Julie Zahle
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Julie Zahle has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Finn Collin
University of Copenhagen
2 shared publications Finn Collin
University of Copenhagen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 48 (4) , 553-567
Ability Theories of Practice and Turner’s Criticism of Bourdieu
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 48 (4) , 553-567
Ability Theories of Practice and Turner’s Criticism of Bourdieu
- 15 May 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 44 (6) , 810-816
How to Circumscribe Individualist Explanations
In “Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence: A Response to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg,” Elder-Vass takes the opportunity to reply to my criticism of his theory in “Holism, Emergence, and the Crucial Distinction.” In this response, I show how methodological individualists may respond to his argument against their position and I argue that Elder-Vass fails to provide reasons as to why his particular distinction between individualist and holist explanations should be adopted.
- 15 May 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 44 (6) , 810-816
How to Circumscribe Individualist Explanations
In “Redescription, Reduction, and Emergence: A Response to Tobias Hansson Wahlberg,” Elder-Vass takes the opportunity to reply to my criticism of his theory in “Holism, Emergence, and the Crucial Distinction.” In this response, I show how methodological individualists may respond to his argument against their position and I argue that Elder-Vass fails to provide reasons as to why his particular distinction between individualist and holist explanations should be adopted.
- 10 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 44 (1) , 225-226
ENPOSS 2012: The First Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Copenhagen, September 21–23, 2012)
- 10 March 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 44 (1) , 225-226
ENPOSS 2012: The First Conference of the European Network for the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Copenhagen, September 21–23, 2012)
- 26 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 365-376
Participant Observation and Objectivity in Anthropology
- 26 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 365-376
Participant Observation and Objectivity in Anthropology
- 8 October 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 44 (1) , 74-85
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States
The overall aim of this two-part paper is to provide a supplement to ability theories of practice in terms of a defense of the following thesis: Individuals’ ability to act appropriately sometimes depends on their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. In part I, I presented the account of direct perception. In this part II, I argue that, by the lights of this account, normative states are sometimes directly perceptible. Also, I show that the ability directly to perceive normative states is a commonly possessed—and exercised—ability. On this basis, I establish the conclusion that, in situations of social interaction, individuals’ ability to act appropriately is sometimes underwritten by their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. By way of ending, I briefly explain the different ways in which my discussion constitutes both a useful supplement to ability theories of practice and a reply to an important objection raised against these theories.
- 8 October 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 44 (1) , 74-85
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States
The overall aim of this two-part paper is to provide a supplement to ability theories of practice in terms of a defense of the following thesis: Individuals’ ability to act appropriately sometimes depends on their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. In part I, I presented the account of direct perception. In this part II, I argue that, by the lights of this account, normative states are sometimes directly perceptible. Also, I show that the ability directly to perceive normative states is a commonly possessed—and exercised—ability. On this basis, I establish the conclusion that, in situations of social interaction, individuals’ ability to act appropriately is sometimes underwritten by their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. By way of ending, I briefly explain the different ways in which my discussion constitutes both a useful supplement to ability theories of practice and a reply to an important objection raised against these theories.
- 14 August 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 43 (4) , 493-518
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States
The overall aim of this two-part article is to provide a supplement to ability theories of practice in terms of a defense of the following thesis: In situations of social interaction, individuals’ ability to act appropriately sometimes depends on their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. In this Part I, I introduce ability theories of practice and motivate my thesis. Furthermore, I offer an analysis of normative states as response-dependent properties. Last, I work out and defend an account of direct perception that is compatible with individuals being able directly to perceive various everyday phenomena. Drawing on this account, I show in part II, that normative states are sometimes directly perceptible too.
- 14 August 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Philosophy of the Social Sciences
- Vol. 43 (4) , 493-518
Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States
The overall aim of this two-part article is to provide a supplement to ability theories of practice in terms of a defense of the following thesis: In situations of social interaction, individuals’ ability to act appropriately sometimes depends on their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. In this Part I, I introduce ability theories of practice and motivate my thesis. Furthermore, I offer an analysis of normative states as response-dependent properties. Last, I work out and defend an account of direct perception that is compatible with individuals being able directly to perceive various everyday phenomena. Drawing on this account, I show in part II, that normative states are sometimes directly perceptible too.
- 28 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 43 (1) , 133-136
Conference on the Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2011
- 28 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 43 (1) , 133-136
Conference on the Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2011
- 18 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (1) , 50-65
Practical Knowledge and Participant Observation
An important strand of theories of practice stress that individuals' practical knowledge, i.e., their ability to act in appropriate and/or effective ways, is mainly tacit. This means that the social scientist cannot find out about this knowledge by simply asking the individuals she studies to articulate how it is appropriate and/or effective to act in various circumstances. In this paper, I pursue the proposal that the method of participant observation may be used to find out about individuals' practical knowledge. Surprisingly, the literature does not contain any systematic and comprehensive discussion of this suggestion. I distinguish and exemplify four types of observation that are indicative of individuals' practical knowledge. The observations may serve as a basis for the social scientist's formulations of this knowledge. Further, I point to two main ways in which things may go wrong when the social scientist uses participant observation to find out about individuals' practical knowledge. I argue that the social scientist can make reasonably sure to avoid these two potential difficulties. Accordingly, I conclude that these difficulties do not undermine the effectiveness of the method. In this sense, social scientists are right to use the method of participant observation to find out about individuals' practical knowledge.
- 18 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (1) , 50-65
Practical Knowledge and Participant Observation
An important strand of theories of practice stress that individuals' practical knowledge, i.e., their ability to act in appropriate and/or effective ways, is mainly tacit. This means that the social scientist cannot find out about this knowledge by simply asking the individuals she studies to articulate how it is appropriate and/or effective to act in various circumstances. In this paper, I pursue the proposal that the method of participant observation may be used to find out about individuals' practical knowledge. Surprisingly, the literature does not contain any systematic and comprehensive discussion of this suggestion. I distinguish and exemplify four types of observation that are indicative of individuals' practical knowledge. The observations may serve as a basis for the social scientist's formulations of this knowledge. Further, I point to two main ways in which things may go wrong when the social scientist uses participant observation to find out about individuals' practical knowledge. I argue that the social scientist can make reasonably sure to avoid these two potential difficulties. Accordingly, I conclude that these difficulties do not undermine the effectiveness of the method. In this sense, social scientists are right to use the method of participant observation to find out about individuals' practical knowledge.