Tim Shallice

Two views on the semantics of concrete words are that their core mental representations are feature-based or are reconstructions of sensory experience. We argue that neither of these approaches is capable of representing the semantics of abstract words, which involve the representation of possibly hypothetical physical and mental states, the binding of entities within a structure, and the possible use of embedding (or recursion) in such structures. Brain based evidence in the form of dissociations between deficits related to concrete and abstract semantics corroborates the hypothesis. Neuroimaging evidence suggests that left lateral inferior frontal cortex supports those processes responsible for the representation of abstract words.

We studied the ability of patients with lesions arising from operation for an anterior or posterior (left or right) brain tumour to read a set of words and pronounceable nonwords. In line with previous works, we observed that damage to the left posterior or left anterior cortex can give rise to phonological alexia, where the reading performance of nonwords is affected more than that of words. More surprisingly, similar effects were found in the right posterior group. However, there were significant differences in the error types, for both complex and positional errors, between phonological alexic patients in the three location groups. The findings present difficulties for the position held by theorists of the triangle model that phonological alexia arises from impairments in the language production system or in a general-purpose orthographic–phonological translation system. They also pose new questions about the possible role of the right posterior cortex in letter sequence representation.

The paper addresses a weakness in the Schwartz and Dell paper (2010)—namely, its discussion of the inclusion criteria for case series. The paper distinguishes the different types that exist and how they constrain the theoretical conclusions that one can draw about the organization of the normal cognitive system. Four different types of inclusion criteria are considered. Two are those treated by Schwartz and Dell—namely, theoretically derived clinical criteria, such as the example of semantic dementia, and broad clinical criteria such as the presence of aphasia. In addition, in the present paper two different types of anatomically based criteria are assessed—those using anatomical regions selected a priori and also regions selected as a result of an anatomical group study analysis. Putative functional syndromes are argued to be the empirical building blocks for cognitive neuropsychology. Anatomically based case series can aid in their construction or in their fractionation.

This is a rejoinder in response to the book review by Max Coltheart on the book The Organization of Mind, edited by Tim Shallice and Richard P. Cooper, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 608. ISBN 978-0-19-957924-2.

This chapter addresses whether the rejection of Fodor's pessimism in his core domain of thinking has been justified. It begins by considering one of the simplest forms of thinking, namely reasoning with relations. It then discusses reasoning by analogy; deductive inference; goal-directed problem solving; rule induction; hypothesis generation and lateral thinking; insight and restructuring; and towards a unified account of thinking and reasoning.

This chapter on consciousness discusses the following: non-conscious processes; unconscious specific effects of insufficiently specific experiences; completely unconscious specific effects; neural correlates of conscious experience; phenomenology; the potential applications of a theory of consciousness; what a theory of consciousness must explain; the activation strength/quality of the representation and related theories of consciousness; type C processes; the global workspace approach; and the functional role of consciousness.