Sharona M. Atkins
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sharona M. Atkins has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Amber M. Sprenger
Decision Attention and Memory Lab, Department of Psychology, University of Maryland College Park, MD, USA
2 shared publications - Michael R. Dougherty
Department of Psychology, University of Maryland
2 shared publications - Ana M. Franco-Watkins
Department of Psychology, Auburn University, Auburn, AL, USA.
1 shared publication - Brandon Abbs
MGH & MIT Athinoula Martinos Biomedical Imaging Center, 149 13th Street, Charlestown, MA 02129, USA
1 shared publication Donald J. Bolger
1 shared publicationGregory J. H. Colflesh
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2012
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Examining Visual Spatial Working Memory Training
- 1 January 2012
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Examining Visual Spatial Working Memory Training
- 1 January 2012
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
A Four-Dimensional Video Game For Measuring Cognitive Ability
- 1 January 2012
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
A Four-Dimensional Video Game For Measuring Cognitive Ability
- Open Access
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 2, 129
Implications of Cognitive Load for Hypothesis Generation and Probability Judgment
We tested the predictions of HyGene (Thomas et al., 2008) that both divided attention at encoding and judgment should affect the degree to which participants’ probability judgments violate the principle of additivity. In two experiments, we showed that divided attention during judgment leads to an increase in subadditivity, suggesting that the comparison process for probability judgments is capacity limited. Contrary to the predictions of HyGene, a third experiment revealed that divided attention during encoding leads to an increase in later probability judgment made under full attention. The effect of divided attention during encoding on judgment was completely mediated by the number of hypotheses participants generated, indicating that limitations in both encoding and recall can cascade into biases in judgments.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 2, 129
Open AccessImplications of Cognitive Load for Hypothesis Generation and Probability Judgment
We tested the predictions of HyGene (Thomas et al., 2008) that both divided attention at encoding and judgment should affect the degree to which participants’ probability judgments violate the principle of additivity. In two experiments, we showed that divided attention during judgment leads to an increase in subadditivity, suggesting that the comparison process for probability judgments is capacity limited. Contrary to the predictions of HyGene, a third experiment revealed that divided attention during encoding leads to an increase in later probability judgment made under full attention. The effect of divided attention during encoding on judgment was completely mediated by the number of hypotheses participants generated, indicating that limitations in both encoding and recall can cascade into biases in judgments.