Alejo Salles
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Alejo Salles has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Mariano Sigman
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella, CONICET, Laboratorio de Neurociencia, Buenos Aires, Argentina
3 shared publications - Cecilia Ines Calero
Laboratorio de Neurociencia, Universidad Torcuato di Tella, Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina
1 shared publication - Florent Meyniel
Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, INSERM, CEA, Université Paris-Saclay, NeuroSpin center
1 shared publication - Luciano Paz
PLC Tech d.o.o., Slovenia
1 shared publication - Mariano Semelman
Laboratorio de Neurociencia Integrativa, Departamento de Física, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales, Universidad de Buenos Aires Buenos Aires, Argentina
1 shared publication - Pablo Tano
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Ciencias Exactas y Naturales
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Variability in prior expectations explains biases in confidence reports
Confidence in a decision is defined statistically as the probability of that decision being correct. Humans, however, display systematic confidence biases, as has been exposed in various experiments. Here, we show that these biases vanish when taking into account participants' prior expectations, which we measure independently of the confidence report. We use a wagering experiment to show that modeling subjects' choices allows for classifying individuals according to their prior biases, which fully explain from first principles the differences in their later confidence reports. Our parameter-free confidence model predicts two counterintuitive patterns for individuals with different prior beliefs: pessimists should report higher confidence than optimists, and, for the same task difficulty, the confidence of pessimists should increase with the generosity of the task. These findings show how systematic confidence biases can be simply understood as differences in prior expectations.
Open AccessVariability in prior expectations explains biases in confidence reports
Confidence in a decision is defined statistically as the probability of that decision being correct. Humans, however, display systematic confidence biases, as has been exposed in various experiments. Here, we show that these biases vanish when taking into account participants' prior expectations, which we measure independently of the confidence report. We use a wagering experiment to show that modeling subjects' choices allows for classifying individuals according to their prior biases, which fully explain from first principles the differences in their later confidence reports. Our parameter-free confidence model predicts two counterintuitive patterns for individuals with different prior beliefs: pessimists should report higher confidence than optimists, and, for the same task difficulty, the confidence of pessimists should increase with the generosity of the task. These findings show how systematic confidence biases can be simply understood as differences in prior expectations.
- Open Access
Decision confidence as a mapping of bayesian posterior belief
We study the confidence response distributions for several two alternative forced choice tasks with different structure, and assess whether their behavioral responses are accurately accounted for as a mapping from bayesian inferred probability of having made a correct choice. We propose an extension to an existing bayesian decision making model that allows us to quantitatively compare the relative quality of different function mappings from bayesian belief onto responded confidence. We find that a simple linear rescaling from bayesian belief best fits the observed response distributions. Furthermore, the parameter values allow us to study how task structure affects differently the decision policy and confidence mapping, highlighting a dissociable effect between confidence and perceptual performance.
Open AccessDecision confidence as a mapping of bayesian posterior belief
We study the confidence response distributions for several two alternative forced choice tasks with different structure, and assess whether their behavioral responses are accurately accounted for as a mapping from bayesian inferred probability of having made a correct choice. We propose an extension to an existing bayesian decision making model that allows us to quantitatively compare the relative quality of different function mappings from bayesian belief onto responded confidence. We find that a simple linear rescaling from bayesian belief best fits the observed response distributions. Furthermore, the parameter values allow us to study how task structure affects differently the decision policy and confidence mapping, highlighting a dissociable effect between confidence and perceptual performance.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Vol. 7, 281
Age and gender dependent development of Theory of Mind in 6- to 8-years old children
The ability to attribute different mental states to distinct individuals, or Theory of Mind (ToM), is widely believed to be developed mostly during preschool years. How different factors such as gender, number of siblings or coarse personality traits affect this development is not entirely agreed upon. Here, we introduce a computerized version of the scaled ToM suite of tasks introduced by Wellman and Liu (2004), which allows us to meaningfully test ToM development on children 6 to 8-years old. We find that kids this age are still not entirely proficient in all ToM tasks, and continue to show a progression of performance with age. By testing this age range, too, we are able to observe a significant advantage of girls over boys in ToM performance. Other factors such as number of siblings, birth order, and coarse personality traits show no significant relation with the ToM task results. Finally, we introduce a novel way to quantify the scaling property of the suite involving a sequence of set inclusions and also, a comparison between specially tailored sets of logistic models. These measures confirm the validity of the scale in the 6 to 8-years old range.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Vol. 7, 281
Open AccessAge and gender dependent development of Theory of Mind in 6- to 8-years old children
The ability to attribute different mental states to distinct individuals, or Theory of Mind (ToM), is widely believed to be developed mostly during preschool years. How different factors such as gender, number of siblings or coarse personality traits affect this development is not entirely agreed upon. Here, we introduce a computerized version of the scaled ToM suite of tasks introduced by Wellman and Liu (2004), which allows us to meaningfully test ToM development on children 6 to 8-years old. We find that kids this age are still not entirely proficient in all ToM tasks, and continue to show a progression of performance with age. By testing this age range, too, we are able to observe a significant advantage of girls over boys in ToM performance. Other factors such as number of siblings, birth order, and coarse personality traits show no significant relation with the ToM task results. Finally, we introduce a novel way to quantify the scaling property of the suite involving a sequence of set inclusions and also, a comparison between specially tailored sets of logistic models. These measures confirm the validity of the scale in the 6 to 8-years old range.