Max M. Krasnow
Research Subjects
Max M. Krasnow has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
John Tooby
Department of Anthropology University of California, Santa Barbara
4 shared publicationsLeda Cosmides
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences University of California, Santa Barbara
4 shared publications- Andrew W. Delton
Center for Behavioral Political Economy, Department of Political Science and College of Business, Stony Brook University
3 shared publications - Eric J. Pedersen
Department of Psychology, University of Miami
1 shared publication - Miriam Lindner
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (4) , 478-492
Indirect Intergroup Bargaining: An Evolutionary Psychological Theory of Microaggression
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Evolutionary Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (4) , 478-492
Indirect Intergroup Bargaining: An Evolutionary Psychological Theory of Microaggression
- Open Access
- 29 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 3 (1) , srep01747
Meeting now suggests we will meet again: Implications for debates on the evolution of cooperation
Humans are often generous, even towards strangers encountered by chance and even in the absence of any explicit information suggesting they will meet again. Because game theoretic analyses typically conclude that a psychology designed for direct reciprocity should defect in such situations, many have concluded that alternative explanations for human generosity—explanations beyond direct reciprocity—are necessary. However, human cooperation evolved within a material and informational ecology: Simply adding consideration of one minimal ecological relationship to the analysis of reciprocity brings theory and observation closer together, indicating that ecology-free analyses of cooperation can be fragile. Using simulations, we show that the autocorrelation of an individual's location over time means that even a chance encounter with an individual predicts an increased probability of a future encounter with that same individual. We discuss how a psychology designed for such an ecology may be expected to often cooperate even in apparently one-shot situations.
- 29 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 3 (1) , srep01747
Open AccessMeeting now suggests we will meet again: Implications for debates on the evolution of cooperation
Humans are often generous, even towards strangers encountered by chance and even in the absence of any explicit information suggesting they will meet again. Because game theoretic analyses typically conclude that a psychology designed for direct reciprocity should defect in such situations, many have concluded that alternative explanations for human generosity—explanations beyond direct reciprocity—are necessary. However, human cooperation evolved within a material and informational ecology: Simply adding consideration of one minimal ecological relationship to the analysis of reciprocity brings theory and observation closer together, indicating that ecology-free analyses of cooperation can be fragile. Using simulations, we show that the autocorrelation of an individual's location over time means that even a chance encounter with an individual predicts an increased probability of a future encounter with that same individual. We discuss how a psychology designed for such an ecology may be expected to often cooperate even in apparently one-shot situations.
- Open Access
- 26 September 2012
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 7 (9) , e45662
What Are Punishment and Reputation for?
Why did punishment and the use of reputation evolve in humans? According to one family of theories, they evolved to support the maintenance of cooperative group norms; according to another, they evolved to enhance personal gains from cooperation. Current behavioral data are consistent with both hypotheses (and both selection pressures could have shaped human cooperative psychology). However, these hypotheses lead to sharply divergent behavioral predictions in circumstances that have not yet been tested. Here we report results testing these rival predictions. In every test where social exchange theory and group norm maintenance theory made different predictions, subject behavior violated the predictions of group norm maintenance theory and matched those of social exchange theory. Subjects do not direct punishment toward those with reputations for norm violation per se; instead, they use reputation self-beneficially, as a cue to lower the risk that they personally will experience losses from defection. More tellingly, subjects direct their cooperative efforts preferentially towards defectors they have punished and away from those they haven’t punished; they avoid expending punitive effort on reforming defectors who only pose a risk to others. These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the psychology of punishment evolved to uphold group norms. The circumstances in which punishment is deployed and withheld–its circuit logic–support the hypothesis that it is generated by psychological mechanisms that evolved to benefit the punisher, by allowing him to bargain for better treatment.
- 26 September 2012
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 7 (9) , e45662
Open AccessWhat Are Punishment and Reputation for?
Why did punishment and the use of reputation evolve in humans? According to one family of theories, they evolved to support the maintenance of cooperative group norms; according to another, they evolved to enhance personal gains from cooperation. Current behavioral data are consistent with both hypotheses (and both selection pressures could have shaped human cooperative psychology). However, these hypotheses lead to sharply divergent behavioral predictions in circumstances that have not yet been tested. Here we report results testing these rival predictions. In every test where social exchange theory and group norm maintenance theory made different predictions, subject behavior violated the predictions of group norm maintenance theory and matched those of social exchange theory. Subjects do not direct punishment toward those with reputations for norm violation per se; instead, they use reputation self-beneficially, as a cue to lower the risk that they personally will experience losses from defection. More tellingly, subjects direct their cooperative efforts preferentially towards defectors they have punished and away from those they haven’t punished; they avoid expending punitive effort on reforming defectors who only pose a risk to others. These results are not consistent with the hypothesis that the psychology of punishment evolved to uphold group norms. The circumstances in which punishment is deployed and withheld–its circuit logic–support the hypothesis that it is generated by psychological mechanisms that evolved to benefit the punisher, by allowing him to bargain for better treatment.
- Open Access
- 25 October 2011
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 108 (44) , E972
Reply to McNally and Tanner: Generosity evolves when cooperative decisions must be made under uncertainty
- 25 October 2011
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 108 (44) , E972
Open AccessReply to McNally and Tanner: Generosity evolves when cooperative decisions must be made under uncertainty
- 25 July 2011
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 108 (32) , 13335-13340
Evolution of direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters
Are humans too generous? The discovery that subjects choose to incur costs to allocate benefits to others in anonymous, one-shot economic games has posed an unsolved challenge to models of economic and evolutionary rationality. Using agent-based simulations, we show that such generosity is the necessary byproduct of selection on decision systems for regulating dyadic reciprocity under conditions of uncertainty. In deciding whether to engage in dyadic reciprocity, these systems must balance (i) the costs of mistaking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction (hence, risking a single chance of being exploited) with (ii) the far greater costs of mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction (thereby precluding benefits from multiple future cooperative interactions). This asymmetry builds organisms naturally selected to cooperate even when exposed to cues that they are in one-shot interactions.
- 25 July 2011
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 108 (32) , 13335-13340
Evolution of direct reciprocity under uncertainty can explain human generosity in one-shot encounters
Are humans too generous? The discovery that subjects choose to incur costs to allocate benefits to others in anonymous, one-shot economic games has posed an unsolved challenge to models of economic and evolutionary rationality. Using agent-based simulations, we show that such generosity is the necessary byproduct of selection on decision systems for regulating dyadic reciprocity under conditions of uncertainty. In deciding whether to engage in dyadic reciprocity, these systems must balance (i) the costs of mistaking a one-shot interaction for a repeated interaction (hence, risking a single chance of being exploited) with (ii) the far greater costs of mistaking a repeated interaction for a one-shot interaction (thereby precluding benefits from multiple future cooperative interactions). This asymmetry builds organisms naturally selected to cooperate even when exposed to cues that they are in one-shot interactions.