Edith D. Balbach

Following legal action in the 1990s, internal tobacco industry documents became public, allowing unprecedented insight into the industry's relationships with outside organizations. During the 1980s and 1990s, the National Energy Management Institute (NEMI), established by the Sheet Metal Workers International Association and the Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors' National Association, (SMACNA) received tobacco industry funding to establish an indoor air quality services program. But the arrangement also required NEMI to serve as an advocate for industry efforts to defeat indoor smoking bans by arguing that ventilation was a more appropriate solution to environmental tobacco smoke. Drawing on tobacco industry documents, this paper describes a striking example of the ethical compromises that accompanied NEMI's collaboration with the tobacco industry, highlighting the solicitation of tobacco industry financial support for a SMACNA indoor air quality manual in exchange for sanitizing references to the health impact of environmental tobacco smoke prior to publication.

Objective:To analyse trial and deposition testimony of tobacco industry executives to determine how they use the concepts of “information” and “choice” and consider how these concepts are related to theoretical models of health behaviour change.Methods:We coded and analysed transcripts of trial and deposition testimony of 14 high-level executives representing six companies plus the Tobacco Institute. We conducted an interpretive analysis of industry executives’ characterisation of the industry’s role as information provider and the agency of tobacco consumers in making “choices”.Results:Tobacco industry executives deployed the concept of “information” as a mechanism that shifted to consumers full moral responsibility for the harms caused by tobacco products. The industry’s role was characterised as that of impartial supplier of value-free “information”, without regard to its quality, accuracy and truthfulness. Tobacco industry legal defences rely on assumptions congruent with and supported by individual rational choice theories, particularly those that emphasise individual, autonomous decision-makers.Conclusions:Tobacco control advocates and health educators must challenge the industry’s preferred framing, pointing out that “information” is not value-free. Multi-level, multi-sectoral interventions are critical to tobacco use prevention. Over-reliance on individual and interpersonal rational choice models may have the effect of validating the industry’s model of smoking and cessation behaviour, absolving it of responsibility and rendering invisible the “choices” the industry has made and continues to make in promoting the most deadly consumer product ever made.

Objectives: To assess how the tobacco industry established a political relationship with the Coalition of Labor Union Women (CLUW) and to learn from this example how tobacco control advocates can work more effectively with organisations with which working class women are affiliated. Methods: The study reviewed tobacco industry documents to determine Tobacco Institute strategy, using the CLUW News and other published material to corroborate our findings. Results: The Tobacco Institute was effective at framing excise tax and smokefree worksite issues in a way that facilitated CLUW’s support of industry positions on these issues. The Tobacco Institute was also willing to reciprocate by providing financial and other kinds of support to CLUW. Conclusions: While tobacco control missed an opportunity to partner with CLUW on smokefree worksites and excise taxes in the 1980s and 1990s, tobacco control can also use issue framing and reciprocity to form coalitions with organisations representing the interests of working women.

In 1984, the tobacco workers’ union and the Tobacco Institute, which represents US tobacco companies, formed a labor management committee (LMC). The institute relied on LMC unions to resist smoke-free worksite rules. In a review of the internal tobacco industry documents now publicly available, we found that the LMC succeeded for 2 primary reasons. First, the LMC furthered members’ interests, allowing them to overcome institutional barriers to policy success. Second, the LMC used an “institutions, ideas, and interests” strategy to encourage non-LMC unions to oppose smoke-free worksite rules. While public health advocates missed an opportunity to partner with unions on the issue of smoke-free worksites during the era studied, they can use a similar strategy to form coalitions with unions.

Objectives. The purpose of this study was to describe RJ Reynolds (RJR) Tobacco Company’s strategy for targeting African Americans, as revealed in tobacco industry documents and magazine advertisements. Methods. The authors searched industry documents to determine RJR’s strategies and analyzed magazine advertising during 2 periods: the time of the launch of the company’s Uptown cigarette (1989–1990) and a decade later (1999–2000). Results. RJR’s efforts to target the African American market segment existed before and after Uptown, and the company’s strategy was largely implemented via other RJR brands. Advertisements featured mentholated cigarettes, fantasy/escape, expensive objects, and nightlife. Conclusions. To help all populations become tobacco-free, tobacco control practitioners must understand and counter tobacco industry strategies.

Objective: To assess the comparability of searches conducted on two publicly available tobacco industry document collections: hard copies housed and maintained by a neutral party in the Minnesota Depository and electronic copies available through tobacco industry maintained websites. Methods: We conducted a set of searches in Minnesota and then conducted the same searches using the industry websites. We matched documents by Bates number, weeded out duplicates, and coded documents that were unique to either collection as major, minor, or trivial. Results: Among hundreds of documents produced by several searches, we found only four unique major documents in the Minnesota Depository. By contrast, we found 62 unique major documents using the websites. Conclusion: These results suggest that researchers can rely on industry websites while waiting for improved access resulting from searching, indexing, and document storage administered by the tobacco control community. Searching the tobacco industry websites is at least as good as searching in Minnesota and may in some instances actually be better. Four smaller subcollections, however, can only be searched by hand in Minnesota.