Katherine Stovel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Interests
Katherine Stovel has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexander Volfovsky
Department of Statistics Department of Statistics at Harvard University Harvard University
1 shared publication - Bailey K. Fosdick
Colorado State University
1 shared publication Benjamin Golub
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
1 shared publicationEva M. Meyersson Milgrom
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; and
1 shared publication- Peter D. Hoff
University of Washington
1 shared publication Yen-Sheng Chiang
Chinese University of Hong Kong, New Territories, Hong Kong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 8 April 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Behavioral Scientist
- Vol. 60 (10) , 1194-1214
Commitments and Contests
This article offers a contribution to the broader theoretical goal of increasing our systematic understanding of the social mechanisms that underlie collective behavior. Specifically, we ask how it is possible that equity can arise in a market situation. Even though fair outcomes can be observed across a wide range of social situations that are not centrally coordinated, we argue that there is scant understanding of how these outcomes are facilitated and what impact they have on interaction patterns. We use experimental game theory to test two mechanisms of preferential association, which is defined as a situation where there is competition for partners and in which two actors have a preference for each other. The first mechanism, committed partnership, is abundant in social life and is exemplified by friendships. The second mechanism, competitive altruism, is the intuitive idea that to secure a desirable matching, one must display desirable behavior. To test the mechanisms, we use a laboratory experiment in which participants play a version of the well-known repeated Ultimatum Game. In our version of the game, players either (a) play each other randomly, (b) according to reputation, or (c) according to preferential association in which players are matched according to a preferred ranking of past player histories. The results suggest that fairness can arise from the reduced risk associated with committing to a desirable partner. This is a study of micro-to-micro mechanisms, investigating the micro-level conditions that produce a particular type of social action, namely, a sustainable equitable division of offerings.
- 8 April 2016
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Behavioral Scientist
- Vol. 60 (10) , 1194-1214
Commitments and Contests
This article offers a contribution to the broader theoretical goal of increasing our systematic understanding of the social mechanisms that underlie collective behavior. Specifically, we ask how it is possible that equity can arise in a market situation. Even though fair outcomes can be observed across a wide range of social situations that are not centrally coordinated, we argue that there is scant understanding of how these outcomes are facilitated and what impact they have on interaction patterns. We use experimental game theory to test two mechanisms of preferential association, which is defined as a situation where there is competition for partners and in which two actors have a preference for each other. The first mechanism, committed partnership, is abundant in social life and is exemplified by friendships. The second mechanism, competitive altruism, is the intuitive idea that to secure a desirable matching, one must display desirable behavior. To test the mechanisms, we use a laboratory experiment in which participants play a version of the well-known repeated Ultimatum Game. In our version of the game, players either (a) play each other randomly, (b) according to reputation, or (c) according to preferential association in which players are matched according to a preferred ranking of past player histories. The results suggest that fairness can arise from the reduced risk associated with committing to a desirable partner. This is a study of micro-to-micro mechanisms, investigating the micro-level conditions that produce a particular type of social action, namely, a sustainable equitable division of offerings.
- 20 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Network Science
- Vol. 1 (3) , 253-277
Likelihoods for fixed rank nomination networks
Many studies that gather social network data use survey methods that lead to censored, missing, or otherwise incomplete information. For example, the popular fixed rank nomination (FRN) scheme, often used in studies of schools and businesses, asks study participants to nominate and rank at most a small number of contacts or friends, leaving the existence of other relations uncertain. However, most statistical models are formulated in terms of completely observed binary networks. Statistical analyses of FRN data with such models ignore the censored and ranked nature of the data and could potentially result in misleading statistical inference. To investigate this possibility, we compare Bayesian parameter estimates obtained from a likelihood for complete binary networks with those obtained from likelihoods that are derived from the FRN scheme, and therefore accommodate the ranked and censored nature of the data. We show analytically and via simulation that the binary likelihood can provide misleading inference, particularly for certain model parameters that relate network ties to characteristics of individuals and pairs of individuals. We also compare these different likelihoods in a data analysis of several adolescent social networks. For some of these networks, the parameter estimates from the binary and FRN likelihoods lead to different conclusions, indicating the importance of analyzing FRN data with a method that accounts for the FRN survey design.
- 20 December 2013
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Network Science
- Vol. 1 (3) , 253-277
Likelihoods for fixed rank nomination networks
Many studies that gather social network data use survey methods that lead to censored, missing, or otherwise incomplete information. For example, the popular fixed rank nomination (FRN) scheme, often used in studies of schools and businesses, asks study participants to nominate and rank at most a small number of contacts or friends, leaving the existence of other relations uncertain. However, most statistical models are formulated in terms of completely observed binary networks. Statistical analyses of FRN data with such models ignore the censored and ranked nature of the data and could potentially result in misleading statistical inference. To investigate this possibility, we compare Bayesian parameter estimates obtained from a likelihood for complete binary networks with those obtained from likelihoods that are derived from the FRN scheme, and therefore accommodate the ranked and censored nature of the data. We show analytically and via simulation that the binary likelihood can provide misleading inference, particularly for certain model parameters that relate network ties to characteristics of individuals and pairs of individuals. We also compare these different likelihoods in a data analysis of several adolescent social networks. For some of these networks, the parameter estimates from the binary and FRN likelihoods lead to different conclusions, indicating the importance of analyzing FRN data with a method that accounts for the FRN survey design.
- 23 December 2011
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 108 (supplement) , 21326-21332
Stabilizing brokerage
A variety of social and economic arrangements exist to facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and information over gaps in social structure. Each of these arrangements bears some relationship to the idea of brokerage, but this brokerage is rarely like the pure and formal economic intermediation seen in some modern markets. Indeed, for reasons illuminated by existing sociological and economic models, brokerage is a fragile relationship. In this paper, we review the causes of instability in brokerage and identify three social mechanisms that can stabilize fragile brokerage relationships: social isolation, broker capture, and organizational grafting. Each of these mechanisms rests on the emergence or existence of supporting institutions. We suggest that organizational grafting may be the most stable and effective resolution to the tensions inherent in brokerage, but it is also the most institutionally demanding.
- 23 December 2011
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 108 (supplement) , 21326-21332
Stabilizing brokerage
A variety of social and economic arrangements exist to facilitate the exchange of goods, services, and information over gaps in social structure. Each of these arrangements bears some relationship to the idea of brokerage, but this brokerage is rarely like the pure and formal economic intermediation seen in some modern markets. Indeed, for reasons illuminated by existing sociological and economic models, brokerage is a fragile relationship. In this paper, we review the causes of instability in brokerage and identify three social mechanisms that can stabilize fragile brokerage relationships: social isolation, broker capture, and organizational grafting. Each of these mechanisms rests on the emergence or existence of supporting institutions. We suggest that organizational grafting may be the most stable and effective resolution to the tensions inherent in brokerage, but it is also the most institutionally demanding.
- 1 March 2001
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Forces
- Vol. 79 (3) , 843-880
Local Sequential Patterns: The Structure of Lynching in the Deep South, 1882-1930
White-on-black violence was a fact of life in the Deep South during the decades straddling the turn of the century. Yet though the lynching of blacks
- 1 March 2001
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Forces
- Vol. 79 (3) , 843-880
Local Sequential Patterns: The Structure of Lynching in the Deep South, 1882-1930
White-on-black violence was a fact of life in the Deep South during the decades straddling the turn of the century. Yet though the lynching of blacks