Dounia Bitar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Dounia Bitar has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
C. Saura
Institut de Veille Sanitaire
2 shared publicationsD. Che
2 shared publicationsDidier Che
Département des Maladies infectieuses, Institut de veille sanitaire, 12 rue du Val d’Osne, 94415 Saint-Maurice cedex
2 shared publications- Eric Dannaoui
Dynamyc research team UR 7380, UPEC, EnVA, ANSES , 94000 Créteil
2 shared publications A Goubar
Department of infectious diseases, Institut de Veille Sanitaire, Saint Maurice, France
1 shared publicationA. Goubar
Institut de Veille Sanitaire, Infectious Diseases Department, Saint Maurice, France
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Revue D'Épidémiologie Et de Santé Publique
- Vol. 60 (5) , 383-387
Estimating the burden of mucormycosis infections in France (2005–2007) through a capture-recapture method on laboratory and administrative data
- 1 October 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Revue D'Épidémiologie Et de Santé Publique
- Vol. 60 (5) , 383-387
Estimating the burden of mucormycosis infections in France (2005–2007) through a capture-recapture method on laboratory and administrative data
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Annales de Dermatologie et de Vénéréologie
- Vol. 139 (6-7) , 428-434
La gale en France entre 1999 et 2010 : augmentation de l’incidence et implications en santé publique
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Annales de Dermatologie et de Vénéréologie
- Vol. 139 (6-7) , 428-434
La gale en France entre 1999 et 2010 : augmentation de l’incidence et implications en santé publique
- Open Access
- 21 September 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Public Health
- Vol. 11 (1) , 713
Detection of events of public health importance under the international health regulations: a toolkit to improve reporting of unusual events by frontline healthcare workers
The International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)) require countries to notify WHO of any event which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. This notification relies on reports of events occurring at the local level reaching the national public health authorities. By June 2012 WHO member states are expected to have implemented the capacity to "detect events involving disease or death above expected levels for the particular time and place" on the local level and report essential information to the appropriate level of public health authority. Our objective was to develop tools to assist European countries improve the reporting of unusual events of public health significance from frontline healthcare workers to public health authorities.
- 21 September 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in BMC Public Health
- Vol. 11 (1) , 713
Open AccessDetection of events of public health importance under the international health regulations: a toolkit to improve reporting of unusual events by frontline healthcare workers
The International Health Regulations (IHR (2005)) require countries to notify WHO of any event which may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. This notification relies on reports of events occurring at the local level reaching the national public health authorities. By June 2012 WHO member states are expected to have implemented the capacity to "detect events involving disease or death above expected levels for the particular time and place" on the local level and report essential information to the appropriate level of public health authority. Our objective was to develop tools to assist European countries improve the reporting of unusual events of public health significance from frontline healthcare workers to public health authorities.
- 14 April 2011
- Published by Lavoisier in Réanimation
- Vol. 20 (3) , 157-158
Dispositif d’alerte et de déclaration des maladies infectieuses
- 14 April 2011
- Published by Lavoisier in Réanimation
- Vol. 20 (3) , 157-158
Dispositif d’alerte et de déclaration des maladies infectieuses
- 1 February 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Medecine Et Maladies Infectieuses
- Vol. 41 (2) , 53-62
Veille sanitaire et appréciation du risque infectieux émergent : méthode et critères d’analyse du risque
- 1 February 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Medecine Et Maladies Infectieuses
- Vol. 41 (2) , 53-62
Veille sanitaire et appréciation du risque infectieux émergent : méthode et critères d’analyse du risque
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Bulletin de l'Académie Nationale de Médecine
- Vol. 193 (8) , 1847-1860
Risques d’importation des maladies infectieuses exotiques en France métropolitaine : détection, alerte et réponse
- 1 November 2009
- Published by Elsevier in Bulletin de l'Académie Nationale de Médecine
- Vol. 193 (8) , 1847-1860
Risques d’importation des maladies infectieuses exotiques en France métropolitaine : détection, alerte et réponse
- Open Access
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Emerging Infectious Diseases
- Vol. 15 (9) , 1395-1401
Increasing Incidence of Zygomycosis (Mucormycosis), France, 1997–2006
We analyzed hospital records to provide a population-based estimate of zygomycosis incidence and trends over a 10-year period at a national level in France. Data showed an increasing incidence from 0.7/million in 1997 to 1.2/million in 2006 (p<0.001). We compared our data with those from the French Mycosis Study Group, a recently established voluntary network of French mycologists coordinated by the National Reference Center for Mycoses and Antifungals. We documented that incidence of zygomycosis increased, particularly in patients with hematologic malignancies or bone marrow transplants. The role of previous exposure to antifungal drugs lacking activity against zygomycetes could explain this increase but does not appear exclusive. Incidence also increased in the population of patients with diabetes mellitus. We conclude that observed trends reflect a genuine increase of zygomycosis cases in at-risk populations.
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Emerging Infectious Diseases
- Vol. 15 (9) , 1395-1401
Open AccessIncreasing Incidence of Zygomycosis (Mucormycosis), France, 1997–2006
We analyzed hospital records to provide a population-based estimate of zygomycosis incidence and trends over a 10-year period at a national level in France. Data showed an increasing incidence from 0.7/million in 1997 to 1.2/million in 2006 (p<0.001). We compared our data with those from the French Mycosis Study Group, a recently established voluntary network of French mycologists coordinated by the National Reference Center for Mycoses and Antifungals. We documented that incidence of zygomycosis increased, particularly in patients with hematologic malignancies or bone marrow transplants. The role of previous exposure to antifungal drugs lacking activity against zygomycetes could explain this increase but does not appear exclusive. Incidence also increased in the population of patients with diabetes mellitus. We conclude that observed trends reflect a genuine increase of zygomycosis cases in at-risk populations.
- Open Access
- 12 February 2009
- Published by European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) in Eurosurveillance
- Vol. 14 (6) , 19115
International travels and fever screening during epidemics: a literature review on the effectiveness and potential use of non-contact infrared thermometers
Several countries plan to introduce non-contact infrared thermometers (NCIT) at international airports in order to detect febrile passengers, thus to delay the introduction of a novel influenza strain. We reviewed the existing studies on fever screening by NCIT to estimate their efficacy under the hypothesis of pandemic influenza. Three Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) or dengue fever interventions in airports were excluded because of insufficient information. Six fever screening studies in other gathering areas, mainly hospitals, were included (N= 176 to 72,327 persons; fever prevalence= 1.2% to 16.9%). Sensitivity varied from 4.0% to 89.6%, specificity from 75.4% to 99.6%, positive predictive value (PPV) from 0.9% to 76.0% and negative predictive value (NPV) from 86.1% to 99.7%. When we fixed fever prevalence at 1% in all studies to allow comparisons, the derived PPV varied from 3.5% to 65.4% and NPV was >=99%. The low PPV suggests limited efficacy of NCIT to detect symptomatic passengers at the early stages of a pandemic influenza, when fever prevalence among passengers would be =<1%. External factors can also impair the screening strategy: passengers can hide their symptoms or cross borders before symptoms occur. These limits should be considered when setting up border control measures to delay the pandemic progression.
- 12 February 2009
- Published by European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) in Eurosurveillance
- Vol. 14 (6) , 19115
Open AccessInternational travels and fever screening during epidemics: a literature review on the effectiveness and potential use of non-contact infrared thermometers
Several countries plan to introduce non-contact infrared thermometers (NCIT) at international airports in order to detect febrile passengers, thus to delay the introduction of a novel influenza strain. We reviewed the existing studies on fever screening by NCIT to estimate their efficacy under the hypothesis of pandemic influenza. Three Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) or dengue fever interventions in airports were excluded because of insufficient information. Six fever screening studies in other gathering areas, mainly hospitals, were included (N= 176 to 72,327 persons; fever prevalence= 1.2% to 16.9%). Sensitivity varied from 4.0% to 89.6%, specificity from 75.4% to 99.6%, positive predictive value (PPV) from 0.9% to 76.0% and negative predictive value (NPV) from 86.1% to 99.7%. When we fixed fever prevalence at 1% in all studies to allow comparisons, the derived PPV varied from 3.5% to 65.4% and NPV was >=99%. The low PPV suggests limited efficacy of NCIT to detect symptomatic passengers at the early stages of a pandemic influenza, when fever prevalence among passengers would be =<1%. External factors can also impair the screening strategy: passengers can hide their symptoms or cross borders before symptoms occur. These limits should be considered when setting up border control measures to delay the pandemic progression.
- 15 December 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Epidemiology and Infection
- Vol. 137 (7) , 1019-1031
An approach to estimate the number of SARS cases imported by international air travel
SUMMARY: The worldwide spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) raised questions about the risk of importation of such infection, in particular by air travel. Entry screening was implemented in some countries although poor evidence on its effectiveness is reported. We developed a model to estimate the number of imported SARS cases between regions, using the 2003 SARS epidemic data to apply this model for two scenarios: from Beijing to Frankfurt and from Hong Kong to London. We back-calculated the data to estimate individuals’ time of infection and built a model where every individual has a probability of being isolated, of traveling, and of being undetected at arrival. The findings, consistent with what was observed in 2003, suggest that entry screening does not affect the predicted number of imported cases. Inversely, importation depends on the transmission dynamic in the country of origin (including control measures in place) and on the intensity of air travel between regions.
- 15 December 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Epidemiology and Infection
- Vol. 137 (7) , 1019-1031
An approach to estimate the number of SARS cases imported by international air travel
SUMMARY: The worldwide spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) raised questions about the risk of importation of such infection, in particular by air travel. Entry screening was implemented in some countries although poor evidence on its effectiveness is reported. We developed a model to estimate the number of imported SARS cases between regions, using the 2003 SARS epidemic data to apply this model for two scenarios: from Beijing to Frankfurt and from Hong Kong to London. We back-calculated the data to estimate individuals’ time of infection and built a model where every individual has a probability of being isolated, of traveling, and of being undetected at arrival. The findings, consistent with what was observed in 2003, suggest that entry screening does not affect the predicted number of imported cases. Inversely, importation depends on the transmission dynamic in the country of origin (including control measures in place) and on the intensity of air travel between regions.