Marc Hauser
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Marc Hauser has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Bailey Spaulding
Departments of *Psychology
2 shared publicationsDavid Glynn
Department of Psychology, Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
1 shared publicationErnst Fehr
1 shared publication- Fiery Andrews Cushman
Harvard University
1 shared publication John Mikhail
John MikhailGeorgetown University Law Center, Washington DC
1 shared publicationJustin Wood
Department of Psychology, Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 November 2008
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 322 (5904) , 1057-1059
A Biolinguistic Agenda
Neurobiology and genetics are helping to generate insights about the evolution of language.
- 14 November 2008
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 322 (5904) , 1057-1059
A Biolinguistic Agenda
Neurobiology and genetics are helping to generate insights about the evolution of language.
- 31 May 2007
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 274 (1620) , 1913-1918
Rhesus monkeys correctly read the goal-relevant gestures of a human agent
When humans point, they reveal to others their underlying intent to communicate about some distant goal. A controversy has recently emerged based on a broad set of comparative and phylogenetically relevant data. In particular, whereas chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes ) have difficulty in using human-generated communicative gestures and actions such as pointing and placing symbolic markers to find hidden rewards, domesticated dogs ( Canis familiaris ) and silver foxes ( Urocyon cinereoargenteus ) readily use such gestures and markers. These comparative data have led to the hypothesis that the capacity to infer communicative intent in dogs and foxes has evolved as a result of human domestication. Though this hypothesis has met with challenges, due in part to studies of non-domesticated, non-primate animals, there remains the fundamental question of why our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees, together with other non-human primates, generally fail to make inferences about a target goal of an agent's communicative intent. Here, we add an important wrinkle to this phylogenetic pattern by showing that free-ranging rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta ) draw correct inferences about the goals of a human agent, using a suite of communicative gestures to locate previously concealed food. Though domestication and human enculturation may play a significant role in tuning up the capacity to infer intentions from communicative gestures, these factors are not necessary.
- 31 May 2007
- Published by The Royal Society in Proceedings Of The Royal Society B-Biological Sciences
- Vol. 274 (1620) , 1913-1918
Rhesus monkeys correctly read the goal-relevant gestures of a human agent
When humans point, they reveal to others their underlying intent to communicate about some distant goal. A controversy has recently emerged based on a broad set of comparative and phylogenetically relevant data. In particular, whereas chimpanzees ( Pan troglodytes ) have difficulty in using human-generated communicative gestures and actions such as pointing and placing symbolic markers to find hidden rewards, domesticated dogs ( Canis familiaris ) and silver foxes ( Urocyon cinereoargenteus ) readily use such gestures and markers. These comparative data have led to the hypothesis that the capacity to infer communicative intent in dogs and foxes has evolved as a result of human domestication. Though this hypothesis has met with challenges, due in part to studies of non-domesticated, non-primate animals, there remains the fundamental question of why our closest living relatives, the chimpanzees, together with other non-human primates, generally fail to make inferences about a target goal of an agent's communicative intent. Here, we add an important wrinkle to this phylogenetic pattern by showing that free-ranging rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta ) draw correct inferences about the goals of a human agent, using a suite of communicative gestures to locate previously concealed food. Though domestication and human enculturation may play a significant role in tuning up the capacity to infer intentions from communicative gestures, these factors are not necessary.
- 10 May 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Animal Behaviour
- Vol. 73 (6) , 1059-1065
When males call, females listen: sex differences in responsiveness to rhesus monkey, Macaca mulatta, copulation calls
- 10 May 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Animal Behaviour
- Vol. 73 (6) , 1059-1065
When males call, females listen: sex differences in responsiveness to rhesus monkey, Macaca mulatta, copulation calls
- Open Access
- 17 April 2007
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Biology
- Vol. 5 (4) , e107
An Incentive Solution to the Peer Review Problem
- 17 April 2007
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS Biology
- Vol. 5 (4) , e107
Open AccessAn Incentive Solution to the Peer Review Problem
- 31 January 2007
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 22 (1) , 1-21
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
Abstract: To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web‐based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals’ responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: (1) patterns of moral judgments were consistent with the principle of double effect and showed little variation across differences in gender, age, educational level, ethnicity, religion or national affiliation (within the limited range of our sample population) and (2) a majority of subjects failed to provide justifications that could account for their judgments. These results indicate that the principle of the double effect may be operative in our moral judgments but not open to conscious introspection. We discuss these results in light of current psychological theories of moral cognition, emphasizing the need to consider the unconscious appraisal system that mentally represents the causal and intentional properties of human action.
- 31 January 2007
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 22 (1) , 1-21
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
Abstract: To what extent do moral judgments depend on conscious reasoning from explicitly understood principles? We address this question by investigating one particular moral principle, the principle of the double effect. Using web‐based technology, we collected a large data set on individuals’ responses to a series of moral dilemmas, asking when harm to innocent others is permissible. Each moral dilemma presented a choice between action and inaction, both resulting in lives saved and lives lost. Results showed that: (1) patterns of moral judgments were consistent with the principle of double effect and showed little variation across differences in gender, age, educational level, ethnicity, religion or national affiliation (within the limited range of our sample population) and (2) a majority of subjects failed to provide justifications that could account for their judgments. These results indicate that the principle of the double effect may be operative in our moral judgments but not open to conscious introspection. We discuss these results in light of current psychological theories of moral cognition, emphasizing the need to consider the unconscious appraisal system that mentally represents the causal and intentional properties of human action.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 1 (3) , 214-220
The liver and the moral organ
Recent negative focus on women's academic abilities has fueled disputes over gender disparities in the sciences. The controversy derives, in part, from women's relatively poorer performance in aptitude tests, many of which require skills of spatial reasoning. We used functional magnetic imaging to examine the neural structure underlying shifts in women's performance of a spatial reasoning task induced by positive and negative stereotypes. Three groups of participants performed a task involving imagined rotations of the self. Prior to scanning, the positive stereotype group was exposed to a false but plausible stereotype of women's superior perspective-taking abilities; the negative stereotype group was exposed to the pervasive stereotype that men outperform women on spatial tasks; and the control group received neutral information. The significantly poorer performance we found in the negative stereotype group corresponded to increased activation in brain regions associated with increased emotional load. In contrast, the significantly improved performance we found in the positive stereotype group was associated with increased activation in visual processing areas and, to a lesser degree, complex working memory processes. These findings suggest that stereotype messages affect the brain selectively, with positive messages producing relatively more efficient neural strategies than negative messages.
- 1 December 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Vol. 1 (3) , 214-220
Open AccessThe liver and the moral organ
Recent negative focus on women's academic abilities has fueled disputes over gender disparities in the sciences. The controversy derives, in part, from women's relatively poorer performance in aptitude tests, many of which require skills of spatial reasoning. We used functional magnetic imaging to examine the neural structure underlying shifts in women's performance of a spatial reasoning task induced by positive and negative stereotypes. Three groups of participants performed a task involving imagined rotations of the self. Prior to scanning, the positive stereotype group was exposed to a false but plausible stereotype of women's superior perspective-taking abilities; the negative stereotype group was exposed to the pervasive stereotype that men outperform women on spatial tasks; and the control group received neutral information. The significantly poorer performance we found in the negative stereotype group corresponded to increased activation in brain regions associated with increased emotional load. In contrast, the significantly improved performance we found in the positive stereotype group was associated with increased activation in visual processing areas and, to a lesser degree, complex working memory processes. These findings suggest that stereotype messages affect the brain selectively, with positive messages producing relatively more efficient neural strategies than negative messages.
- 2 May 2006
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 103 (18) , 7181-7185
Wild rhesus monkeys generate causal inferences about possible and impossible physical transformations in the absence of experience
Human infants and adults generate causal inferences about the physical world from observations of single, novel events, thereby violating Hume's thesis that spatiotemporal cooccurrence from prior experience drives causal perception in our species. Is this capacity unique or shared with other animals? We address this question by presenting the results of three experiments on free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), focusing specifically on their capacity to generate expectations about the nature of completely unfamiliar physical transformations. By using an expectancy violation looking-time method, each experiment presented subjects with either physically possible or impossible transformations of objects (e.g., a knife, as opposed to a glass of water, appears to cut an apple in half). In both experiments, subjects looked longer when the transformation was impossible than when it was possible. Follow up experiments ruled out that these patterns could be explained by association. These results show that in the absence of training or direct prior experience, rhesus monkeys generate causal inferences from single, novel events, using their knowledge of the physical world to guide such expectations.
- 2 May 2006
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 103 (18) , 7181-7185
Wild rhesus monkeys generate causal inferences about possible and impossible physical transformations in the absence of experience
Human infants and adults generate causal inferences about the physical world from observations of single, novel events, thereby violating Hume's thesis that spatiotemporal cooccurrence from prior experience drives causal perception in our species. Is this capacity unique or shared with other animals? We address this question by presenting the results of three experiments on free-ranging rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), focusing specifically on their capacity to generate expectations about the nature of completely unfamiliar physical transformations. By using an expectancy violation looking-time method, each experiment presented subjects with either physically possible or impossible transformations of objects (e.g., a knife, as opposed to a glass of water, appears to cut an apple in half). In both experiments, subjects looked longer when the transformation was impossible than when it was possible. Follow up experiments ruled out that these patterns could be explained by association. These results show that in the absence of training or direct prior experience, rhesus monkeys generate causal inferences from single, novel events, using their knowledge of the physical world to guide such expectations.
- 30 September 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Animal Behaviour
- Vol. 70 (3) , 517-526
What experience is required for acquiring tool competence? Experiments with two callitrichids
- 30 September 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Animal Behaviour
- Vol. 70 (3) , 517-526
What experience is required for acquiring tool competence? Experiments with two callitrichids
- 2 September 2005
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 309 (5740) , 1498-1499
Beyond the Chimpanzee Genome: The Threat of Extinction
In his Perspective, Hauser comments that to fully profit from the information encoded in the chimpanzee genome, we will need an equally rich depiction of chimpanzee behavior, thought, and neural function. Given the explosion of recent findings from the behavioral and cognitive sciences, a synthesis is on the horizon. Only our own casual use of the environment, which threatens the future of chimpanzees, can stand in the way of witnessing this synthesis.
- 2 September 2005
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 309 (5740) , 1498-1499
Beyond the Chimpanzee Genome: The Threat of Extinction
In his Perspective, Hauser comments that to fully profit from the information encoded in the chimpanzee genome, we will need an equally rich depiction of chimpanzee behavior, thought, and neural function. Given the explosion of recent findings from the behavioral and cognitive sciences, a synthesis is on the horizon. Only our own casual use of the environment, which threatens the future of chimpanzees, can stand in the way of witnessing this synthesis.
- 1 September 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 437 (7055) , 60-63
Our chimpanzee mind
Some might consider the title of this piece preposterous. Bishop Wilberforce would no doubt have shaken his fist at it, just as he disputed Huxley's championing of darwinian continuity. But the title of this essay is no more outrageous than one entitled 'The chimpanzee's bird brain', for there has been extensive evolutionary conservation of many neural and psychological functions across species. We share with chimpanzees some--but not all--mental functions, some of which are shared with other species as well. As the publication of the chimpanzee genome reveals, we also share a good deal of our DNA. Unfortunately, we are virtually in the dark when it comes to understanding how genes build minds. If comparative genomics is to enlighten our understanding of human origins, it must be accompanied by an equally rich description of animal psychology, both in terms of its underlying neural signatures and the evolutionary processes that led to convergence and divergence with other species.
- 1 September 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 437 (7055) , 60-63
Our chimpanzee mind
Some might consider the title of this piece preposterous. Bishop Wilberforce would no doubt have shaken his fist at it, just as he disputed Huxley's championing of darwinian continuity. But the title of this essay is no more outrageous than one entitled 'The chimpanzee's bird brain', for there has been extensive evolutionary conservation of many neural and psychological functions across species. We share with chimpanzees some--but not all--mental functions, some of which are shared with other species as well. As the publication of the chimpanzee genome reveals, we also share a good deal of our DNA. Unfortunately, we are virtually in the dark when it comes to understanding how genes build minds. If comparative genomics is to enlighten our understanding of human origins, it must be accompanied by an equally rich description of animal psychology, both in terms of its underlying neural signatures and the evolutionary processes that led to convergence and divergence with other species.