Salo V. Coslovsky
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Salo V. Coslovsky has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Renato Bignami
Labor inspector at the Ministério do Trabalho, Superintenděncia Regional do Trabalho in São Paulo
1 shared publication - Roberto Rocha Coelho Pires
Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, Brasil
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Latin American Politics and Society
- Vol. 59 (2) , 77-102
Resilience and Renewal: The Enforcement of Labor Laws in Brazil
What happens to a country's system of labor laws when its government embraces market-oriented reforms? In a twist on the prediction that labor regulations will be repealed, researchers find that laws remain in place but are not faithfully enforced, a phenomenon known as de facto flexibility. This article examines the case of Brazil to understand its near-opposite; namely, resilience and renewal in the enforcement of labor regulations. It finds that labor unions have combined the corporatist authority they gained under state control with the autonomy they acquired under democratization to devise new modes of action and to safeguard existing regulations. Meanwhile, labor inspectors and prosecutors rely on existing laws to combat precarious work conditions and promote formal employment relations, which strengthen the unions. This mutually supportive arrangement is neither perfect nor free of tension, but it shows how workers can be protected even when employers are subjected to global competition.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Latin American Politics and Society
- Vol. 59 (2) , 77-102
Resilience and Renewal: The Enforcement of Labor Laws in Brazil
What happens to a country's system of labor laws when its government embraces market-oriented reforms? In a twist on the prediction that labor regulations will be repealed, researchers find that laws remain in place but are not faithfully enforced, a phenomenon known as de facto flexibility. This article examines the case of Brazil to understand its near-opposite; namely, resilience and renewal in the enforcement of labor regulations. It finds that labor unions have combined the corporatist authority they gained under state control with the autonomy they acquired under democratization to devise new modes of action and to safeguard existing regulations. Meanwhile, labor inspectors and prosecutors rely on existing laws to combat precarious work conditions and promote formal employment relations, which strengthen the unions. This mutually supportive arrangement is neither perfect nor free of tension, but it shows how workers can be protected even when employers are subjected to global competition.
- 1 November 2015
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1103-1119
Beyond Bureaucracy: How Prosecutors and Public Defenders Enforce Urban Planning Laws in São Paulo, Brazil
- 1 November 2015
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Urban and Regional Research
- Vol. 39 (6) , 1103-1119
Beyond Bureaucracy: How Prosecutors and Public Defenders Enforce Urban Planning Laws in São Paulo, Brazil
- 24 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Oxford Development Studies
- Vol. 42 (2) , 190-216
Flying Under the Radar? The State and the Enforcement of Labour Laws in Brazil
Over the past three decades, developing countries have deregulated, privatized and liberalized their economies. Paradoxically, they have also retained or even strengthened their labour laws and regulations. This compromise has created enormous political tension, which manifests itself as recurrent calls for either a rollback or a deepening of reforms. Few of these calls have been heeded, so the burden of reconciling the conflicting policies ends up being transferred to those public agents who enforce the regulations on the ground. To understand how these agents act, the latitude they have, the limits they face and the results they accomplish, this paper examines how labour inspectors and prosecutors intervened in four beleaguered industries in Brazil. It finds that enforcement agents often do more than just impose fines or teach infringers about the law. Rather, they use their discretion and legal powers to realign incentives, reshape interests and redistribute the risks, costs and benefits of compliance across a tailor-made assemblage of public, private and non-profit enterprises in a way that makes compliance easier for all involved. On a broader canvas, regulatory enforcement agents who perform this role can be characterized as the foot soldiers of a post-neoliberal or neo-developmental state.
- 24 January 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Oxford Development Studies
- Vol. 42 (2) , 190-216
Flying Under the Radar? The State and the Enforcement of Labour Laws in Brazil
Over the past three decades, developing countries have deregulated, privatized and liberalized their economies. Paradoxically, they have also retained or even strengthened their labour laws and regulations. This compromise has created enormous political tension, which manifests itself as recurrent calls for either a rollback or a deepening of reforms. Few of these calls have been heeded, so the burden of reconciling the conflicting policies ends up being transferred to those public agents who enforce the regulations on the ground. To understand how these agents act, the latitude they have, the limits they face and the results they accomplish, this paper examines how labour inspectors and prosecutors intervened in four beleaguered industries in Brazil. It finds that enforcement agents often do more than just impose fines or teach infringers about the law. Rather, they use their discretion and legal powers to realign incentives, reshape interests and redistribute the risks, costs and benefits of compliance across a tailor-made assemblage of public, private and non-profit enterprises in a way that makes compliance easier for all involved. On a broader canvas, regulatory enforcement agents who perform this role can be characterized as the foot soldiers of a post-neoliberal or neo-developmental state.
- 1 March 2011
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 5 (1) , 70-89
Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness
- 1 March 2011
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 5 (1) , 70-89
Relational regulation in the Brazilian Ministério Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness