BABen W. Ansell

Ben W. Ansell

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ben W. Ansell has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Skills in Demand? Higher Education and Social Investment in Europe

    by Ben Ansell, Jane Gingrich

    The chapter analyzes how welfare democracies expanded higher education systems. It argues that the “massification” of higher education across the OECD has had starkly different impacts on occupational structure and returns depending on countries’ institutional environment. The chapter identifies four ideal types in terms of the employment prospects and wage premia associated with higher education: credentialism, mismatch, social investment, and “winner takes all,” which correspond closely to the four types of welfare democracies. Employment and wage data drawn from the European Community Household Panel and Social Inclusion and Living Condition datasets is used to demonstrate these patterns. The chapter also uses individual survey data drawn from the European Social Survey to show the effects of graduate skill mismatch on policy attitudes.


  • Preferences in Context

    by Jane Gingrich, Ben Ansell

    Political economists have increasingly looked to understand social welfare policy as a product of individual-level demand for social spending. This work hypothesizes that individuals with riskier jobs demand more social spending and that large welfare states emerge where there are more of such individuals. In this article we build on the “policy feedback” literature to argue that existing welfare institutions condition how individual-level factors affect social policy preferences. Specifically, we argue that institutions directly altering the risk of unemployment (employment protection legislation) and those that delink benefits from the labor market create a more uniform system of social risk that reduces the importance of individual-level risk in shaping policy preferences. We test these propositions using multilevel analysis of 19 advanced industrial countries in 2006. We find that individual risk matters for social policy preferences only where employment protection is low and welfare benefits are dependent on employment.


  • University Challenges: Explaining Institutional Change in Higher Education

    by Ben W. Ansell

    Higher education policy has been subject to considerable reform in OECD states over the past two decades. Some states have introduced tuition fees, others have massively increased public funding for higher education, and still others remain in stasis, retaining the elitist model with which they began the postwar era. This article develops the argument that higher education policy in the OECD is driven by a set of partisan choices within a trilemma between the level of enrollment, the degree of subsidization, and the overall public cost of higher education. The author develops a formal model of the micromechanisms underlying movements within this trilemma, noting the importance of partisan politics, existing enrollment, tax structure, and access. These propositions are tested statistically on a sample of twenty-two OECD countries and through case histories of higher education reform in England, Sweden, and Germany.


  • Traders, Teachers, and Tyrants: Democracy, Globalization, and Public Investment in Education

    by Ben W. Ansell

    This article develops a model of the redistributive political economy of education spending, focusing on the role of democracy and economic openness in determining the provision of education. I argue that democratization should be associated with higher levels of public education spending, lower private education spending, and a shift from tertiary education spending toward primary education spending. Furthermore, I argue that integration with the international economy should lead to higher public education spending, conditioned on regime type and income, and should push the balance between tertiary and primary education toward states' particular comparative advantages. These propositions are tested on a data set of more than one hundred states from 1960 to 2000, using a variety of panel data techniques, including instruments for democracy. The logic of the causal mechanism developed in the formal model is also tested on a number of case histories, including the Philippines, which shows great variation in democracy and openness, and India and Malaysia, which constitute unusual cases that lie “off the diagonal” of open democracies and autarkic autocracies.