Claudio Mulatti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Claudio Mulatti has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Remo Job
Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento
11 shared publications - Francesca Peressotti
Dipartimento di Psicologia dello Sviluppo e della Socializzazione, Università di Padova, Padova, Italy
10 shared publications - Max Coltheart
School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
5 shared publications Remo Job
Dipartimento di Psicologia e Scienze Cognitive, Università degli Studi di Trento Rovereto, Italy
4 shared publications- Sara Dellantonio
University of Trento
4 shared publications - Barbara Treccani
Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 23 July 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 42
To be or not to be emotionally aware and socially motivated: How alexithymia impacts autism spectrum disorders
Autism often co-occurs with alexithymia, a condition characterized by no or diminished awareness of emotions that significantly impacts an individual's social relationships. We investigate how the social motivation of autistics would be eroded by comorbidity with alexithymia and why this diminished motivation would be difficult for non-autistic people to perceive and reciprocate.
- 23 July 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 42
To be or not to be emotionally aware and socially motivated: How alexithymia impacts autism spectrum disorders
Autism often co-occurs with alexithymia, a condition characterized by no or diminished awareness of emotions that significantly impacts an individual's social relationships. We investigate how the social motivation of autistics would be eroded by comorbidity with alexithymia and why this diminished motivation would be difficult for non-autistic people to perceive and reciprocate.
- 24 December 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Language, Cognition and Neuroscience
- Vol. 30 (6) , 700-703
Semantic effects in the word–word interference task: a comment on Roelofs, Piai, and Schriefers (2013)
- 24 December 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Language, Cognition and Neuroscience
- Vol. 30 (6) , 700-703
Semantic effects in the word–word interference task: a comment on Roelofs, Piai, and Schriefers (2013)
- 1 December 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 65, 125-130
The cumulative semantic interference effect in normal and pathological ageing
- 1 December 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Neuropsychologia
- Vol. 65, 125-130
The cumulative semantic interference effect in normal and pathological ageing
- Open Access
- 8 October 2014
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 5, 1139
The role of the sound of objects in object identification: evidence from picture naming
In the present work we were concerned with the role of sound representations in object recognition. In order to address this issue we made use of a picture naming task in which target pictures might be accompanied by a white-noise burst. White-noise was thought to interfere with the representation of the sound possibly associated with the depicted object. We reasoned that if such a representation is critical for the recognition of objects strongly associated with certain sounds, white-noise interference should affect the naming of pictures representing objects with typical sounds leaving the naming of object without typical sounds unaffected. The results were congruent with the predictions and consistent with a view of the semantic representations of objects as collection of related representations, modal in nature, and mandatorily accessed.
- 8 October 2014
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 5, 1139
Open AccessThe role of the sound of objects in object identification: evidence from picture naming
In the present work we were concerned with the role of sound representations in object recognition. In order to address this issue we made use of a picture naming task in which target pictures might be accompanied by a white-noise burst. White-noise was thought to interfere with the representation of the sound possibly associated with the depicted object. We reasoned that if such a representation is critical for the recognition of objects strongly associated with certain sounds, white-noise interference should affect the naming of pictures representing objects with typical sounds leaving the naming of object without typical sounds unaffected. The results were congruent with the predictions and consistent with a view of the semantic representations of objects as collection of related representations, modal in nature, and mandatorily accessed.
- 23 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 43 (1) , 121-132
What can we learn about visual attention to multiple words from the word–word interference task?
In this work, we develop an empirically driven model of visual attention to multiple words using the word–word interference (WWI) task. In this task, two words are simultaneously presented visually: a to-be-ignored distractor word at fixation, and a to-be-read-aloud target word above or below the distractor word. Experiment 1 showed that low-frequency distractor words interfere more than high-frequency distractor words. Experiment 2 showed that distractor frequency (high vs. low) and target frequency (high vs. low) exert additive effects. Experiment 3 showed that the effect of the case status of the target (same vs. AlTeRnAtEd) interacts with the type of distractor (word vs. string of # marks). Experiment 4 showed that targets are responded to faster in the presence of semantically related distractors than in presence of unrelated distractors. Our model of visual attention to multiple words borrows two principles governing processing dynamics from the dual-route cascaded model of reading: cascaded interactive activation and lateral inhibition. At the core of the model are three mechanisms aimed at dealing with the distinctive feature of the WWI task, which is that two words are presented simultaneously. These mechanisms are identification, tokenization, and deactivation.
- 23 July 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 43 (1) , 121-132
What can we learn about visual attention to multiple words from the word–word interference task?
In this work, we develop an empirically driven model of visual attention to multiple words using the word–word interference (WWI) task. In this task, two words are simultaneously presented visually: a to-be-ignored distractor word at fixation, and a to-be-read-aloud target word above or below the distractor word. Experiment 1 showed that low-frequency distractor words interfere more than high-frequency distractor words. Experiment 2 showed that distractor frequency (high vs. low) and target frequency (high vs. low) exert additive effects. Experiment 3 showed that the effect of the case status of the target (same vs. AlTeRnAtEd) interacts with the type of distractor (word vs. string of # marks). Experiment 4 showed that targets are responded to faster in the presence of semantically related distractors than in presence of unrelated distractors. Our model of visual attention to multiple words borrows two principles governing processing dynamics from the dual-route cascaded model of reading: cascaded interactive activation and lateral inhibition. At the core of the model are three mechanisms aimed at dealing with the distinctive feature of the WWI task, which is that two words are presented simultaneously. These mechanisms are identification, tokenization, and deactivation.
- Open Access
- 3 April 2014
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 5, 279
Imageability: now you see it again (albeit in a different form)
A commentary on Now you see it, now you don't: on context, and the algorithmic prediction of human imageability judgments by Westbury, C. F., Shaoul, C., Hollis, G., Smithson, L., Briesemeister, B. B., Hofmann, M. J., et al. (2013). Front. Psychol. 4:991. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00991 Imageability is a complex and controversial measure as was already noted by Paivio et al. (1968) when they first introduced the term. According to these authors imageability should describe the ease/difficulty with which “words arouse a sensory experience” (p. 4) and therefore should closely correlate with concreteness. Since concrete objects are experienced through the senses, the words that denote them should easily re-evoke that sensory experience: words high in concreteness should also be high in imageability and vice versa. However, Paivio et al. also noted an interesting asymmetry: some terms with low concreteness ratings (i.e., abstract terms) had high imageability ratings. The peculiarity of these words is that they have strong emotional connotations (Paivio et al., 1968, p. 7). (They also noted a few terms with high concreteness and low imageability ratings such as e.g., astrolab, but these are easy to explain: people know that they denote concrete objects, but they do not know what they look like). Westbury et al. (2013) aim is mainly pragmatic, and consists in “estimating imageability using algorithmic methods grounded in empirical measures,” and we are quite sympathetic to this endeavor. Nevertheless, the measures these authors rely on clearly imply a theoretical account able to deal with the anomalies of this construct. Their strategy is to distinguish two aspects of imageability: (a) the relationship between imageability and context, and (b) the relationship between imageability and emotionality. The line of reasoning they adopt to develop their method is the following. (a) The first measure introduced is “density of the context,” a measure derived from Context Availability Theory which maintains that the difference between concrete and abstract words can be reduced to the fact that it is easier (faster) to describe the properties of concrete than of abstract words when they are presented without context. “Density of the context” is a measure which reflects how low imageability words—like low concreteness words—depend more on contextual information than high imageability (and high concreteness) words. In this sense words with high imageability ratings are considered to behave analogously to words with high concreteness playing a more important role when context is less dense. However, as e.g., Prinz (2002) notes, the context effects derived from Context Availability Theory are also compatible with the predictions made by its most important competitor, i.e., Paivio's Dual Coding Theory (1986, 2007), which proposes an explanation of the abstract/concrete difference that is radically different from a psychological perspective: “In the dual-code model, abstract word comprehension relies on verbal information. As a result, processing speed for abstract words should increase when more verbal information is provided. The dual-code model also predicts that there will be no comparable improvement in performance on concrete words because performance is already near ceiling levels when concrete words are presented in isolation” (Prinz, 2002, p. 132). If the two accounts make the same prediction, then the results of Westbury and colleagues do not necessarily favor the Context Availability Theory over the Dual Coding Theory. Thus, the reason why the density of the context is a good predictor of imageability does not necessarily relate to the fact that the difference between concrete/imageable vs. abstract words can be reduced to differences in the way these words depend on context and the possibility that imageability may rely on semantic properties cannot be ruled out. In fact, the density of the context would also be a good measure of imageability if the difference between concrete/imageable vs. abstract depended on how the semantic system is structured, as Paivio suggests, since the way words are represented influences whether they rely strongly or weakly on context. (b) Second, imageability is related to abstractness and is described on the basis of the theoretical account largely developed by Altarriba et al. (1999) and Kousta et al. (2011) who maintain that “affective information (emotional association […]) is more important for abstract than concrete concepts.” From these studies Westbury and collaborators derive the second predictor of imageability, which they call “emotional valence,” and which they claim can account for the asymmetry already identified by Paivio and collaborators: For some words characterized by strong emotional connotations imageability is significantly higher than concreteness. Taken together, these two measures describe imageability in the way Paivio et al. did when the construct was originally introduced. In fact, they reproduce the intrinsic ambiguity of the words with high or relatively high imageability ratings which, if they also have high concreteness ratings behave like concrete words, but if they have low concreteness ratings are of high emotional valence. Notably, these observations challenge Westbury and collaborators' assumption that “imageability judgments are correlated with factors that have nothing to do with evoked sensation […].” On the contrary, one could argue that the factors they identify support the hypothesis that imageability measures evoke sensations; however, they support this claim in a slightly different version also suggested by Paivio in his later works. Words with high imageability and high concreteness ratings evoke sensations connected to the perception of the objects they denote, while words with high imageability and low concreteness ratings evoke sensations connected to affective arousal (Paivio, 1986, 2007). The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Altarriba, J., Bauer, L., and Benvenuto, C. (1999). Concreteness, context availability, and imageability ratings and word associations for abstract, concrete, and emotion words. Behav. Res. Methods 31, 578–602. doi: 10.3758/BF03200738 CrossRef Full Text Kousta, S., Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D., Andrew, A., and Del Campo, E. (2011). The representation of abstract words: why emotion matters. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 140, 14–34. doi: 10.1037/a0021446 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Paivio, A. (1986). Mental Representations. A Dual Coding Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paivio, A. (2007). Mind and Its Evolution: A Dual Coding Theoretical Approach. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Paivio, A., Yuille, J. C., and Madigan, S. A. (1968). Concreteness, imagery, and meaningfulness values for 925 nouns. J. Exp. Psychol. 76, 1–25. doi: 10.1037/h0025327 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Prinz, J. J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind. Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge: MIT Press. Westbury, C. F., Shaoul, C., Hollis, G., Smithson, L., Breisemeister, B. B., Hofmann, M. J., et al. (2013). Now you see it, now you don't: on emotion, context, and the algorithmic prediction of human imageability judgments. Front. Psychol. 4:991. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00991 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Keywords: emotions, context effects, imageability, lexical access, co-occurrence statistics Citation: Dellantonio S, Job R and MulattiC (2014) Imageability: now you see it again (albeit in a different form). Front. Psychol. 5:279. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00279 Received: 21 January 2014; Accepted: 17 March 2014; Published online: 03 April 2014. Edited by: Reviewed by: Copyright © 2014 Dellantonio, Job and Mulatti. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. *Correspondence: claudio.mulatti@unipd.it
- 3 April 2014
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 5, 279
Open AccessImageability: now you see it again (albeit in a different form)
A commentary on Now you see it, now you don't: on context, and the algorithmic prediction of human imageability judgments by Westbury, C. F., Shaoul, C., Hollis, G., Smithson, L., Briesemeister, B. B., Hofmann, M. J., et al. (2013). Front. Psychol. 4:991. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00991 Imageability is a complex and controversial measure as was already noted by Paivio et al. (1968) when they first introduced the term. According to these authors imageability should describe the ease/difficulty with which “words arouse a sensory experience” (p. 4) and therefore should closely correlate with concreteness. Since concrete objects are experienced through the senses, the words that denote them should easily re-evoke that sensory experience: words high in concreteness should also be high in imageability and vice versa. However, Paivio et al. also noted an interesting asymmetry: some terms with low concreteness ratings (i.e., abstract terms) had high imageability ratings. The peculiarity of these words is that they have strong emotional connotations (Paivio et al., 1968, p. 7). (They also noted a few terms with high concreteness and low imageability ratings such as e.g., astrolab, but these are easy to explain: people know that they denote concrete objects, but they do not know what they look like). Westbury et al. (2013) aim is mainly pragmatic, and consists in “estimating imageability using algorithmic methods grounded in empirical measures,” and we are quite sympathetic to this endeavor. Nevertheless, the measures these authors rely on clearly imply a theoretical account able to deal with the anomalies of this construct. Their strategy is to distinguish two aspects of imageability: (a) the relationship between imageability and context, and (b) the relationship between imageability and emotionality. The line of reasoning they adopt to develop their method is the following. (a) The first measure introduced is “density of the context,” a measure derived from Context Availability Theory which maintains that the difference between concrete and abstract words can be reduced to the fact that it is easier (faster) to describe the properties of concrete than of abstract words when they are presented without context. “Density of the context” is a measure which reflects how low imageability words—like low concreteness words—depend more on contextual information than high imageability (and high concreteness) words. In this sense words with high imageability ratings are considered to behave analogously to words with high concreteness playing a more important role when context is less dense. However, as e.g., Prinz (2002) notes, the context effects derived from Context Availability Theory are also compatible with the predictions made by its most important competitor, i.e., Paivio's Dual Coding Theory (1986, 2007), which proposes an explanation of the abstract/concrete difference that is radically different from a psychological perspective: “In the dual-code model, abstract word comprehension relies on verbal information. As a result, processing speed for abstract words should increase when more verbal information is provided. The dual-code model also predicts that there will be no comparable improvement in performance on concrete words because performance is already near ceiling levels when concrete words are presented in isolation” (Prinz, 2002, p. 132). If the two accounts make the same prediction, then the results of Westbury and colleagues do not necessarily favor the Context Availability Theory over the Dual Coding Theory. Thus, the reason why the density of the context is a good predictor of imageability does not necessarily relate to the fact that the difference between concrete/imageable vs. abstract words can be reduced to differences in the way these words depend on context and the possibility that imageability may rely on semantic properties cannot be ruled out. In fact, the density of the context would also be a good measure of imageability if the difference between concrete/imageable vs. abstract depended on how the semantic system is structured, as Paivio suggests, since the way words are represented influences whether they rely strongly or weakly on context. (b) Second, imageability is related to abstractness and is described on the basis of the theoretical account largely developed by Altarriba et al. (1999) and Kousta et al. (2011) who maintain that “affective information (emotional association […]) is more important for abstract than concrete concepts.” From these studies Westbury and collaborators derive the second predictor of imageability, which they call “emotional valence,” and which they claim can account for the asymmetry already identified by Paivio and collaborators: For some words characterized by strong emotional connotations imageability is significantly higher than concreteness. Taken together, these two measures describe imageability in the way Paivio et al. did when the construct was originally introduced. In fact, they reproduce the intrinsic ambiguity of the words with high or relatively high imageability ratings which, if they also have high concreteness ratings behave like concrete words, but if they have low concreteness ratings are of high emotional valence. Notably, these observations challenge Westbury and collaborators' assumption that “imageability judgments are correlated with factors that have nothing to do with evoked sensation […].” On the contrary, one could argue that the factors they identify support the hypothesis that imageability measures evoke sensations; however, they support this claim in a slightly different version also suggested by Paivio in his later works. Words with high imageability and high concreteness ratings evoke sensations connected to the perception of the objects they denote, while words with high imageability and low concreteness ratings evoke sensations connected to affective arousal (Paivio, 1986, 2007). The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Altarriba, J., Bauer, L., and Benvenuto, C. (1999). Concreteness, context availability, and imageability ratings and word associations for abstract, concrete, and emotion words. Behav. Res. Methods 31, 578–602. doi: 10.3758/BF03200738 CrossRef Full Text Kousta, S., Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D., Andrew, A., and Del Campo, E. (2011). The representation of abstract words: why emotion matters. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 140, 14–34. doi: 10.1037/a0021446 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Paivio, A. (1986). Mental Representations. A Dual Coding Approach. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Paivio, A. (2007). Mind and Its Evolution: A Dual Coding Theoretical Approach. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Paivio, A., Yuille, J. C., and Madigan, S. A. (1968). Concreteness, imagery, and meaningfulness values for 925 nouns. J. Exp. Psychol. 76, 1–25. doi: 10.1037/h0025327 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Prinz, J. J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind. Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge: MIT Press. Westbury, C. F., Shaoul, C., Hollis, G., Smithson, L., Breisemeister, B. B., Hofmann, M. J., et al. (2013). Now you see it, now you don't: on emotion, context, and the algorithmic prediction of human imageability judgments. Front. Psychol. 4:991. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00991 Pubmed Abstract | Pubmed Full Text | CrossRef Full Text Keywords: emotions, context effects, imageability, lexical access, co-occurrence statistics Citation: Dellantonio S, Job R and MulattiC (2014) Imageability: now you see it again (albeit in a different form). Front. Psychol. 5:279. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00279 Received: 21 January 2014; Accepted: 17 March 2014; Published online: 03 April 2014. Edited by: Reviewed by: Copyright © 2014 Dellantonio, Job and Mulatti. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. *Correspondence: claudio.mulatti@unipd.it
- 20 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (3) , 407-418
Artifact and Tool Categorization
- 20 April 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 4 (3) , 407-418
Artifact and Tool Categorization