GDGary K. Dowse

Gary K. Dowse

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Gary K. Dowse has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Ian George Barr

    WHO Collaborating Centre for Reference and Research on Influenza Peter Doherty Institute for Infection and Immunity Melbourne Victoria Australia

    2 shared publications
  • Amanda Whittle

    South West Population Health Unit, Department of Health , Bunbury, Australia

    1 shared publication
  • Andrew Robertson

    Health Protection Group, Western Australian Department of Health, Perth, Western Australia, Australia

    1 shared publication
  • Anthony D Keil

    Department of Microbiology, PathWest Laboratory Medicine WA, Perth, WA

    1 shared publication
  • Anthony R Jones

    Department of Microbiology, PathWest Laboratory Medicine WA, Perth, WA

    1 shared publication
  • David W Smith

    Department of Microbiology and Laboratory Medicine, University of Western Australia, Perth, WA

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    What serosurveillance studies tell us about the 2009 influenza pandemic

    by Gary K Dowse, Ian Barr

    Surveillance of the impact of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza during its initial seasons in both hemispheres relied on routinely available indicators, including numbers and rates of laboratory-detected cases, hospitalisations, ICU admissions and deaths, along with monitoring of influenza-like illness (ILI) from primary care sentinel surveillance systems. Estimates of the clinical attack rate and the case fatality ratio were imperfect. Understanding of the pathogenicity of the pandemic virus and prediction of the impact in subsequent seasons was hindered by a lack of information on actual infection rates in the population. Results of a number of serosurveys conducted in Australia and overseas countries have now become available, revealing that the arrival of the pandemic virus in modern urbanised and non-immune populations resulted in relatively similar infection rates in both the southern and northern hemispheres. Around 30–50% of children and teenagers were infected during the first pandemic season, with lower rates, around 10–20%, in young and middle-aged adults, and very few infections in older adults. There were significant numbers of mild or asymptomatic infections, and case fatality and hospitalisation ratios were much lower than those contemplated in pandemic plans. Many populations, including Australia, achieved a significant level of herd immunity during the first wave, and community susceptibility was further reduced by vaccination programs, although coverage was lower than expected. In the absence of significant antigenic drift or changes in virulence, the impact of the pandemic H1N1 virus should continue to decline in future influenza seasons.

  • Open Access

    We should not be complacent about our population-based public health response to the first influenza pandemic of the 21stcentury

    by Heath A Kelly, Patricia C Priest, Geoffry N Mercer, Gary K Dowse

    More than a year after an influenza pandemic was declared in June 2009, the World Health Organization declared the pandemic to be over. Evaluations of the pandemic response are beginning to appear in the public domain.


  • Incidence of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza infection in children and pregnant women during the 2009 influenza season in Western Australia — a seroprevalence study

    by Gary K Dowse, David W Smith, Heath Kelly, Ian Barr, Karen L Laurie, Anthony R Jones, Anthony D Keil, Paul Effler

    Objective: To determine antibody levels and estimate incidence of infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in children and pregnant women during the 2009 winter in Western Australia. Design, set...


  • Open Access

    Response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in Australia – lessons from a State health department perspective

    by Tarun S. Weeramanthri, Andrew G. Robertson, Gary K. Dowse, Paul V. Effler, Muriel G. Leclercq, Jeremy D. Burtenshaw, Susan J. Oldham, David W. Smith, Kathryn J. Gatti, Helen M. Gladstones

    This article reviews the lessons that can be learned by the health sector, in particular, and the public sector, more generally, from the governmental response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza A (pH1N1) in Australia during 2009. It covers the period from the emergence of the epidemic to the release of the vaccine, and describes a range of impacts on the Western Australian health system, the government sector and the community. There are three main themes considered from a State government agency perspective: how decisions were influenced by prior planning; how the decision making and communication processes were intimately linked; and the interdependent roles of States and the Commonwealth Government in national programs. We conclude that: (a) communications were generally effective, but need to be improved and better coordinated between the Australian Government, States and general practice; (b) decision making was appropriately flexible, but there needs to be better alignment with expert advice, and consideration of the need for a national disease control agency in Australia; and (c) national funding arrangements need to fit with the model of state-based service delivery and to support critical workforce needs for surge capacity, as well as stockpile and infrastructure requirements. What is known about the topic?: There have been a number of articles on pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza in Australia that have provided an overview of the response from a Commonwealth Government perspective, as well as specific aspects of the State response (e.g. virology, impact on intensive care units across Australia, infection control). Victoria, Queensland and NSW have published papers more focussed on epidemiology and an overview of public health actions. What does this paper add?: This would be the first in-depth account of the response that both details a broader range of impacts and costs across health and other State government agencies, and also provides a critical reflection on governance, communication and decision making arrangements from the beginning of the pandemic to the start of the vaccination program. What are the implications for practitioners?: Practitioners (clinical, public health, and laboratory) would recognise the importance of the workforce and surge capacity issues highlighted in the paper, and the extent to which they were stretched. Addressing these issues is vital to meeting practitioner needs in future pandemic seasons. Policy makers would see the relevance of the observations and analysis to governance arrangements within a Federal system, where the majority of funding is provided from the Commonwealth level, whereas service delivery responsibilities remain with the States and Territories. In particular, the argument to consider a national disease control agency along the lines of the US and UK will be of interest to public health and communicable disease practitioners in all States and Territories, as it would affect how and where policy and expert advice is created and used.


  • Open Access

    Outbreak ofAeromonas hydrophilaWound Infections Associated with Mud Football

    by Hassan Vally, Amanda Whittle, Scott Cameron, Gary K. Dowse, Tony Watson

    On 16 February 2002, a total of 26 people presented to the emergency department of the local hospital in the rural town of Collie in southwest Western