Kristen Intemann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kristen Intemann has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Inmaculada de Melo-Martín
Division of Medical Ethics, Weill Cornell Medicine—Cornell University, New York, USA
20 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (3) , 1-17
On masks and masking: epistemic harms and science communication
- 6 September 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (3) , 1-17
On masks and masking: epistemic harms and science communication
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 13 (3) , 1-18
Socially responsible science: Exploring the complexities
Philosophers of science, particularly those working on science and values, often talk about the need for science to be socially responsible. However, what this means is not clear. In this paper, we review the contributions of philosophers of science to the debate over socially responsible science and explore the dimensions that a fruitful account of socially responsible science should address. Our review shows that offering a comprehensive account is difficult. We contend that broad calls for socially responsible science that fail to attend to relevant dimensions are not the solution, as they preclude meaningful changes to research institutions and practices. We conclude that narrower, more explicit accounts are more likely to lead to substantive transformation.
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 13 (3) , 1-18
Socially responsible science: Exploring the complexities
Philosophers of science, particularly those working on science and values, often talk about the need for science to be socially responsible. However, what this means is not clear. In this paper, we review the contributions of philosophers of science to the debate over socially responsible science and explore the dimensions that a fruitful account of socially responsible science should address. Our review shows that offering a comprehensive account is difficult. We contend that broad calls for socially responsible science that fail to attend to relevant dimensions are not the solution, as they preclude meaningful changes to research institutions and practices. We conclude that narrower, more explicit accounts are more likely to lead to substantive transformation.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Scientific Practices and the Erosion of Trust
This chapter discusses some social and institutional factors related to the practice of science that cast doubt on the trustworthiness of scientists and thus contribute to undermining the trust that people place in the scientific community and its claims. Specifically, it explores the roles played by the increasing commercialization of science, with its effect on the common good and on conflicts of interests, and by scientific misconduct in eroding public trust. It explains why this occurs and provides evidence to support the claim that trust has, in fact, been undermined as the result of these factors. It also suggests strategies for changing these trust-undermining practices so as to better facilitate and maintain warranted public trust in scientific communities.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Scientific Practices and the Erosion of Trust
This chapter discusses some social and institutional factors related to the practice of science that cast doubt on the trustworthiness of scientists and thus contribute to undermining the trust that people place in the scientific community and its claims. Specifically, it explores the roles played by the increasing commercialization of science, with its effect on the common good and on conflicts of interests, and by scientific misconduct in eroding public trust. It explains why this occurs and provides evidence to support the claim that trust has, in fact, been undermined as the result of these factors. It also suggests strategies for changing these trust-undermining practices so as to better facilitate and maintain warranted public trust in scientific communities.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Values in Science and the Erosion of Trust
This chapter considers another factor that plays a role in eroding the public’s trust in science: concerns about the negative influence of nonepistemic values in science, particularly in controversial areas of inquiry with important effects on public policy. It shows that the credibility of scientists can be undermined when the public perceives that scientists have a political agenda or will be biased by their own personal or political values. However, to assume that the best way to address this problem is try to eliminate such values from science altogether would be a mistake. Ethical and social values are necessary and important to knowledge production. Consequently, the chapter explores alternative strategies to increase transparency and stakeholder involvement so as to address legitimate concerns about bias and sustain warranted trust in scientific communities.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Values in Science and the Erosion of Trust
This chapter considers another factor that plays a role in eroding the public’s trust in science: concerns about the negative influence of nonepistemic values in science, particularly in controversial areas of inquiry with important effects on public policy. It shows that the credibility of scientists can be undermined when the public perceives that scientists have a political agenda or will be biased by their own personal or political values. However, to assume that the best way to address this problem is try to eliminate such values from science altogether would be a mistake. Ethical and social values are necessary and important to knowledge production. Consequently, the chapter explores alternative strategies to increase transparency and stakeholder involvement so as to address legitimate concerns about bias and sustain warranted trust in scientific communities.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
The Relevance of Trust
This chapter offers a brief overview of the importance of epistemic trust and the relevance that scientific institutions and practices have in promoting or undermining warranted public trust. Epistemic trust is crucial for the production of scientific knowledge, the ability of the public to make sense of scientific phenomena, and the development of public policy. Normatively inappropriate dissent is more likely to take hold and erroneously affect people’s beliefs and actions in a context where the trustworthiness of scientists is called into question and where there is an excessive reliance on scientific information when it comes to assessing policy decisions. Thus, finding ways to facilitate and sustain warranted epistemic trust, as well as increasing understanding of the proper role of science in public policy decisions can help mitigate the negative impact of dissenting views.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
The Relevance of Trust
This chapter offers a brief overview of the importance of epistemic trust and the relevance that scientific institutions and practices have in promoting or undermining warranted public trust. Epistemic trust is crucial for the production of scientific knowledge, the ability of the public to make sense of scientific phenomena, and the development of public policy. Normatively inappropriate dissent is more likely to take hold and erroneously affect people’s beliefs and actions in a context where the trustworthiness of scientists is called into question and where there is an excessive reliance on scientific information when it comes to assessing policy decisions. Thus, finding ways to facilitate and sustain warranted epistemic trust, as well as increasing understanding of the proper role of science in public policy decisions can help mitigate the negative impact of dissenting views.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Dealing with Normatively Inappropriate Dissent
This chapter considers whether the reliable identification of normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) would be helpful in addressing many of the adverse epistemic and social impacts that can result from it. It considers a variety of ways in which such identification could be used to minimize the epistemic and social damages that NID can inflict, including prohibiting the dissent in question, targeting it for special scrutiny, placing limits on scientists’ epistemic obligations, guiding public beliefs, emphasizing the existence of a consensus, and discrediting dissenters. It shows that although some of these strategies could be useful, others are unhelpful in limiting the negative impacts of NID, and may even exacerbate them or generate other equally serious problems.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Dealing with Normatively Inappropriate Dissent
This chapter considers whether the reliable identification of normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) would be helpful in addressing many of the adverse epistemic and social impacts that can result from it. It considers a variety of ways in which such identification could be used to minimize the epistemic and social damages that NID can inflict, including prohibiting the dissent in question, targeting it for special scrutiny, placing limits on scientists’ epistemic obligations, guiding public beliefs, emphasizing the existence of a consensus, and discrediting dissenters. It shows that although some of these strategies could be useful, others are unhelpful in limiting the negative impacts of NID, and may even exacerbate them or generate other equally serious problems.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Imposing Unfair Risks
This chapters evaluates whether inductive risks judgments can serve as a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Dissent that calls for rejecting certain consensus views related to public policy can be risky. When consensus views are mistakenly rejected, it can have serious consequences for public health and well-being. These risks may not be worth taking when the risks disproportionately fall on the public, or when the dissent in question fails to conform to widely shared standards of good science. It concludes that this account also fails to offer a criterion to reliably identify NID. In part this is because of the difficulties presented by the criterion of shared standards in science. Also, the ambiguities present in judgments about inductive risks lead to serious problems in practice.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Imposing Unfair Risks
This chapters evaluates whether inductive risks judgments can serve as a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Dissent that calls for rejecting certain consensus views related to public policy can be risky. When consensus views are mistakenly rejected, it can have serious consequences for public health and well-being. These risks may not be worth taking when the risks disproportionately fall on the public, or when the dissent in question fails to conform to widely shared standards of good science. It concludes that this account also fails to offer a criterion to reliably identify NID. In part this is because of the difficulties presented by the criterion of shared standards in science. Also, the ambiguities present in judgments about inductive risks lead to serious problems in practice.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Where Disagreements Can Lie
Chapter 10 proposes a second recommendation to deal with the negative adverse effects that normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) can have: it calls for a recognition of the limits of scientific evidence when it comes to public policymaking and for an increased focus on potential differences in the values that underlie policy decisions. It contends that while confusion and doubt about the existing empirical evidence or about its strength can contribute to stalled policies, disagreements about values can also play a significant role. Such disagreements can involve what people take to be valuable, how to interpret shared values, how to weigh conflicting values, and what policies are better for promoting certain valuable goals.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Where Disagreements Can Lie
Chapter 10 proposes a second recommendation to deal with the negative adverse effects that normatively inappropriate dissent (NID) can have: it calls for a recognition of the limits of scientific evidence when it comes to public policymaking and for an increased focus on potential differences in the values that underlie policy decisions. It contends that while confusion and doubt about the existing empirical evidence or about its strength can contribute to stalled policies, disagreements about values can also play a significant role. Such disagreements can involve what people take to be valuable, how to interpret shared values, how to weigh conflicting values, and what policies are better for promoting certain valuable goals.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
The Important Roles of Dissent
This chapter offers an overview of the ways in which dissent from a scientific consensus is epistemically valuable. It contends that dissent furthers scientific progress in various ways, including correcting false empirical assumptions, providing alternative ways of conceiving phenomena, and challenging value judgments. Dissent can also strengthen the justification for consensus views as such views are more likely to be reliable when they survive critical scrutiny, than if they go unchallenged. Similarly, dissent can foster warranted public trust in science because it can assure the public that scientific inquiry is an open and critical process. The chapter also points out that because dissent has these benefits, it imposes epistemic obligations on scientific communities.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
The Important Roles of Dissent
This chapter offers an overview of the ways in which dissent from a scientific consensus is epistemically valuable. It contends that dissent furthers scientific progress in various ways, including correcting false empirical assumptions, providing alternative ways of conceiving phenomena, and challenging value judgments. Dissent can also strengthen the justification for consensus views as such views are more likely to be reliable when they survive critical scrutiny, than if they go unchallenged. Similarly, dissent can foster warranted public trust in science because it can assure the public that scientific inquiry is an open and critical process. The chapter also points out that because dissent has these benefits, it imposes epistemic obligations on scientific communities.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Bad-Faith Dissent
This chapter explores whether the presence of bad-faith motive is a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Rather than appropriate epistemic motives to help advance scientific knowledge, bad-faith motives involve some other objectionable goal: to confuse the public, stall policies that the dissenters dislike, promote particular ideological views, or safeguard profits. This chapter evaluates various ways to explain why bad-faith motives could result in dissent that fails to promote or that impedes scientific progress and it assesses their plausibility. It concludes that in spite of the intuitive appeal of attending to motivations, they cannot serve as a criterion to reliably identify NID.
- 18 October 2018
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
Bad-Faith Dissent
This chapter explores whether the presence of bad-faith motive is a reliable criterion to identify normatively inappropriate dissent (NID). Rather than appropriate epistemic motives to help advance scientific knowledge, bad-faith motives involve some other objectionable goal: to confuse the public, stall policies that the dissenters dislike, promote particular ideological views, or safeguard profits. This chapter evaluates various ways to explain why bad-faith motives could result in dissent that fails to promote or that impedes scientific progress and it assesses their plausibility. It concludes that in spite of the intuitive appeal of attending to motivations, they cannot serve as a criterion to reliably identify NID.