LJLuo-Luo Jiang

Luo-Luo Jiang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Luo-Luo Jiang has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Loss impresses human beings more than gain in the decision-making game

    by Jia Quan Shen, Luo-Luo Jiang

    What happen in the brain when human beings play games with computers? Here a simple zero-sum game was conducted to investigate how people make decision via their brain even they know that their opponent is a computer. There are two choices (a low or high number) for people and also two strategies for the computer (red color or green color). When the number selected by the human subject meet the red color, the person loses the score which is equal to the number. On the contrary, the person gains the number of score if the computer chooses a green color for the number selected by the human being. Both the human subject and the computer give their choice at the same time, and subjects have been told that the computer make its decision randomly on the red color or green color. During the experiments, the signal of electroencephalograph (EEG) obtained from brain of subjects was recorded. From the analysis of EEG, we find that people mind the loss more than the gain, and the phenomenon becoming obvious when the gap between loss and gain grows. In addition, the signal of EEG is clearly distinguishable before making different decisions. It is observed that significant negative waves in the entire brain region when the participant has a greater expectation for the outcome, and these negative waves are mainly concentrated in the forebrain region in the brain of human beings.

  • Cooperation transition of spatial public goods games

    by Xu-Wen Wang, Sen Nie, Luo-Luo Jiang, Bing-Hong Wang

    In the public goods games, players attempt to optimize their payoffs, following as fair, generous, and extortionate rules according to the pattern needed for obtaining their expected profits compared to those of their opponents. In first type of rule (the fair one), players seek equal profits of the opponent, and the generous rule induces to lower payoff than that of opposite players, while the extortionate rule leads to higher payoffs than that of their opponents. To model the three types of behaviors, we introduce a conditional strategy with a parameter χ, which control conditions of existence of the three behaviors. Therefore, players may contribute in a group, but may not contribute in the other group, because it depends on conditions of their opponents. Simulation results show that there exists a pure cooperation state when parameter χ is moderate, even for a lower multiplication factor. Because conditional players cautiously contribute they can form compact clusters to prevent the invasion of defection and finally spread the cooperation when defectors die out.


  • Open Access

    Promoting cooperation through fast response to defection in spatial games

    by Xu-Wen Wang, Luo-Luo Jiang, Sen Nie, Shi-Ming Chen, Bing-Hong Wang


  • Open Access

    Effect of correlations on controllability transition in network control

    by Sen Nie, Xu-Wen Wang, Bing-Hong Wang, Luo-Luo Jiang

    The network control problem has recently attracted an increasing amount of attention, owing to concerns including the avoidance of cascading failures of power-grids and the management of ecological networks. It has been proven that numerical control can be achieved if the number of control inputs exceeds a certain transition point. In the present study, we investigate the effect of degree correlation on the numerical controllability in networks whose topological structures are reconstructed from both real and modeling systems, and we find that the transition point of the number of control inputs depends strongly on the degree correlation in both undirected and directed networks with moderately sparse links. More interestingly, the effect of the degree correlation on the transition point cannot be observed in dense networks for numerical controllability, which contrasts with the corresponding result for structural controllability. In particular, for directed random networks and scale-free networks, the influence of the degree correlation is determined by the types of correlations. Our approach provides an understanding of control problems in complex sparse networks.


  • Open Access

    Multiple effect of social influence on cooperation in interdependent network games

    by Luo-Luo Jiang, Wen-Jing Li, Zhen Wang

    The social influence exists widely in the human society, where individual decision-making process (from congressional election to electronic commerce) may be affected by the attitude and behavior of others belonging to different social networks. Here, we couple the snowdrift (SD) game and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game on two interdependent networks, where strategies in both games are associated by social influence to mimick the majority rule. More accurately, individuals’ strategies updating refers to social learning (based on payoff difference) and above-mentioned social influence (related with environment of interdependent group), which is controlled by social influence strength s. Setting s = 0 decouples the networks and returns the traditional network game; while its increase involves the interactions between networks. By means of numerous Monte Carlo simulations, we find that such a mechanism brings multiple influence to the evolution of cooperation. Small s leads to unequal cooperation level in both games, because social learning is still the main updating rule for most players. Though intermediate and large s guarantees the synchronized evolution of strategy pairs, cooperation finally dies out and reaches a completely dominance in both cases. Interestingly, these observations are attributed to the expansion of cooperation clusters. Our work may provide a new understanding to the emergence of cooperation in intercorrelated social systems.


  • Open Access

    Bidirectional selection between two classes in complex social networks

    by Bin Zhou, Zhe He, Luo-Luo Jiang, Nian-Xin Wang, Bing-Hong Wang

    The bidirectional selection between two classes widely emerges in various social lives, such as commercial trading and mate choosing. Until now, the discussions on bidirectional selection in structured human society are quite limited. We demonstrated theoretically that the rate of successfully matching is affected greatly by individuals' neighborhoods in social networks, regardless of the type of networks. Furthermore, it is found that the high average degree of networks contributes to increasing rates of successful matches. The matching performance in different types of networks has been quantitatively investigated, revealing that the small-world networks reinforces the matching rate more than scale-free networks at given average degree. In addition, our analysis is consistent with the modeling result, which provides the theoretical understanding of underlying mechanisms of matching in complex networks.


  • Open Access

    Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups

    by Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaz Perc

    Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.

  • Open Access

    Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups

    by Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc

    Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.


  • Open Access

    If Cooperation Is Likely Punish Mildly: Insights from Economic Experiments Based on the Snowdrift Game

    by Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki

    Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.


  • Open Access

    If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

    by Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaz Perc, Attila Szolnoki

    Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.