Ellen Raber
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Ellen Raber has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adam H. Love
Johnson Wright, Inc., 3730 Mt Diablo Blvd, Suite 230, Lafayette, CA 94549, USA
1 shared publication - Alex K. Vu
L-091, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, 94550, United States
1 shared publication Alfred Jin
Environmental Protection Department , University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory , Livermore, CA, USA
1 shared publicationAlfred L. Jin
Environmental Protection Department, University of California, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA 94551
1 shared publication- Alison Burklund
Thayer School of Engineering, Dartmouth College 1 , Hanover, New Hampshire 03755, USA
1 shared publication - Christopher G. Bailey
L-091, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, 94550, United States
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 25-36
Operational Framework for Recovery from an Attack Involving a Radiological Dispersal Device/Improvised Nuclear Device
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 25-36
Operational Framework for Recovery from an Attack Involving a Radiological Dispersal Device/Improvised Nuclear Device
- 30 November 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Hazardous Materials
- Vol. 196, 115-122
Efficacy of liquid and foam decontamination technologies for chemical warfare agents on indoor surfaces
- 30 November 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Hazardous Materials
- Vol. 196, 115-122
Efficacy of liquid and foam decontamination technologies for chemical warfare agents on indoor surfaces
- Open Access
- 1 September 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
- Vol. 9 (3) , 257-261
The Challenge of Determining the Need for Remediation Following a Wide-Area Biological Release
Recovering from a biological attack is a complex process requiring the successful resolution of numerous challenges. The Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration program is one of the first multiagency efforts to develop strategies and tools that could be effective following a wide-area release of B. anthracis spores. Nevertheless, several key policy issues and associated science and technology issues still need to be addressed. For example, more refined risk assessment and management approaches are needed to help evaluate “true” public health risk. Once the risk is understood, that information can be considered along with the types of characterization activities deemed necessary to determine whether the cost and time of decontamination are actually warranted. This commentary offers 5 recommendations associated with decision making regarding decontamination and clearance options that should accompany a comprehensive risk analysis leading to more effective risk management decisions. It summarizes some of the most important technological gaps that still need to be addressed to help decision makers in their objective of reducing health risks to an acceptable level. The risk management approach described should enable decision makers to improve credibility and gain public acceptance, especially when an adequate science and technology base is available to support the required decisions.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
- Vol. 9 (3) , 257-261
Open AccessThe Challenge of Determining the Need for Remediation Following a Wide-Area Biological Release
Recovering from a biological attack is a complex process requiring the successful resolution of numerous challenges. The Interagency Biological Restoration Demonstration program is one of the first multiagency efforts to develop strategies and tools that could be effective following a wide-area release of B. anthracis spores. Nevertheless, several key policy issues and associated science and technology issues still need to be addressed. For example, more refined risk assessment and management approaches are needed to help evaluate “true” public health risk. Once the risk is understood, that information can be considered along with the types of characterization activities deemed necessary to determine whether the cost and time of decontamination are actually warranted. This commentary offers 5 recommendations associated with decision making regarding decontamination and clearance options that should accompany a comprehensive risk analysis leading to more effective risk management decisions. It summarizes some of the most important technological gaps that still need to be addressed to help decision makers in their objective of reducing health risks to an acceptable level. The risk management approach described should enable decision makers to improve credibility and gain public acceptance, especially when an adequate science and technology base is available to support the required decisions.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
- Vol. 9 (3) , 271-279
The National Framework and Consequence Management Guidance Following a Biological Attack
Consequence management following a release of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores requires a high level of technical understanding and direction. National policies and regulations address the topics of preparedness goals and organizational structure, but they do not tell responders how to perform remediation. Essential considerations include determining what must be cleaned, evaluating health risks, ascertaining the priority of cleanup, and selecting appropriate decontamination technologies to meet consensus and risk-derived clearance goals. This article highlights key features of a national-level framework that has been developed to guide a risk-based decision process and inform technical personnel of the best practices to follow during each activity leading to the restoration of functions at affected facilities or areas. The framework and associated guidance follows the scheme of 6 phases for response and recovery arrived at through interagency consensus and approval. Each phase is elaborated in a series of detailed decision flowcharts identifying key questions that must be addressed and answered from the time that first indications of a credible biological attack are received to final reoccupancy of affected areas and a return to normal daily functions.
- 1 September 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
- Vol. 9 (3) , 271-279
Open AccessThe National Framework and Consequence Management Guidance Following a Biological Attack
Consequence management following a release of aerosolized Bacillus anthracis spores requires a high level of technical understanding and direction. National policies and regulations address the topics of preparedness goals and organizational structure, but they do not tell responders how to perform remediation. Essential considerations include determining what must be cleaned, evaluating health risks, ascertaining the priority of cleanup, and selecting appropriate decontamination technologies to meet consensus and risk-derived clearance goals. This article highlights key features of a national-level framework that has been developed to guide a risk-based decision process and inform technical personnel of the best practices to follow during each activity leading to the restoration of functions at affected facilities or areas. The framework and associated guidance follows the scheme of 6 phases for response and recovery arrived at through interagency consensus and approval. Each phase is elaborated in a series of detailed decision flowcharts identifying key questions that must be addressed and answered from the time that first indications of a credible biological attack are received to final reoccupancy of affected areas and a return to normal daily functions.
- 1 October 2010
- Published by American Society for Microbiology in Applied and Environmental Microbiology
- Vol. 76 (19) , 6631-6638
Decontamination Options for Bacillus anthracis -Contaminated Drinking Water Determined from Spore Surrogate Studies
Five parameters were evaluated with surrogates of Bacillus anthracis spores to determine effective decontamination alternatives for use in a contaminated drinking water supply. The parameters were as follows: (i) type of Bacillus spore surrogate ( B. thuringiensis or B. atrophaeus ), (ii) spore concentration in suspension (10 2 and 10 6 spores/ml), (iii) chemical characteristics of the decontaminant (sodium dichloro- S -triazinetrione dihydrate [Dichlor], hydrogen peroxide, potassium peroxymonosulfate [Oxone], sodium hypochlorite, and VirkonS), (iv) decontaminant concentration (0.01% to 5%), and (v) exposure time to decontaminant (10 min to 1 h). Results from 138 suspension tests with appropriate controls are reported. Hydrogen peroxide at a concentration of 5% and Dichlor or sodium hypochlorite at a concentration of 2% were highly effective at spore inactivation regardless of spore type tested, spore exposure time, or spore concentration evaluated. This is the first reported study of Dichlor as an effective decontaminant for B. anthracis spore surrogates. Dichlor's desirable characteristics of high oxidation potential, high level of free chlorine, and a more neutral pH than that of other oxidizers evaluated appear to make it an excellent alternative. All three oxidizers were effective against B. atrophaeus spores in meeting the EPA biocide standard of greater than a 6-log kill after a 10-min exposure time and at lower concentrations than typically reported for biocide use. Solutions of 5% VirkonS and Oxone were less effective as decontaminants than other options evaluated in this study and did not meet the EPA's efficacy standard for a biocide, although they were found to be as effective for concentrations of 10 2 spores/ml. Differences in methods and procedures reported by other investigators make quantitative comparisons among studies difficult.
- 1 October 2010
- Published by American Society for Microbiology in Applied and Environmental Microbiology
- Vol. 76 (19) , 6631-6638
Decontamination Options for Bacillus anthracis -Contaminated Drinking Water Determined from Spore Surrogate Studies
Five parameters were evaluated with surrogates of Bacillus anthracis spores to determine effective decontamination alternatives for use in a contaminated drinking water supply. The parameters were as follows: (i) type of Bacillus spore surrogate ( B. thuringiensis or B. atrophaeus ), (ii) spore concentration in suspension (10 2 and 10 6 spores/ml), (iii) chemical characteristics of the decontaminant (sodium dichloro- S -triazinetrione dihydrate [Dichlor], hydrogen peroxide, potassium peroxymonosulfate [Oxone], sodium hypochlorite, and VirkonS), (iv) decontaminant concentration (0.01% to 5%), and (v) exposure time to decontaminant (10 min to 1 h). Results from 138 suspension tests with appropriate controls are reported. Hydrogen peroxide at a concentration of 5% and Dichlor or sodium hypochlorite at a concentration of 2% were highly effective at spore inactivation regardless of spore type tested, spore exposure time, or spore concentration evaluated. This is the first reported study of Dichlor as an effective decontaminant for B. anthracis spore surrogates. Dichlor's desirable characteristics of high oxidation potential, high level of free chlorine, and a more neutral pH than that of other oxidizers evaluated appear to make it an excellent alternative. All three oxidizers were effective against B. atrophaeus spores in meeting the EPA biocide standard of greater than a 6-log kill after a 10-min exposure time and at lower concentrations than typically reported for biocide use. Solutions of 5% VirkonS and Oxone were less effective as decontaminants than other options evaluated in this study and did not meet the EPA's efficacy standard for a biocide, although they were found to be as effective for concentrations of 10 2 spores/ml. Differences in methods and procedures reported by other investigators make quantitative comparisons among studies difficult.
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Environmental Health Research
- Vol. 14 (6) , 465-469
Letter to the Editor
- 1 December 2004
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Environmental Health Research
- Vol. 14 (6) , 465-469
Letter to the Editor
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Environmental Health Research
- Vol. 14 (1) , 31-41
How clean is clean enough? Recent developments in response to threats posed by chemical and biological warfare agents
Recent terrorist events underscore the urgent need to develop a comprehensive set of health-protective cleanup standards and effective decontamination technologies for use in the restoration of civilian facilities. Accurate scientific information remains limited in the area of biological warfare agents. However, new guidelines and calculated cleanup values are emerging for initial re-entry and long-term reoccupation following use of chemical warfare agents. This article addresses airborne, soil, and surface exposures following release of G-type chemical warfare agents and VX. Cleanup goals should be tailored to the type of population that may be exposed, potential exposure times, and other scenario-specific considerations. Three different airborne concentrations are proposed for cleanup of public sector facilities. One value is recommended for initial re-entry; a more conservative value is recommended for long-term monitoring and increased public confidence; and a third, even more conservative concentration represents essentially a no-effect level for round-the-clock airborne exposure. Health-based cleanup levels are provided for contaminated residential and industrial soil. Results are presented on the outcome of a preliminary risk assessment to determine safe surface levels (e.g., walls, floors, and handrails) for cleanup after exposure to the G agents and VX. Because specific cleanup criteria for most biological warfare agents remain problematic, recommendations are made for filling the knowledge gaps.
- 1 February 2004
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Environmental Health Research
- Vol. 14 (1) , 31-41
How clean is clean enough? Recent developments in response to threats posed by chemical and biological warfare agents
Recent terrorist events underscore the urgent need to develop a comprehensive set of health-protective cleanup standards and effective decontamination technologies for use in the restoration of civilian facilities. Accurate scientific information remains limited in the area of biological warfare agents. However, new guidelines and calculated cleanup values are emerging for initial re-entry and long-term reoccupation following use of chemical warfare agents. This article addresses airborne, soil, and surface exposures following release of G-type chemical warfare agents and VX. Cleanup goals should be tailored to the type of population that may be exposed, potential exposure times, and other scenario-specific considerations. Three different airborne concentrations are proposed for cleanup of public sector facilities. One value is recommended for initial re-entry; a more conservative value is recommended for long-term monitoring and increased public confidence; and a third, even more conservative concentration represents essentially a no-effect level for round-the-clock airborne exposure. Health-based cleanup levels are provided for contaminated residential and industrial soil. Results are presented on the outcome of a preliminary risk assessment to determine safe surface levels (e.g., walls, floors, and handrails) for cleanup after exposure to the G agents and VX. Because specific cleanup criteria for most biological warfare agents remain problematic, recommendations are made for filling the knowledge gaps.
- 1 April 2002
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 22 (2) , 195-202
Chemical and Biological Agent Incident Response and Decision Process for Civilian and Public Sector Facilities
In the event of a terrorist attack or catastrophic release involving potential chemical and/or biological warfare agents, decisionmakers will need to make timely and informed choices about whether, or how, to respond. The objective of this article is to provide a decision framework to specify initial and follow‐up actions, including possible decontamination, and to address long‐term health and environmental issues. This decision framework consists of four phases, beginning with the identification of an incident and ending with verification that cleanup and remediation criteria have been met. The flowchart takes into account both differences and similarities among potential agents or toxins at key points in the decision‐making process. Risk evaluation and communication of information to the public must be done throughout the process to ensure a successful effort.
- 1 April 2002
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 22 (2) , 195-202
Chemical and Biological Agent Incident Response and Decision Process for Civilian and Public Sector Facilities
In the event of a terrorist attack or catastrophic release involving potential chemical and/or biological warfare agents, decisionmakers will need to make timely and informed choices about whether, or how, to respond. The objective of this article is to provide a decision framework to specify initial and follow‐up actions, including possible decontamination, and to address long‐term health and environmental issues. This decision framework consists of four phases, beginning with the identification of an incident and ending with verification that cleanup and remediation criteria have been met. The flowchart takes into account both differences and similarities among potential agents or toxins at key points in the decision‐making process. Risk evaluation and communication of information to the public must be done throughout the process to ensure a successful effort.
- 1 June 2001
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Environmental Health Research
- Vol. 11 (2) , 128-148
Decontamination issues for chemical and biological warfare agents: How clean is clean enough?
The objective of this assessment is to determine what level of cleanup will be required to meet regulatory and stakeholder needs in the case of a chemical and/or biological incident at a civilian facility. A literature review for selected, potential chemical and biological warfare agents shows that dose information is often lacking or controversial. Environmental regulatory limits or other industrial health guidelines that could be used to help establish cleanup concentration levels for such agents are generally unavailable or not applicable for a public setting. Although dose information, cleanup criteria, and decontamination protocols all present challenges to effective planning, several decontamination approaches are available. Such approaches should be combined with risk-informed decision making to establish reasonable cleanup goals for protecting health, property, and resources. Key issues during a risk assessment are to determine exactly what constitutes a safety hazard and whether decontamination is necessary or not for a particular scenario. An important conclusion is that cleanup criteria are site dependent and stakeholder specific. The results of a modeling exercise for two outdoor scenarios are presented to reinforce this conclusion. Public perception of risk to health, public acceptance of recommendations based on scientific criteria, political support, time constraints, and economic concerns must all be addressed in the context of a specific scenario to yield effective and acceptable decontamination.
- 1 June 2001
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Environmental Health Research
- Vol. 11 (2) , 128-148
Decontamination issues for chemical and biological warfare agents: How clean is clean enough?
The objective of this assessment is to determine what level of cleanup will be required to meet regulatory and stakeholder needs in the case of a chemical and/or biological incident at a civilian facility. A literature review for selected, potential chemical and biological warfare agents shows that dose information is often lacking or controversial. Environmental regulatory limits or other industrial health guidelines that could be used to help establish cleanup concentration levels for such agents are generally unavailable or not applicable for a public setting. Although dose information, cleanup criteria, and decontamination protocols all present challenges to effective planning, several decontamination approaches are available. Such approaches should be combined with risk-informed decision making to establish reasonable cleanup goals for protecting health, property, and resources. Key issues during a risk assessment are to determine exactly what constitutes a safety hazard and whether decontamination is necessary or not for a particular scenario. An important conclusion is that cleanup criteria are site dependent and stakeholder specific. The results of a modeling exercise for two outdoor scenarios are presented to reinforce this conclusion. Public perception of risk to health, public acceptance of recommendations based on scientific criteria, political support, time constraints, and economic concerns must all be addressed in the context of a specific scenario to yield effective and acceptable decontamination.