Rebecca J. Compton

Interoception, or perception of internal bodily signals, is thought to be an important contributor to emotional experience and cognition, and individual differences in interoceptive beliefs may affect cognitive processing of emotional information. Addressing this issue, the present study examined the correlation between self-reported interoceptive awareness and EEG markers of motivated attention to emotional versus neutral images. A sample of undergraduates (n = 115) viewed images of neutral, pleasant, and unpleasant scenes while EEG was recorded, and the late positive potential (LPP) was extracted for each image type. Group results replicate prior findings of enhanced LPP signals for pleasant and unpleasant compared to neutral images. Moreover, a greater degree of enhanced LPP for unpleasant images (versus pleasant or neutral images) was positively correlated with self-reported interoceptive awareness. Results support the role of interoceptive beliefs in cortical processing of emotional information.

This study tested whether self‐reports of childhood adversity would predict altered error processing under emotional versus non‐emotional task conditions. N = 99 undergraduates completed two selective attention tasks, a traditional color‐word Stroop task and a modified task using emotional words, while EEG was recorded. Participants also completed self‐report measures of adverse and positive childhood experiences, executive functioning, depression, current stress, and emotion regulation. Reports of adversity were robustly correlated with self‐reported challenges in executive functioning, even when controlling for self‐reported depression and stress, but adversity was not correlated with task performance. With regard to neural markers of error processing, adversity predicted an enhanced error‐related negativity and blunted error‐positivity, but only during the emotion‐word blocks of the task. Moreover, error‐related changes in alpha oscillations were predicted by adversity, in a pattern that suggested less error responsiveness in alpha patterns during the emotion block, compared to the color block, among participants with higher adversity. Overall, results indicate alterations in error monitoring associated with adversity, such that in an emotional context, initial error detection is enhanced and sustained error processing is blunted, even in the absence of overt performance changes.

The present research aimed to determine whether self-reports of early adversity predicted individual differences in self-reported and laboratory-measured executive functioning in college-aged samples. Two studies with young adult samples (n = 231 and n = 61) measured endorsement of adverse childhood experiences (ACEs), self-reported executive functioning difficulties on the Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF), and self-report measures of depression and emotion regulation. The second sample also completed laboratory performance tasks of working memory, inhibitory control, and selective attention while electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded. In both samples, greater self-reported ACEs predicted greater reports of executive functioning difficulties on the BRIEF (rs = 0.378 and 0.322), relationships of medium effect size that remained significant when controlling for depression and emotion regulation variables. In the second sample, despite robust EEG/event-related potential (ERP) task findings in the group as a whole, neither lab task performance nor EEG/ERP measures were reliably correlated with individual differences in ACEs. We consider multiple alternative explanations for why early adversity predicted self-reported executive functioning difficulties but not lab task performance or neural measures in the same sample. These findings may reflect a propensity for negative self-evaluation among those with early adverse experiences, leading to inflated estimates of their own executive function problems. Alternatively, the findings may indicate that the lab tasks are insufficient in tapping aspects of executive functions that are relevant outside the lab context. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

This study was designed to examine how mind-wandering and its neural correlates vary across tasks with different attentional demands, motivated by the context regulation hypothesis of mind-wandering. Participants (n = 59 undergraduates) completed the sustained attention to response task (SART) and the Stroop selective attention task in counterbalanced order while EEG was recorded. The tasks included experience-sampling probes to identify self-reported episodes of mind-wandering, along with retrospective reports. Participants reported more mind-wandering during the SART than the Stroop and during whichever task was presented second during the session, compared with first. Replicating previous findings, EEG data (n = 37 usable participants) indicated increased alpha oscillations during episodes of mind-wandering, compared with on-task episodes, for both the SART and Stroop tasks. ERP data, focused on the P2 component reflecting perceptual processing, found that mind-wandering was associated with increased P2 amplitudes during the Stroop task, counter to predictions from the perceptual decoupling theory. Overall, the study found that self-report and neural correlates of mind-wandering are sensitive to task context. This line of research can further the understanding of how mechanisms of mind-wandering are adapted to varied tasks and situations.

This study investigated whether detection of a performance mistake is followed by adaptive or detrimental effects on subsequent attention and performance. Using a Stroop task with spatial cueing, along with simultaneous EEG and pupillary measurements, we examined evidence bearing on two alternative hypotheses: maladaptive arousal and adaptive control. Error detection, indexed by the error‐related negativity ERP component, was followed by pupil dilation and suppression of EEG oscillations in the alpha band, two indices of arousal that were associated with one another on a trial‐by‐trial basis. On the trials following errors, there was neural evidence of enhanced spatial cueing, manifested in greater hemispheric activation contralateral to the cued visual field. However, this post‐error enhancement was not followed by changes in Stroop or spatial cueing effects in performance, nor by increased attentional cueing effects in ERP responses to targets. Rather, performance tended to be slower and less accurate following errors compared to correct trials, and higher post‐response arousal, indexed by larger pupils, predicted next‐trial slowing and decreased P2 amplitude to targets. Results favor the maladaptive arousal account of post‐error cognitive control and offer only limited support for adaptive control.

This study contrasted the efficacy of two strategies for emotion regulation, cognitive reappraisal (CR) and attentional control (AC), while using eye-tracking to examine gaze fixation patterns associated with each strategy. Participants (n = 98 undergraduates) viewed emotionally negative and neutral slides before and after one of three training conditions: CR training (verbal instructions to reframe interpretations of negative images), AC training (gaze-contingent feedback emphasizing fixation away from negative portions of images), or a no-training control condition. CR training led to the most beneficial consequences for self-reported emotion ratings; AC training improved emotion ratings more than the no-training control but not as much as CR. AC training led to significantly reduced time fixating gaze on negative content, whereas CR did not alter gaze fixations compared with the no-training control. Moreover, among the AC group, participants who looked away from negative content to a greater extent reported more beneficial change in emotional self-report, whereas that same pattern was not evident in the CR or no-training group. The findings add to evidence that CR training is more effective than distraction-related strategies and that CR does not necessitate gaze changes to be effective. Together, the findings contribute to furthering knowledge about distinct cognitive mechanisms involved in different strategies of emotion regulation. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Arousal evoked by detecting a performance error may provide a mechanism by which error detection leads to either adaptive or maladaptive changes in attention and performance. By pairing EEG data acquisition with simultaneous measurements of pupil diameter, which is thought to reflect norepinephrinergic arousal, this study tested whether transient changes in EEG oscillations in the alpha frequency range (8–12 Hz) following performance mistakes may reflect error‐evoked arousal. In the inter‐trial interval following performance mistakes (approximately 8% of trials), pupil diameter increased and EEG alpha power decreased, compared to the inter‐trial interval following correct responses. Moreover when trials were binned based on pupil diameter on a within‐subjects basis, trials with greater pupil diameter were associated with lower EEG alpha power during the inter‐trial interval. This pattern of association suggests that error‐related alpha suppression, like pupil dilation, reflects arousal in response to error commission. Errors were also followed by worse next‐trial performance, implying that error‐evoked arousal may not always be beneficial for adaptive control.

What is your brain doing while your mind is wandering? This study used a within-subjects experience-sampling design to test whether episodes of mind-wandering during a demanding cognitive task are...

To all who knew him, Dan appeared to be a relatively intelligent 12-year-old with a friendly and cooperative manner. Yet, he was struggling in his schoolwork, especially in spelling and reading. These troubles were nothing new. Despite considerable remedial training, these subjects had always been difficult for him. When a school counselor suggested neuropsychological assessment, his parents agreed willingly, hoping that it might shed some light on his problems. Neuropsychological testing revealed no evidence of gross brain damage. His sensory, perceptual, and motor abilities all appeared normal and his overall IQ was in the average range. A more detailed analysis of his abilities revealed that his visuospatial skills were quite good. His score on the Visual Spatial Index of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, Fifth Edition (WISC-V), which emphasizes visuomotor and visuospatial abilities, was above average, and he performed well on a number of other tests assessing nonverbal problem solving. In contrast, his performance on the Verbal Comprehension Index of the WISC-V was below average. A number of additional verbal tests revealed that he had little appreciation for the phonemic structure of words. He read words by guessing what they were on the basis of their salient visual features or configuration, rather than by trying to sound them out. For example, he read form as “farm,” theory as “those,” grieve as “great,” and tranquility as “train track.” He exhibited similar problems in the spelling of orally presented words, spelling square as “s-c-a-r,” cross as “c-o-r-s,” and triangle as “t-r-e-r-e.” Given that his difficulties were long-standing and that remediation so far had not been effective, the neuropsychologist diagnosed Dan as having a specific verbal learning disability that is commonly known as dyslexia. She suggested that further intervention for reading be geared to capitalize on Dan's good visuospatial abilities, such as teaching him to carefully distinguish words on the basis of their visual features and using flash cards to drill him on the form of words. An incremental approach could be taken; he could first acquire knowledge about simple words and then apply it toward reading more complicated material. For example, once Dan could learn to recognize fly, he could then use that knowledge to help read other words, such as butterfly.