Benjamin E. Hilbig
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Benjamin E. Hilbig has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Rüdiger F. Pohl
6 shared publications- Morten Moshagen
Ulm University, Germany
3 shared publications - Andreas Glöckner
Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
2 shared publications - Edgar Erdfelder
University of Mannheim
2 shared publications - Arndt Bröder
Department of Psychology, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany
1 shared publication - Ingo Zettler
Department of Psychology University of Copenhagen Copenhagen Denmark
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 10 October 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 6 (2) , 140-147
Truth Will Out
Individual differences in morality and honesty are inherently connected such that individuals more likely to engage in immoral behavior will typically be less likely to admit to it. Indeed, this is a central prediction of the Honesty-Humility (HH) factor of personality, recently proposed as part of the HEXACO Model of Personality (Honesty-Humility [H], Emotionality [E], Extraversion [X], Agreeablenes [A], Conscientiousness [C], and Openness to Experience [O]). However, this very link between morality and honesty necessarily limits the conclusiveness of typical investigations—especially those relying on self-report data for both constructs. Herein, we apply an indirect questioning technique to overcome such limitations and provide evidence for individual differences in trait honesty and morality in line with the HH factor of personality. Specifically, results show that individuals low in (self-reported) HH are indeed more likely to engage in immoral behavior although less likely to be upfront about it when directly questioned.
- 10 October 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 6 (2) , 140-147
Truth Will Out
Individual differences in morality and honesty are inherently connected such that individuals more likely to engage in immoral behavior will typically be less likely to admit to it. Indeed, this is a central prediction of the Honesty-Humility (HH) factor of personality, recently proposed as part of the HEXACO Model of Personality (Honesty-Humility [H], Emotionality [E], Extraversion [X], Agreeablenes [A], Conscientiousness [C], and Openness to Experience [O]). However, this very link between morality and honesty necessarily limits the conclusiveness of typical investigations—especially those relying on self-report data for both constructs. Herein, we apply an indirect questioning technique to overcome such limitations and provide evidence for individual differences in trait honesty and morality in line with the HH factor of personality. Specifically, results show that individuals low in (self-reported) HH are indeed more likely to engage in immoral behavior although less likely to be upfront about it when directly questioned.
- 12 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 22 (1) , 312
Erratum to: Generalized outcome-based strategy classification: Comparing deterministic and probabilistic choice models
- 12 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 22 (1) , 312
Erratum to: Generalized outcome-based strategy classification: Comparing deterministic and probabilistic choice models
- 28 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 21 (6) , 1431-1443
Generalized outcome-based strategy classification: Comparing deterministic and probabilistic choice models
Model comparisons are a vital tool for disentangling which of several strategies a decision maker may have used—that is, which cognitive processes may have governed observable choice behavior. However, previous methodological approaches have been limited to models (i.e., decision strategies) with deterministic choice rules. As such, psychologically plausible choice models—such as evidence-accumulation and connectionist models—that entail probabilistic choice predictions could not be considered appropriately. To overcome this limitation, we propose a generalization of Bröder and Schiffer’s (Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 361–380, 2003) choice-based classification method, relying on (1) parametric order constraints in the multinomial processing tree framework to implement probabilistic models and (2) minimum description length for model comparison. The advantages of the generalized approach are demonstrated through recovery simulations and an experiment. In explaining previous methods and our generalization, we maintain a nontechnical focus—so as to provide a practical guide for comparing both deterministic and probabilistic choice models.
- 28 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 21 (6) , 1431-1443
Generalized outcome-based strategy classification: Comparing deterministic and probabilistic choice models
Model comparisons are a vital tool for disentangling which of several strategies a decision maker may have used—that is, which cognitive processes may have governed observable choice behavior. However, previous methodological approaches have been limited to models (i.e., decision strategies) with deterministic choice rules. As such, psychologically plausible choice models—such as evidence-accumulation and connectionist models—that entail probabilistic choice predictions could not be considered appropriately. To overcome this limitation, we propose a generalization of Bröder and Schiffer’s (Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 361–380, 2003) choice-based classification method, relying on (1) parametric order constraints in the multinomial processing tree framework to implement probabilistic models and (2) minimum description length for model comparison. The advantages of the generalized approach are demonstrated through recovery simulations and an experiment. In explaining previous methods and our generalization, we maintain a nontechnical focus—so as to provide a practical guide for comparing both deterministic and probabilistic choice models.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 9 (1) , 51-57
On the role of recognition in consumer choice: A model comparison
One prominent model in the realm of memory-based judgments and decisions is the recognition heuristic. Under certain preconditions, it presumes that choices are based on recognition in a one-cue non-compensatory manner and that other information is ignored. This claim has been studied widely—and received, at best, mixed support—in probabilistic inferences. By contrast, only a small number of recent investigations have taken the RH to the realm of preferential decisions (i.e. consumer choice). So far, the conclusion has been that the RH cannot satisfactorily account for aggregate data patterns, but no fully specified alternative model has been demonstrated to provide a better account. Herein, the data from a recent consumer-choice study (Thoma & Williams, 2013) are re-analyzed with the outcome-based maximum-likelihood strategy classification method, thus testing several competing models on individual data. Results revealed that an alternative compensatory model (an equal weights strategy) accounted best for a larger number of datasets than the RH. Thereby, the findings further specify prior results and answer the call for comparative model testing on individual data that has been voiced repeatedly.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 9 (1) , 51-57
Open AccessOn the role of recognition in consumer choice: A model comparison
One prominent model in the realm of memory-based judgments and decisions is the recognition heuristic. Under certain preconditions, it presumes that choices are based on recognition in a one-cue non-compensatory manner and that other information is ignored. This claim has been studied widely—and received, at best, mixed support—in probabilistic inferences. By contrast, only a small number of recent investigations have taken the RH to the realm of preferential decisions (i.e. consumer choice). So far, the conclusion has been that the RH cannot satisfactorily account for aggregate data patterns, but no fully specified alternative model has been demonstrated to provide a better account. Herein, the data from a recent consumer-choice study (Thoma & Williams, 2013) are re-analyzed with the outcome-based maximum-likelihood strategy classification method, thus testing several competing models on individual data. Results revealed that an alternative compensatory model (an equal weights strategy) accounted best for a larger number of datasets than the RH. Thereby, the findings further specify prior results and answer the call for comparative model testing on individual data that has been voiced repeatedly.
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 141 (1) , 9-16
A matter of time: Antecedents of one-reason decision making based on recognition
- 1 September 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 141 (1) , 9-16
A matter of time: Antecedents of one-reason decision making based on recognition
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 59 (1) , 38-46
Good Things Don’t Come Easy (to Mind)
Recently, the general phenomenon of a positive-negative-asymmetry was extended to judgments of truth. That is, negatively framed statements were shown to receive substantially higher truth ratings than formally equivalent statements framed positively. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect are unknown, so far. In the current work, two potential accounts are introduced and tested against each other in three experiments: On the one hand, negative framing may induce increased elaboration and thereby persuasion. Alternatively, negative framing could yield faster retrieval or generation of evidence and thus influence subjective veracity via experiential fluency. Two experiments drawing on response latencies and one manipulating the delay between information acquisition and judgment provide support for the fluency-based account. Overall, results replicate and extend the negatively-biased framing effect in truth judgments and show that processing fluency may account for it.
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Hogrefe Publishing Group in Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 59 (1) , 38-46
Good Things Don’t Come Easy (to Mind)
Recently, the general phenomenon of a positive-negative-asymmetry was extended to judgments of truth. That is, negatively framed statements were shown to receive substantially higher truth ratings than formally equivalent statements framed positively. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying this effect are unknown, so far. In the current work, two potential accounts are introduced and tested against each other in three experiments: On the one hand, negative framing may induce increased elaboration and thereby persuasion. Alternatively, negative framing could yield faster retrieval or generation of evidence and thus influence subjective veracity via experiential fluency. Two experiments drawing on response latencies and one manipulating the delay between information acquisition and judgment provide support for the fluency-based account. Overall, results replicate and extend the negatively-biased framing effect in truth judgments and show that processing fluency may account for it.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 6 (8) , 705-710
Editorial: Methodology in judgment and decision making research
In this introduction to the special issue on methodology, we provide background on its original motivation and a systematic overview of the contributions. The latter are discussed with correspondence to the phase of the scientific process they (most strongly) refer to: Theory construction, design, data analysis, and cumulative development of scientific knowledge. Several contributions propose novel measurement techniques and paradigms that will allow for new insights and can thus avail researchers in JDM and beyond. Another set of contributions centers around how models can best be tested and/or compared. Especially when viewed in combination, the papers on this topic spell out vital necessities for model comparisons and provide approaches that solve noteworthy problems prior work has been faced with.
- 1 December 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 6 (8) , 705-710
Open AccessEditorial: Methodology in judgment and decision making research
In this introduction to the special issue on methodology, we provide background on its original motivation and a systematic overview of the contributions. The latter are discussed with correspondence to the phase of the scientific process they (most strongly) refer to: Theory construction, design, data analysis, and cumulative development of scientific knowledge. Several contributions propose novel measurement techniques and paradigms that will allow for new insights and can thus avail researchers in JDM and beyond. Another set of contributions centers around how models can best be tested and/or compared. Especially when viewed in combination, the papers on this topic spell out vital necessities for model comparisons and provide approaches that solve noteworthy problems prior work has been faced with.
- 1 November 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 138 (3) , 390-396
Yes, they can! Appropriate weighting of small probabilities as a function of information acquisition
- 1 November 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 138 (3) , 390-396
Yes, they can! Appropriate weighting of small probabilities as a function of information acquisition
- 1 January 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 37 (4) , 827-839
Fluent, fast, and frugal? A formal model evaluation of the interplay between memory, fluency, and comparative judgments.
A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency-that is, the speed with which objects are recognized-will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 37 (4) , 827-839
Fluent, fast, and frugal? A formal model evaluation of the interplay between memory, fluency, and comparative judgments.
A new process model of the interplay between memory and judgment processes was recently suggested, assuming that retrieval fluency-that is, the speed with which objects are recognized-will determine inferences concerning such objects in a single-cue fashion. This aspect of the fluency heuristic, an extension of the recognition heuristic, has remained largely untested due to methodological difficulties. To overcome the latter, we propose a measurement model from the class of multinomial processing tree models that can estimate true single-cue reliance on recognition and retrieval fluency. We applied this model to aggregate and individual data from a probabilistic inference experiment and considered both goodness of fit and model complexity to evaluate different hypotheses. The results were relatively clear-cut, revealing that the fluency heuristic is an unlikely candidate for describing comparative judgments concerning recognized objects. These findings are discussed in light of a broader theoretical view on the interplay of memory and judgment processes.