Shang-Hua Teng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Shang-Hua Teng has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel A. Spielman
Yale University, New Haven, USA
5 shared publications - Rajmohan Rajaraman
Northeastern University, Boston, USA
4 shared publications - Ravi Sundaram
Northeastern University
4 shared publications Laura J. Poplawski
3 shared publications- John Dunagan
Microsoft Research
2 shared publications - Konstantin Voevodski
Department of Computer Science, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 November 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Systems Biology
- Vol. 3 (1) , 112
Spectral affinity in protein networks
Background: Protein-protein interaction (PPI) networks enable us to better understand the functional organization of the proteome. We can learn a lot about a particular protein by querying its neighborhood in a PPI network to find proteins with similar function. A spectral approach that considers random walks between nodes of interest is particularly useful in evaluating closeness in PPI networks. Spectral measures of closeness are more robust to noise in the data and are more precise than simpler methods based on edge density and shortest path length. Results: We develop a novel affinity measure for pairs of proteins in PPI networks, which uses personalized PageRank, a random walk based method used in context-sensitive search on the Web. Our measure of closeness, which we call PageRank Affinity, is proportional to the number of times the smaller-degree protein is visited in a random walk that restarts at the larger-degree protein. PageRank considers paths of all lengths in a network, therefore PageRank Affinity is a precise measure that is robust to noise in the data. PageRank Affinity is also provably related to cluster co-membership, making it a meaningful measure. In our experiments on protein networks we find that our measure is better at predicting co-complex membership and finding functionally related proteins than other commonly used measures of closeness. Moreover, our experiments indicate that PageRank Affinity is very resilient to noise in the network. In addition, based on our method we build a tool that quickly finds nodes closest to a queried protein in any protein network, and easily scales to much larger biological networks. Conclusion: We define a meaningful way to assess the closeness of two proteins in a PPI network, and show that our closeness measure is more biologically significant than other commonly used methods. We also develop a tool, accessible at http://xialab.bu.edu/resources/pnns, that allows the user to quickly find nodes closest to a queried vertex in any protein network available from BioGRID or specified by the user.
- 29 November 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Systems Biology
- Vol. 3 (1) , 112
Open AccessSpectral affinity in protein networks
Background: Protein-protein interaction (PPI) networks enable us to better understand the functional organization of the proteome. We can learn a lot about a particular protein by querying its neighborhood in a PPI network to find proteins with similar function. A spectral approach that considers random walks between nodes of interest is particularly useful in evaluating closeness in PPI networks. Spectral measures of closeness are more robust to noise in the data and are more precise than simpler methods based on edge density and shortest path length. Results: We develop a novel affinity measure for pairs of proteins in PPI networks, which uses personalized PageRank, a random walk based method used in context-sensitive search on the Web. Our measure of closeness, which we call PageRank Affinity, is proportional to the number of times the smaller-degree protein is visited in a random walk that restarts at the larger-degree protein. PageRank considers paths of all lengths in a network, therefore PageRank Affinity is a precise measure that is robust to noise in the data. PageRank Affinity is also provably related to cluster co-membership, making it a meaningful measure. In our experiments on protein networks we find that our measure is better at predicting co-complex membership and finding functionally related proteins than other commonly used measures of closeness. Moreover, our experiments indicate that PageRank Affinity is very resilient to noise in the network. In addition, based on our method we build a tool that quickly finds nodes closest to a queried protein in any protein network, and easily scales to much larger biological networks. Conclusion: We define a meaningful way to assess the closeness of two proteins in a PPI network, and show that our closeness measure is more biologically significant than other commonly used methods. We also develop a tool, accessible at http://xialab.bu.edu/resources/pnns, that allows the user to quickly find nodes closest to a queried vertex in any protein network available from BioGRID or specified by the user.
- Open Access
- 18 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Bioinformatics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-14
Finding local communities in protein networks
Background: Protein-protein interactions (PPIs) play fundamental roles in nearly all biological processes, and provide major insights into the inner workings of cells. A vast amount of PPI data for various organisms is available from BioGRID and other sources. The identification of communities in PPI networks is of great interest because they often reveal previously unknown functional ties between proteins. A large number of global clustering algorithms have been applied to protein networks, where the entire network is partitioned into clusters. Here we take a different approach by looking for local communities in PPI networks. Results: We develop a tool, named Local Protein Community Finder, which quickly finds a community close to a queried protein in any network available from BioGRID or specified by the user. Our tool uses two new local clustering algorithms Nibble and PageRank-Nibble, which look for a good cluster among the most popular destinations of a short random walk from the queried vertex. The quality of a cluster is determined by proportion of outgoing edges, known as conductance, which is a relative measure particularly useful in undersampled networks. We show that the two local clustering algorithms find communities that not only form excellent clusters, but are also likely to be biologically relevant functional components. We compare the performance of Nibble and PageRank-Nibble to other popular and effective graph partitioning algorithms, and show that they find better clusters in the graph. Moreover, Nibble and PageRank-Nibble find communities that are more functionally coherent. Conclusion: The Local Protein Community Finder, accessible at http://xialab.bu.edu/resources/lpcf, allows the user to quickly find a high-quality community close to a queried protein in any network available from BioGRID or specified by the user. We show that the communities found by our tool form good clusters and are functionally coherent, making our application useful for biologists who wish to investigate functional modules that a particular protein is a part of.
- 18 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Bioinformatics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-14
Open AccessFinding local communities in protein networks
Background: Protein-protein interactions (PPIs) play fundamental roles in nearly all biological processes, and provide major insights into the inner workings of cells. A vast amount of PPI data for various organisms is available from BioGRID and other sources. The identification of communities in PPI networks is of great interest because they often reveal previously unknown functional ties between proteins. A large number of global clustering algorithms have been applied to protein networks, where the entire network is partitioned into clusters. Here we take a different approach by looking for local communities in PPI networks. Results: We develop a tool, named Local Protein Community Finder, which quickly finds a community close to a queried protein in any network available from BioGRID or specified by the user. Our tool uses two new local clustering algorithms Nibble and PageRank-Nibble, which look for a good cluster among the most popular destinations of a short random walk from the queried vertex. The quality of a cluster is determined by proportion of outgoing edges, known as conductance, which is a relative measure particularly useful in undersampled networks. We show that the two local clustering algorithms find communities that not only form excellent clusters, but are also likely to be biologically relevant functional components. We compare the performance of Nibble and PageRank-Nibble to other popular and effective graph partitioning algorithms, and show that they find better clusters in the graph. Moreover, Nibble and PageRank-Nibble find communities that are more functionally coherent. Conclusion: The Local Protein Community Finder, accessible at http://xialab.bu.edu/resources/lpcf, allows the user to quickly find a high-quality community close to a queried protein in any network available from BioGRID or specified by the user. We show that the communities found by our tool form good clusters and are functionally coherent, making our application useful for biologists who wish to investigate functional modules that a particular protein is a part of.
- 5 May 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- Vol. 126 (2) , 315-350
Smoothed analysis of condition numbers and complexity implications for linear programming
- 5 May 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Mathematical Programming
- Vol. 126 (2) , 315-350
Smoothed analysis of condition numbers and complexity implications for linear programming
- Open Access
Reducibility Among Fractional Stability Problems
In this paper, we resolve the computational complexity of a number of outstanding open problems with practical applications. Here is the list of problems we show to be PPAD-complete, along with the domains of practical significance: Fractional Stable Paths Problem (FSPP) [21] - Internet routing; Core of Balanced Games [41] - Economics and Game theory; Scarf's Lemma [41] - Combinatorics; Hypergraph Matching [1]- Social Choice and Preference Systems; Fractional Bounded Budget Connection Games (FBBC) [30] - Social networks; and Strong Fractional Kernel [2]- Graph Theory. In fact, we show that no fully polynomial-time approximation schemes exist (unless PPAD is in FP). This paper is entirely a series of reductions that build in nontrivial ways on the framework established in previous work. In the course of deriving these reductions, we created two new concepts - preference games and personalized equilibria. The entire set of new reductions can be presented as a lattice with the above problems sandwiched between preference games (at the "easy" end) and personalized equilibria (at the "hard" end). Our completeness results extend to natural approximate versions of most of these problems. On a technical note, we wish to highlight our novel "continuous-to-discrete" reduction from exact personalized equilibria to approximate personalized equilibria using a linear program augmented with an exponential number of "min" constraints of a specific form. In addition to enhancing our repertoire of PPAD-complete problems, we expect the concepts and techniques in this paper to find future use in algorithmic game theory.
Open AccessReducibility Among Fractional Stability Problems
In this paper, we resolve the computational complexity of a number of outstanding open problems with practical applications. Here is the list of problems we show to be PPAD-complete, along with the domains of practical significance: Fractional Stable Paths Problem (FSPP) [21] - Internet routing; Core of Balanced Games [41] - Economics and Game theory; Scarf's Lemma [41] - Combinatorics; Hypergraph Matching [1]- Social Choice and Preference Systems; Fractional Bounded Budget Connection Games (FBBC) [30] - Social networks; and Strong Fractional Kernel [2]- Graph Theory. In fact, we show that no fully polynomial-time approximation schemes exist (unless PPAD is in FP). This paper is entirely a series of reductions that build in nontrivial ways on the framework established in previous work. In the course of deriving these reductions, we created two new concepts - preference games and personalized equilibria. The entire set of new reductions can be presented as a lattice with the above problems sandwiched between preference games (at the "easy" end) and personalized equilibria (at the "hard" end). Our completeness results extend to natural approximate versions of most of these problems. On a technical note, we wish to highlight our novel "continuous-to-discrete" reduction from exact personalized equilibria to approximate personalized equilibria using a linear program augmented with an exponential number of "min" constraints of a specific form. In addition to enhancing our repertoire of PPAD-complete problems, we expect the concepts and techniques in this paper to find future use in algorithmic game theory.
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 410 (11) , 1081-1092
Combinatorial and spectral aspects of nearest neighbor graphs in doubling dimensional and nearly-Euclidean spaces
- 1 March 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 410 (11) , 1081-1092
Combinatorial and spectral aspects of nearest neighbor graphs in doubling dimensional and nearly-Euclidean spaces
- 25 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 56 (3) , 364-382
Quantum Separation of Local Search and Fixed Point Computation
- 25 February 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 56 (3) , 364-382
Quantum Separation of Local Search and Fixed Point Computation
- Open Access
Preference Games and Personalized Equilibria, with Applications to Fractional BGP
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in two classes of network games based on flows - fractional BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) games and fractional BBC (Bounded Budget Connection) games. BGP is the glue that holds the Internet together and hence its stability, i.e. the equilibria of fractional BGP games (Haxell, Wilfong), is a matter of practical importance. BBC games (Laoutaris et al) follow in the tradition of the large body of work on network formation games and capture a variety of applications ranging from social networks and overlay networks to peer-to-peer networks. The central result of this paper is that there are no fully polynomial-time approximation schemes (unless PPAD is in FP) for computing equilibria in both fractional BGP games and fractional BBC games. We obtain this result by proving the hardness for a new and surprisingly simple game, the fractional preference game, which is reducible to both fractional BGP and BBC games. We define a new flow-based notion of equilibrium for matrix games -- personalized equilibria -- generalizing both fractional BBC and fractional BGP games. We prove not just the existence, but the existence of rational personalized equilibria for all matrix games, which implies the existence of rational equilibria for fractional BGP and BBC games. In particular, this provides an alternative proof and strengthening of the main result in [Haxell, Wilfong]. For k-player matrix games, where k = 2, we provide a combinatorial characterization leading to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing all personalized equilibria. For k >= 5, we prove that personalized equilibria are PPAD-hard to approximate in fully polynomial time. We believe that the concept of personalized equilibria has potential for real-world significance.
Open AccessPreference Games and Personalized Equilibria, with Applications to Fractional BGP
We study the complexity of computing equilibria in two classes of network games based on flows - fractional BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) games and fractional BBC (Bounded Budget Connection) games. BGP is the glue that holds the Internet together and hence its stability, i.e. the equilibria of fractional BGP games (Haxell, Wilfong), is a matter of practical importance. BBC games (Laoutaris et al) follow in the tradition of the large body of work on network formation games and capture a variety of applications ranging from social networks and overlay networks to peer-to-peer networks. The central result of this paper is that there are no fully polynomial-time approximation schemes (unless PPAD is in FP) for computing equilibria in both fractional BGP games and fractional BBC games. We obtain this result by proving the hardness for a new and surprisingly simple game, the fractional preference game, which is reducible to both fractional BGP and BBC games. We define a new flow-based notion of equilibrium for matrix games -- personalized equilibria -- generalizing both fractional BBC and fractional BGP games. We prove not just the existence, but the existence of rational personalized equilibria for all matrix games, which implies the existence of rational equilibria for fractional BGP and BBC games. In particular, this provides an alternative proof and strengthening of the main result in [Haxell, Wilfong]. For k-player matrix games, where k = 2, we provide a combinatorial characterization leading to a polynomial-time algorithm for computing all personalized equilibria. For k >= 5, we prove that personalized equilibria are PPAD-hard to approximate in fully polynomial time. We believe that the concept of personalized equilibria has potential for real-world significance.
- Open Access
Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) Games or How to make friends and influence people, on a budget
Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game - we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each link has a cost as well as a length and each node has a set of preference weights for each of the remaining nodes; the objective of each node is to use its budget to buy a set of outgoing links so as to minimize its sum of preference-weighted distances to the remaining nodes. We study the structural and complexity-theoretic properties of pure Nash equilibria in BBC games. We show that determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in general BBC games is NP-hard. However, in a natural variant, fractional BBC games - where it is permitted to buy fractions of links - a pure Nash equilibrium always exists. A major focus is the study of (n,k)-uniform BBC games - those in which all link costs, link lengths and preference weights are equal (to 1) and all budgets are equal (to k). We show that a pure Nash equilibrium or stable graph exists for all (n,k)-uniform BBC games and that all stable graphs are essentially fair (i.e. all nodes have similar costs). We provide an explicit construction of a family of stable graphs that spans the spectrum from minimum total social cost to maximum total social cost. We also study a special family of regular graphs in which all nodes imitate the "same" buying pattern, and show that if n is sufficiently large no such regular graph can be a pure Nash equilibrium. We analyze best-response walks on the configuration defined by the uniform game. Lastly, we extend our results to the case where each node seeks to minimize its maximum distance to the other nodes.
Open AccessBounded Budget Connection (BBC) Games or How to make friends and influence people, on a budget
Motivated by applications in social networks, peer-to-peer and overlay networks, we define and study the Bounded Budget Connection (BBC) game - we have a collection of n players or nodes each of whom has a budget for purchasing links; each link has a cost as well as a length and each node has a set of preference weights for each of the remaining nodes; the objective of each node is to use its budget to buy a set of outgoing links so as to minimize its sum of preference-weighted distances to the remaining nodes. We study the structural and complexity-theoretic properties of pure Nash equilibria in BBC games. We show that determining the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in general BBC games is NP-hard. However, in a natural variant, fractional BBC games - where it is permitted to buy fractions of links - a pure Nash equilibrium always exists. A major focus is the study of (n,k)-uniform BBC games - those in which all link costs, link lengths and preference weights are equal (to 1) and all budgets are equal (to k). We show that a pure Nash equilibrium or stable graph exists for all (n,k)-uniform BBC games and that all stable graphs are essentially fair (i.e. all nodes have similar costs). We provide an explicit construction of a family of stable graphs that spans the spectrum from minimum total social cost to maximum total social cost. We also study a special family of regular graphs in which all nodes imitate the "same" buying pattern, and show that if n is sufficiently large no such regular graph can be a pure Nash equilibrium. We analyze best-response walks on the configuration defined by the uniform game. Lastly, we extend our results to the case where each node seeks to minimize its maximum distance to the other nodes.
- Open Access
A bounded-degree network formation game
Motivated by applications in peer-to-peer and overlay networks we define and study the \emph{Bounded Degree Network Formation} (BDNF) game. In an $(n,k)$-BDNF game, we are given $n$ nodes, a bound $k$ on the out-degree of each node, and a weight $w_{vu}$ for each ordered pair $(v,u)$ representing the traffic rate from node $v$ to node $u$. Each node $v$ uses up to $k$ directed links to connect to other nodes with an objective to minimize its average distance, using weights $w_{vu}$, to all other destinations. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria for $(n,k)$-BDNF games. We show that if the weights are arbitrary, then a pure Nash wiring may not exist. Furthermore, it is NP-hard to determine whether a pure Nash wiring exists for a given $(n,k)$-BDNF instance. A major focus of this paper is on uniform $(n,k)$-BDNF games, in which all weights are 1. We describe how to construct a pure Nash equilibrium wiring given any $n$ and $k$, and establish that in all pure Nash wirings the cost of individual nodes cannot differ by more than a factor of nearly 2, whereas the diameter cannot exceed $O(\sqrt{n \log_k n})$. We also analyze best-response walks on the configuration space defined by the uniform game, and show that starting from any initial configuration, strong connectivity is reached within $\Theta(n^2)$ rounds. Convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium, however, is not guaranteed. We present simulation results that suggest that loop-free best-response walks always exist, but may not be polynomially bounded. We also study a special family of \emph{regular} wirings, the class of Abelian Cayley graphs, in which all nodes imitate the same wiring pattern, and show that if $n$ is sufficiently large no such regular wiring can be a pure Nash equilibrium.Open AccessA bounded-degree network formation game
Motivated by applications in peer-to-peer and overlay networks we define and study the \emph{Bounded Degree Network Formation} (BDNF) game. In an $(n,k)$-BDNF game, we are given $n$ nodes, a bound $k$ on the out-degree of each node, and a weight $w_{vu}$ for each ordered pair $(v,u)$ representing the traffic rate from node $v$ to node $u$. Each node $v$ uses up to $k$ directed links to connect to other nodes with an objective to minimize its average distance, using weights $w_{vu}$, to all other destinations. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria for $(n,k)$-BDNF games. We show that if the weights are arbitrary, then a pure Nash wiring may not exist. Furthermore, it is NP-hard to determine whether a pure Nash wiring exists for a given $(n,k)$-BDNF instance. A major focus of this paper is on uniform $(n,k)$-BDNF games, in which all weights are 1. We describe how to construct a pure Nash equilibrium wiring given any $n$ and $k$, and establish that in all pure Nash wirings the cost of individual nodes cannot differ by more than a factor of nearly 2, whereas the diameter cannot exceed $O(\sqrt{n \log_k n})$. We also analyze best-response walks on the configuration space defined by the uniform game, and show that starting from any initial configuration, strong connectivity is reached within $\Theta(n^2)$ rounds. Convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium, however, is not guaranteed. We present simulation results that suggest that loop-free best-response walks always exist, but may not be polynomially bounded. We also study a special family of \emph{regular} wirings, the class of Abelian Cayley graphs, in which all nodes imitate the same wiring pattern, and show that if $n$ is sufficiently large no such regular wiring can be a pure Nash equilibrium. - Open Access
Settling the Complexity of Computing Two-Player Nash Equilibria
We settle a long-standing open question in algorithmic game theory. We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by Papadimitriou in 1991. This is the first of a series of results concerning the complexity of Nash equilibria. In particular, we prove the following theorems: Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time. The smoothed complexity of the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm and, in fact, of any algorithm for Bimatrix is not polynomial unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in randomized polynomial time. Our results demonstrate that, even in the simplest form of non-cooperative games, equilibrium computation and approximation are polynomial-time equivalent to fixed point computation. Our results also have two broad complexity implications in mathematical economics and operations research: Arrow-Debreu market equilibria are PPAD-hard to compute. The P-Matrix Linear Complementary Problem is computationally harder than convex programming unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.
Open AccessSettling the Complexity of Computing Two-Player Nash Equilibria
We settle a long-standing open question in algorithmic game theory. We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by Papadimitriou in 1991. This is the first of a series of results concerning the complexity of Nash equilibria. In particular, we prove the following theorems: Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time. The smoothed complexity of the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm and, in fact, of any algorithm for Bimatrix is not polynomial unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in randomized polynomial time. Our results demonstrate that, even in the simplest form of non-cooperative games, equilibrium computation and approximation are polynomial-time equivalent to fixed point computation. Our results also have two broad complexity implications in mathematical economics and operations research: Arrow-Debreu market equilibria are PPAD-hard to compute. The P-Matrix Linear Complementary Problem is computationally harder than convex programming unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time.