Adina L. Roskies
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Adina L. Roskies has a total of 122 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Colin Allen
Department of Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara 4 , Santa Barbara, CA, USA
2 shared publications - Aaron Schurger
Department of Psychology, Crean College of Health and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA 92867, USA; Institute for Interdisciplinary Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Chapman University, 14725 Alton Parkway, Irvine, CA 92618, USA; INSERM, Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, NeuroSpin Center, Gif sur Yvette 91191, France; Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique, Direction des Sciences du Vivant, I2BM, NeuroSpin Center, Gif sur Yvette 91191, France
1 shared publication - Alan C. Love
University of Minnesota
1 shared publication - Alan Hájek
Philoso-phy of Science, Cambridge University Press, Journals Fulfillment Department, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS, England
1 shared publication Alan Richardson
University of Edinburgh
1 shared publication- Alex Rosenberg
Duke University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 17 (4) , 299-301
25 Years of Neuroethics
- 2 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 17 (4) , 299-301
25 Years of Neuroethics
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e188
Speed of consciousness results: Implications for conscious agency and free will
Speed of consciousness results may contribute to the popular notion that our consciousness is inefficacious. I argue that Fleming and Michel’s claim that consciousness is slow, coupled with their idea that consciousness marks a predictive world model, instead supports a view of agency in which we are consciously engaged with the world as it unfolds, both in perception and response.
- 25 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e188
Speed of consciousness results: Implications for conscious agency and free will
Speed of consciousness results may contribute to the popular notion that our consciousness is inefficacious. I argue that Fleming and Michel’s claim that consciousness is slow, coupled with their idea that consciousness marks a predictive world model, instead supports a view of agency in which we are consciously engaged with the world as it unfolds, both in perception and response.
- Open Access
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 17 (2) , 96-98
Research on Brain Organoids Should Prioritize Questions of Agency, Not Consciousness
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 17 (2) , 96-98
Open AccessResearch on Brain Organoids Should Prioritize Questions of Agency, Not Consciousness
- Open Access
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 6
Neuroethics and agency: Some comments on Joshua May’s Neuroethics
Neuroethics provides a sober and thoughtful introduction to major issues in neuroethics. This discussion offers a measured assessment and critique of the book.
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Universitatsbibliothek der Ruhr-Universitat Bochum in Philosophy and the Mind Sciences
- Vol. 6
Open AccessNeuroethics and agency: Some comments on Joshua May’s Neuroethics
Neuroethics provides a sober and thoughtful introduction to major issues in neuroethics. This discussion offers a measured assessment and critique of the book.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 27 January 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (5)
The misalignment of incentives in academic publishing and implications for journal reform
For most researchers, academic publishing serves two goals that are often misaligned—knowledge dissemination and establishing scientific credentials. While both goals can encourage research with significant depth and scope, the latter can also pressure scholars to maximize publication metrics. Commercial publishing companies have capitalized on the centrality of publishing to the scientific enterprises of knowledge dissemination and academic recognition to extract large profits from academia by leveraging unpaid services from reviewers, creating financial barriers to research dissemination, and imposing substantial fees for open access. We present a set of perspectives exploring alternative models for communicating and disseminating scientific research. Acknowledging that the success of new publishing models depends on their impact on existing approaches for assigning academic credit that often prioritize prestigious publications and metrics such as citations and impact factors, we also provide various viewpoints on reforming academic evaluation.
- 27 January 2025
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 122 (5)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe misalignment of incentives in academic publishing and implications for journal reform
For most researchers, academic publishing serves two goals that are often misaligned—knowledge dissemination and establishing scientific credentials. While both goals can encourage research with significant depth and scope, the latter can also pressure scholars to maximize publication metrics. Commercial publishing companies have capitalized on the centrality of publishing to the scientific enterprises of knowledge dissemination and academic recognition to extract large profits from academia by leveraging unpaid services from reviewers, creating financial barriers to research dissemination, and imposing substantial fees for open access. We present a set of perspectives exploring alternative models for communicating and disseminating scientific research. Acknowledging that the success of new publishing models depends on their impact on existing approaches for assigning academic credit that often prioritize prestigious publications and metrics such as citations and impact factors, we also provide various viewpoints on reforming academic evaluation.
- 3 December 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 711-715
Concrete thoughts on The Brain Abstracted
- 3 December 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 39 (2) , 711-715
Concrete thoughts on The Brain Abstracted
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e288
Language-of-thought hypothesis: Wrong, but sometimes useful?
Quilty-Dunn et al. maintain that language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) is the best game in town. We counter that LoTH is merely one source of models – always wrong, sometimes useful. Their reasons for liking LoTH are compatible with the view that LoTH provides a sometimes pragmatically useful level of abstraction over processes and mechanisms that fail to fully live up to LoT requirements.
- 28 September 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e288
Language-of-thought hypothesis: Wrong, but sometimes useful?
Quilty-Dunn et al. maintain that language-of-thought hypothesis (LoTH) is the best game in town. We counter that LoTH is merely one source of models – always wrong, sometimes useful. Their reasons for liking LoTH are compatible with the view that LoTH provides a sometimes pragmatically useful level of abstraction over processes and mechanisms that fail to fully live up to LoT requirements.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (3) , f1-f4
PSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 90 (3) , f1-f4
Open AccessPSA volume 90 issue 3 Cover and Front matter
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 14 (2) , 175-177
Moral Status or Moral Value? The Former May Require Phenomenal Consciousness, But Does It Matter?
Shepherd (2023) is concerned about the moral status of nonhumans and argues that consciousness-based approaches to moral status are inadequate to guide policy decisions. Consciousness-based approac...
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in AJOB Neuroscience
- Vol. 14 (2) , 175-177
Moral Status or Moral Value? The Former May Require Phenomenal Consciousness, But Does It Matter?
Shepherd (2023) is concerned about the moral status of nonhumans and argues that consciousness-based approaches to moral status are inadequate to guide policy decisions. Consciousness-based approac...