José Kerstholt

Many decisions in life involve tradeoffs: To gain something, one often has to lose something in return. As robots become more autonomous, their decisions will extend beyond mere assessments (e.g., detecting a threat) to making choices (e.g., taking the faster or the safer route). The aim of the current research was to study perceived trustworthiness in scenarios involving adverse consequences due to (1) an assessment error versus (2) a choice. Perceived trustworthiness (ability, benevolence, integrity) was measured repeatedly during a computer task simulating a military mission. Participants teamed with either a virtual human or a robotic partner who led the way and warned for potential danger. After encountering a hazard, the partner explained that it (1) failed to detect the threat (error) or (2) prioritized the mission and chose the fastest route despite the risk (choice). Results showed that: (a) the error-explanation repaired all trustworthiness dimensions, (b) the choice-explanation only repaired perceptions of ability, not benevolence or integrity, (c) no differences were found between human and robotic partners. Our findings suggest that trust violations due to choices are harder to repair than those due to errors. Implications and future research directions are discussed.

It is extremely hard to successfully fight organized crime, not only because there are ambiguous and complex interactions between factors and actors, but also because organized crime is volatile and adaptive to changing conditions. This paper argues that, in addition to acquiring knowledge on criminal processes and behavior, we also need a better understanding of organizational decision-making processes to select the most effective and sustainable interventions aimed at organized crime. To date, one-shot decisions from a single organizational perspective are predominant in fighting organized crime. This type of decision often ignores the system response to the intervention. There is a need to acknowledge the dynamic nature of criminal behavior and networks, and to take that into account in the design of an intervention strategy. Such an approach entails a sequence of interdependent steps, iteratively applied, to reach sustainable effects. However, this way of decision making does not come naturally for most people. This paper concludes that investments should be made in training and decision support for teams fighting organized crime.

Autonomous agents (AA) will increasingly be deployed as teammates instead of tools. In many operational situations, flawless performance from AA cannot be guaranteed. This may lead to a breach in the human’s trust, which can compromise collaboration. This highlights the importance of thinking about how to deal with error and trust violations when designing AA. The aim of this study was to explore the influence of uncertainty communication and apology on the development of trust in a Human–Agent Team (HAT) when there is a trust violation. Two experimental studies following the same method were performed with (I) a civilian group and (II) a military group of participants. The online task environment resembled a house search in which the participant was accompanied and advised by an AA as their artificial team member. Halfway during the task, an incorrect advice evoked a trust violation. Uncertainty communication was manipulated within-subjects, apology between-subjects. Our results showed that (a) communicating uncertainty led to higher levels of trust in both studies, (b) an incorrect advice by the agent led to a less severe decline in trust when that advice included a measure of uncertainty, and (c) after a trust violation, trust recovered significantly more when the agent offered an apology. The two latter effects were only found in the civilian study. We conclude that tailored agent communication is a key factor in minimizing trust reduction in face of agent failure to maintain effective long-term relationships in HATs. The difference in findings between participant groups emphasizes the importance of considering the (organizational) culture when designing artificial team members.

The role of intelligent agents becomes more social as they are expected to act in direct interaction, involvement and/or interdependency with humans and other artificial entities, as in Human-Agent Teams (HAT). The highly interdependent and dynamic nature of teamwork demands correctly calibrated trust among team members. Trust violations are an inevitable aspect of the cycle of trust and since repairing damaged trust proves to be more difficult than building trust initially, effective trust repair strategies are needed to ensure durable and successful team performance. The aim of this study was to explore the effectiveness of different trust repair strategies from an intelligent agent by measuring the development of human trust and advice taking in a Human-Agent Teaming task. Data for this study were obtained using a task environment resembling a first-person shooter game. Participants carried out a mission in collaboration with their artificial team member. A trust violation was provoked when the agent failed to detect an approaching enemy. After this, the agent offered one of four trust repair strategies, composed of the apology components explanation and expression of regret (either one alone, both or neither). Our results indicated that expressing regret was crucial for effective trust repair. After trust declined due to the violation by the agent, trust only significantly recovered when an expression of regret was included in the apology. This effect was stronger when an explanation was added. In this context, the intelligent agent was the most effective in its attempt of rebuilding trust when it provided an apology that was both affective, and informational. Finally, the implications of our findings for the design and study of Human-Agent trust repair are discussed.

Given their different views and interests, how do liaisons in interorganizational crisis response teams negotiate collective decisions? We conducted an experiment with eight crisis response teams to answer this question. Taking a bureau‐political view, we find that liaisons make decisions by following one of two decision‐making pathways. First, liaisons claim some decisions as subject to their authority and make crisis response decisions independently. Second, when such authority claims are rejected or when no liaison claims decision‐making authority, deliberative consensus‐seeking takes place. Additionally, we find that crisis response team negotiations are primarily prompted by liaisons’ different views, although clashing organizational interests are nor irrelevant. We conclude that a bureau‐political perspective helps to understand how liaisons reach collective crisis response decisions.

The goal of the present study was to investigate whether playing a serious game concerning natural and man-made risks leads to increased risk awareness and additional information search. As an experimental task, we developed a serious board game. Fifty-six students participated in the experiment; half of them played the serious game whereas the other half only filled in a questionnaire at pretest and posttest (after two weeks). Participants who had played the game were more aware of risks in their own environment. Furthermore, playing the serious game counterbalanced the decline in self-efficacy as seen in the control condition. In both conditions, participants gathered more information on natural risks. This positive effect in the control condition is probably a side effect of the method used: a reasonably elaborate questionnaire in combination with a delay of two weeks. In all, the results provide a positive basis for further development of the game and to use it on a larger scale to empower citizens to take more responsibility for their own safety.

Background. Most terminally ill patients prefer to die at home rather than at an institution. However, patients are often insufficiently aware of the downsides of staying at home, which signals a need for effective decision aids.Objectives.The main purpose of the present study was to compare indirect methods of value elicitation (personal narratives [``stories''] in text or video) with a direct method (assessment of the subjective importance of each attribute).Methods. The authors asked 183 participants to evaluate 3 possible places to die: home, hospice, and nursing home. The participants received 1 of 3 value elicitation methods. The main dependent variable was participants' evaluations of the choice options before and after value elicitation, measured on a 100-point scale.Results . A shift occurred between pre- and posttest, F(4, 342) = 4.11, P = 0.003, only with the indirect methods. When text and videos were used, participants became more positive about a hospice (text: 41.9 to 49.1; video: 52.9 to 60.3). In the video condition, participants also became more positive about a nursing home (from 20.9 to 24.9).Conclusion . Stories have more impact in shaping people's preferences than merely asking for an assessment of attribute importance. The most straightforward explanation for this effect is that stories, particularly when presented in video, provide a better image of potential consequences.