selected by the human being. Both the human subject and the computer give their choice at the same time, and subjects have been told that the computer make its decision randomly on the red color or green color. During the experiments, the signal of electroencephalograph (EEG) obtained from brain of subjects was recorded. From the analysis of EEG, we find that people mind the loss more than the gain, and the phenomenon becoming obvious when the gap between loss and gain grows. In addition, the signal of EEG is clearly distinguishable before making different decisions. It is observed that significant negative waves in the entire brain region when the participant has a greater expectation for the outcome, and these negative waves are mainly concentrated in the forebrain region in the brain of human beings.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
- Vol. 2016 (12) , 123403
Cooperation transition of spatial public goods games
In the public goods games, players attempt to optimize their payoffs, following as fair, generous, and extortionate rules according to the pattern needed for obtaining their expected profits compared to those of their opponents. In first type of rule (the fair one), players seek equal profits of the opponent, and the generous rule induces to lower payoff than that of opposite players, while the extortionate rule leads to higher payoffs than that of their opponents. To model the three types of behaviors, we introduce a conditional strategy with a parameter χ, which control conditions of existence of the three behaviors. Therefore, players may contribute in a group, but may not contribute in the other group, because it depends on conditions of their opponents. Simulation results show that there exists a pure cooperation state when parameter χ is moderate, even for a lower multiplication factor. Because conditional players cautiously contribute they can form compact clusters to prevent the invasion of defection and finally spread the cooperation when defectors die out.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by IOP Publishing in Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment
- Vol. 2016 (12) , 123403
Cooperation transition of spatial public goods games
In the public goods games, players attempt to optimize their payoffs, following as fair, generous, and extortionate rules according to the pattern needed for obtaining their expected profits compared to those of their opponents. In first type of rule (the fair one), players seek equal profits of the opponent, and the generous rule induces to lower payoff than that of opposite players, while the extortionate rule leads to higher payoffs than that of their opponents. To model the three types of behaviors, we introduce a conditional strategy with a parameter χ, which control conditions of existence of the three behaviors. Therefore, players may contribute in a group, but may not contribute in the other group, because it depends on conditions of their opponents. Simulation results show that there exists a pure cooperation state when parameter χ is moderate, even for a lower multiplication factor. Because conditional players cautiously contribute they can form compact clusters to prevent the invasion of defection and finally spread the cooperation when defectors die out.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2016
- Published by IOP Publishing in New Journal of Physics
- Vol. 18 (10) , 103025
Promoting cooperation through fast response to defection in spatial games
- 1 October 2016
- Published by IOP Publishing in New Journal of Physics
- Vol. 18 (10) , 103025
Open AccessPromoting cooperation through fast response to defection in spatial games
- Open Access
- 11 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 6 (1) , 23952
Effect of correlations on controllability transition in network control
The network control problem has recently attracted an increasing amount of attention, owing to concerns including the avoidance of cascading failures of power-grids and the management of ecological networks. It has been proven that numerical control can be achieved if the number of control inputs exceeds a certain transition point. In the present study, we investigate the effect of degree correlation on the numerical controllability in networks whose topological structures are reconstructed from both real and modeling systems, and we find that the transition point of the number of control inputs depends strongly on the degree correlation in both undirected and directed networks with moderately sparse links. More interestingly, the effect of the degree correlation on the transition point cannot be observed in dense networks for numerical controllability, which contrasts with the corresponding result for structural controllability. In particular, for directed random networks and scale-free networks, the influence of the degree correlation is determined by the types of correlations. Our approach provides an understanding of control problems in complex sparse networks.
- 11 April 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 6 (1) , 23952
Open AccessEffect of correlations on controllability transition in network control
The network control problem has recently attracted an increasing amount of attention, owing to concerns including the avoidance of cascading failures of power-grids and the management of ecological networks. It has been proven that numerical control can be achieved if the number of control inputs exceeds a certain transition point. In the present study, we investigate the effect of degree correlation on the numerical controllability in networks whose topological structures are reconstructed from both real and modeling systems, and we find that the transition point of the number of control inputs depends strongly on the degree correlation in both undirected and directed networks with moderately sparse links. More interestingly, the effect of the degree correlation on the transition point cannot be observed in dense networks for numerical controllability, which contrasts with the corresponding result for structural controllability. In particular, for directed random networks and scale-free networks, the influence of the degree correlation is determined by the types of correlations. Our approach provides an understanding of control problems in complex sparse networks.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 5 (1) , 14657
Multiple effect of social influence on cooperation in interdependent network games
The social influence exists widely in the human society, where individual decision-making process (from congressional election to electronic commerce) may be affected by the attitude and behavior of others belonging to different social networks. Here, we couple the snowdrift (SD) game and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game on two interdependent networks, where strategies in both games are associated by social influence to mimick the majority rule. More accurately, individuals’ strategies updating refers to social learning (based on payoff difference) and above-mentioned social influence (related with environment of interdependent group), which is controlled by social influence strength s. Setting s = 0 decouples the networks and returns the traditional network game; while its increase involves the interactions between networks. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we find that such a mechanism brings multiple influence to the evolution of cooperation. Small s leads to unequal cooperation level in both games, because social learning is still the main updating rule for most players. Though intermediate and large s guarantees the synchronized evolution of strategy pairs, cooperation finally dies out and reaches a completely dominance in both cases. Interestingly, these observations are attributed to the expansion of cooperation clusters. Our work may provide a new understanding to the emergence of cooperation in intercorrelated social systems.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 5 (1) , 14657
Open AccessMultiple effect of social influence on cooperation in interdependent network games
The social influence exists widely in the human society, where individual decision-making process (from congressional election to electronic commerce) may be affected by the attitude and behavior of others belonging to different social networks. Here, we couple the snowdrift (SD) game and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game on two interdependent networks, where strategies in both games are associated by social influence to mimick the majority rule. More accurately, individuals’ strategies updating refers to social learning (based on payoff difference) and above-mentioned social influence (related with environment of interdependent group), which is controlled by social influence strength s. Setting s = 0 decouples the networks and returns the traditional network game; while its increase involves the interactions between networks. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we find that such a mechanism brings multiple influence to the evolution of cooperation. Small s leads to unequal cooperation level in both games, because social learning is still the main updating rule for most players. Though intermediate and large s guarantees the synchronized evolution of strategy pairs, cooperation finally dies out and reaches a completely dominance in both cases. Interestingly, these observations are attributed to the expansion of cooperation clusters. Our work may provide a new understanding to the emergence of cooperation in intercorrelated social systems.
- Open Access
- 17 December 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 4 (1) , 7577
Bidirectional selection between two classes in complex social networks
The bidirectional selection between two classes widely emerges in various social lives, such as commercial trading and mate choosing. Until now, the discussions on bidirectional selection in structured human society are quite limited. We demonstrated theoretically that the rate of successfully matching is affected greatly by individuals' neighborhoods in social networks, regardless of the type of networks. Furthermore, it is found that the high average degree of networks contributes to increasing rates of successful matches. The matching performance in different types of networks has been quantitatively investigated, revealing that the small-world networks reinforces the matching rate more than scale-free networks at given average degree. In addition, our analysis is consistent with the modeling result, which provides the theoretical understanding of underlying mechanisms of matching in complex networks.
- 17 December 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 4 (1) , 7577
Open AccessBidirectional selection between two classes in complex social networks
The bidirectional selection between two classes widely emerges in various social lives, such as commercial trading and mate choosing. Until now, the discussions on bidirectional selection in structured human society are quite limited. We demonstrated theoretically that the rate of successfully matching is affected greatly by individuals' neighborhoods in social networks, regardless of the type of networks. Furthermore, it is found that the high average degree of networks contributes to increasing rates of successful matches. The matching performance in different types of networks has been quantitatively investigated, revealing that the small-world networks reinforces the matching rate more than scale-free networks at given average degree. In addition, our analysis is consistent with the modeling result, which provides the theoretical understanding of underlying mechanisms of matching in complex networks.
- Open Access
Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
Open AccessSpreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
- Open Access
- 21 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 3 (1) , srep02483
Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
- 21 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 3 (1) , srep02483
Open AccessSpreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
- Open Access
- 31 May 2013
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 8 (5) , e64677
If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game
Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
- 31 May 2013
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 8 (5) , e64677
Open AccessIf Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game
Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
- Open Access
If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game
Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
Open AccessIf cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game
Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.