David P. McCabe

Dual-process theories of retrieval suggest that controlled and automatic processing contribute to memory performance. Free recall tests are often considered pure measures of recollection, assessing only the controlled process. We report two experiments demonstrating that automatic processes also influence free recall. Experiment 1 used inclusion and exclusion tasks to estimate recollection and automaticity in free recall, adopting a new variant of the process dissociation procedure. Dividing attention during study selectively reduced the recollection estimate but did not affect the automatic component. In Experiment 2, we replicated the results of Experiment 1, and subjects additionally reported remember–know–guess judgments during recall in the inclusion condition. In the latter task, dividing attention during study reduced remember judgments for studied items, but know responses were unaffected. Results from both methods indicated that free recall is partly driven by automatic processes. Thus, we conclude that retrieval in free recall tests is not driven solely by conscious recollection (or remembering) but also by automatic influences of the same sort believed to drive priming on implicit memory tests. Sometimes items come to mind without volition in free recall.

Participants between the ages of 18 and 80 were tested on a complex working memory span task that was administered either using a typical experimenter-paced method or using a method in which the processing component was presented at a fixed, limited-pace presentation rate. Path analyses revealed that even after controlling for individual differences in general processing speed, the limited-pace task predicted unique variance in episodic memory, executive functioning, and fluid intelligence, whereas the experimenter-paced task did not. For the experimenter-paced task, slower responses on the processing component of the task were associated with better recall, but only when individual differences in processing speed were controlled. These findings suggest that metacognitive control of response times affects recall from working memory span tasks, as well as the relationship between span task recall and high-level cognition. These results support resource-sharing explanations of working memory and suggest that limiting processing times using computer pacing of complex span tasks can be an effective way to efficiently measure working memory capacity.

Attentional control has been conceptualized as executive functioning by neuropsychologists and as working memory capacity by experimental psychologists. We examined the relationship between these constructs using a factor analytic approach in an adult life span sample. Several tests of working memory capacity and executive function were administered to more than 200 subjects between 18 and 90 years of age, along with tests of processing speed and episodic memory. The correlation between working memory capacity and executive functioning constructs was very strong (r = .97), but correlations between these constructs and processing speed were considerably weaker (rs approximately .79). Controlling for working memory capacity and executive function eliminated age effects on episodic memory, and working memory capacity and executive function accounted for variance in episodic memory beyond that accounted for by processing speed. We conclude that tests of working memory capacity and executive function share a common underlying executive attention component that is strongly predictive of higher level cognition.

The finding that new items are judged as remembered in the remember-know paradigm presents a challenge to traditional process and systems accounts of memory. In three experiments, we demonstrated that false remember responses can be caused by misattributing recollection to a context other than the study list. In Experiments 1 and 2, false remember responses to distractors that were unrelated to studied words increased if they were encountered in a “preexposure” phase a few minutes or even a few days prior to the studied list. A third experiment demonstrated that remember responses to preexposed distractors increased when they were encoded in a manner similar to studied items, despite the more similar items being of weaker overall memory strength. We propose a source misattribution account of false remembering to explain these data, suggesting that all remember judgments reflect conscious recollection of contextual details, but false remember judgments are partly the result of recollection of details from an extralist context (i.e., from a source other than the study list).