Medard Hilhorst

Imagine a Samaritan living kidney donor, who some time ago has anonymously donated one of his kidneys to a patient on top of the waiting list. He now contacts the transplantation centre once again, to donate part of his liver. The Centre, startled by this idea, refers him to the regular screening procedure for all Samaritan donations. It turns out that his wish is well-informed, voluntarily made and that he is competent to decide. We acknowledge that a donor’s wish should not be followed in all cases, even though this wish is a clear expression of his own free will. However, a refusal must be based on sound moral reasons and it is less clear what reasons these might be. We outline the most common arguments for refusal, assess these arguments in terms of strengths and weaknesses, and show which arguments, if any at all, are most promising. We conclude, firstly, that we should only assess risks (which include motivations), not judge relationships, and secondly, that it is not a transplant centre’s mission to carry out a donor’s life project.

To explore whether market reforms in a health care system affect medical professional ethics of hospital-based specialists on the one hand and physicians in independent practices on the other. Qualitative interviews with 27 surgeons and 28 general practitioners in The Netherlands, held 2–3 years after a major overhaul of the Dutch health care system involving several market reforms. Surgeons now regularly advertise their work (while this was forbidden in the past) and pay more attention to patients with relatively minor afflictions, thus deviating from codes of ethics that oblige physicians to treat each other as brothers and to treat patients according to medical need. Dutch GPs have abandoned their traditional reticence and their fear of medicalization. They now seem to treat more in accordance with patients’ preferences and less in accordance with medical need. Market reforms do affect medical professional principles, and it is doubtful whether these changes were intended when Dutch policy makers decided to introduce market elements in the health care system. Policy makers in other countries considering similar reforms should pay attention to these results.

Cadaveric transplantation and living transplantation exist side by side. Both practices help to alleviate organ need. They provide us with two separate moral schemes. Is it rational to keep them apart? The cadaveric system is organised along strict, impartial lines, while the living system is inherently partial and local. The ethical justification for this partial scheme seems to be that it merely supplements the cadaveric scheme: partial transplants do not come at the expense of cadaveric impartiality, but in fact significantly reduce the waiting time for patients on the list for a cadaveric transplant.This seemingly peaceful coexistence is challenged by new initiatives, among them living donation list exchange, and also the LifeSharers initiative, leading to practices that undermine cadaveric impartiality. Should we bemoan this fact, or should we move on towards a new balance in the relationship between cadaveric and living transplantation practices, towards a new moral weighing of impartial and partial values? I argue, against the background of a rapid growth of living donations, that we have good, ethical reasons—not only utilitarian ones—for giving the value of partiality a more prominent place in our policies.

Policies with respect to altruistic living kidney donation to strangers (both nondirected and directed donation) should, in addition to medical criteria, preferably be based on valid attitude research data. However, deciding on what data are relevant is a normative issue. The challenge for both research and policy making is to bring together empirical and normative issues. By comparing two recent surveys, the authors shed light on the complex methodologic and ethical questions surrounding altruistic living kidney donation. The authors found that the main methodologic issues were the distinction between the willingness to donate and the acceptability of the offer, the difference between public attitudes observed in surveys (“facts”) and well-considered moral judgments (“norms”), and biases caused by a misperception of central moral concepts (e.g., discrimination and injustice). The authors argue that transplantation centers have a good case for applying or initiating altruistic living donation programs. Centers should seek to influence public attitudes if these attitudes are shown to be biased by prejudice and misunderstanding. The authors advocate an interaction between research and policy making. Social research can best influence transplantation policies in altruistic living donation by in-depth interviews into the complicated background beliefs underlying personal preferences. In addition, the public should be encouraged to judge the immanent issues in a morally responsible way. In the end, a fair balance should be established between the impartial requirements of social justice and the partial motivations of individuals involved in altruistic living donation. Although discriminatory acts should be rejected categorically, donation policies should be willing to consider, support, and accept motivations based on personal loyalties.

Arguments against directed altruistic living organ donation are too weak to justify a ban. Potential donors who want to specify the non-related person or group of persons to receive their donated kidney should be accepted. The arguments against, based on considerations of motivation, fairness and (non-)anonymity (e.g. those recently cited by an advisory report of the Dutch Health Council), are presented and discussed, as well as the Dutch Government’s response. Whereas the Government argues that individuals have authority with regard to the allocation of their organs, partial considerations have not been sufficiently explored. In addition, it is argued that partial relationships govern human life, are significant and should be valued highly. These relationships are at the core of accepted living kidney donation between relatives (family members, partners, friends). Respecting the particular act of living donation goes beyond respect for autonomy; it touches upon our personal and social identity. Donation, e.g. of a kidney, is not undertaken strictly for the benefit of the recipient, but also to meet the moral standards we wish to set for ourselves. This consideration, rooted in a view of moral identity, provides the basis for many forms of directed donation that are both partial and justified. If the importance of this is not recognized, social policies can be neither adequate nor effective.