Felipe De Brigard
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Felipe De Brigard has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel L. Schacter
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
2 shared publications William J. Brady
New York University
2 shared publicationsDaniel Schacter
1 shared publication- Donna Rose Addis
Rotman Research Institute, Baycrest Academy for Research and Education, North York, Canada; School of Psychology, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand; Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
1 shared publication J.H. Ford
Department of Psychology – UNC, Chapel Hill
1 shared publicationK.S. Giovanello
Department of Psychology – UNC, Chapel Hill
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 9 (2) , 447
Correction to: The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of Responsibility
- 17 March 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 9 (2) , 447
Correction to: The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of Responsibility
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 51 (12) , 2401-2414
Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 51 (12) , 2401-2414
Remembering what could have happened: Neural correlates of episodic counterfactual thinking
- Open Access
- 14 May 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 24 (7) , 1329-1334
Coming to Grips With the Past
When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of alternative ways in which personal past events could have occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical memories. One week later, they self-generated upward, downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those counterfactuals either once or four times. The results indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease, detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations. Possible implications of this finding for pathological and nonpathological anxiety are discussed.
- 14 May 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 24 (7) , 1329-1334
Open AccessComing to Grips With the Past
When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of alternative ways in which personal past events could have occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical memories. One week later, they self-generated upward, downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those counterfactuals either once or four times. The results indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease, detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations. Possible implications of this finding for pathological and nonpathological anxiety are discussed.
- 6 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (2) , 259-269
The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of Responsibility
- 6 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (2) , 259-269
The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of Responsibility
- Top Cited Papers
- 5 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 191 (2) , 155-185
Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking
- 5 February 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 191 (2) , 155-185
Top Cited PapersIs memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of episodic hypothetical thinking
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 21 (3) , 1085-1096
Influence of outcome valence in the subjective experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 21 (3) , 1085-1096
Influence of outcome valence in the subjective experience of episodic past, future, and counterfactual thinking
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 3, 21344
The Role of Attention in Conscious Recollection
Most research on the relationship between attention and consciousness has been limited to perception. However, perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of which we can be conscious. An important set of conscious states that has not received proper treatment within this discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews compelling evidence indicating that attention may be necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of conscious perception, the kind of attention required during recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention. As such, the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as suggesting that internal attention is necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. The paper begins by justifying the need for clear distinctions among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the difference between internal and external attention. Next, evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is required for the successful retrieval of memorial contents is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that internal attention during recollection is what makes us conscious of the contents of retrieved memories; further evidence in support of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested that internal attention is probably not sufficient for conscious recollection. Open questions and possible avenues for future research are also mentioned.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 3, 21344
Open AccessThe Role of Attention in Conscious Recollection
Most research on the relationship between attention and consciousness has been limited to perception. However, perceptions are not the only kinds of mental contents of which we can be conscious. An important set of conscious states that has not received proper treatment within this discussion is that of memories. This paper reviews compelling evidence indicating that attention may be necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. However, it is argued that unlike the case of conscious perception, the kind of attention required during recollection is internal, as opposed to external, attention. As such, the surveyed empirical evidence is interpreted as suggesting that internal attention is necessary, but probably not sufficient, for conscious recollection. The paper begins by justifying the need for clear distinctions among different kinds of attention, and then emphasizes the difference between internal and external attention. Next, evidence from behavioral, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies suggesting that internal attention is required for the successful retrieval of memorial contents is reviewed. In turn, it is argued that internal attention during recollection is what makes us conscious of the contents of retrieved memories; further evidence in support of this claim is also provided. Finally, it is suggested that internal attention is probably not sufficient for conscious recollection. Open questions and possible avenues for future research are also mentioned.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 3, 35015
Predictive Memory and the Surprising Gap
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 3, 35015
Open AccessPredictive Memory and the Surprising Gap