Carey K. Morewedge
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Carey K. Morewedge has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Joachim Vosgerau
Bocconi University
6 shared publications - Young Eun Huh
School of Business and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, South Korea
5 shared publications - Eva C. Buechel
University of South Carolina
2 shared publications Karim S. Kassam
2 shared publicationsAlexander Todorov
Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
1 shared publicationChristopher K. Hsee
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1195-1205
Lost in the crowd: Entitative group membership reduces mind attribution
- 1 December 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Consciousness and Cognition
- Vol. 22 (4) , 1195-1205
Lost in the crowd: Entitative group membership reduces mind attribution
- 4 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Vol. 26 (4) , 319-326
It Was a Most Unusual Time: How Memory Bias Engenders Nostalgic Preferences
Nostalgic preferences are widespread—people believe past movies, music, television shows, places, and periods of life to have been better than their present counterparts. Three experiments explored the cognitive underpinnings of nostalgic preferences. Participants rated past experiences to have been superior to similar present and recent experiences. These nostalgic preferences appeared to be due to the belief that the atypically positive experiences that participants recalled at the time of judgment were more representative of their past experiences than of their present experiences. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 4 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Vol. 26 (4) , 319-326
It Was a Most Unusual Time: How Memory Bias Engenders Nostalgic Preferences
Nostalgic preferences are widespread—people believe past movies, music, television shows, places, and periods of life to have been better than their present counterparts. Three experiments explored the cognitive underpinnings of nostalgic preferences. Participants rated past experiences to have been superior to similar present and recent experiences. These nostalgic preferences appeared to be due to the belief that the atypically positive experiences that participants recalled at the time of judgment were more representative of their past experiences than of their present experiences. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 24 January 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 3 (6) , 760-766
The Least Likely Act
When people predict the future behavior of a person, thinking of that target as an individual decreases the accuracy of their predictions. The present research examined one potential source of this bias, whether and why predictors overweight the atypical past behavior of individuals. The results suggest that predictors do indeed overweight the atypical past behavior of an individual. Atypical past behavior is more cognitively accessible than typical past behavior, which leads it to be overweighted in the impressions that serve as the basis for their predictions. Predictions for group members appear less susceptible to this bias, presumably because predictors are less likely to form a coherent impression of a group than an individual before making their predictions.
- 24 January 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Social Psychological and Personality Science
- Vol. 3 (6) , 760-766
The Least Likely Act
When people predict the future behavior of a person, thinking of that target as an individual decreases the accuracy of their predictions. The present research examined one potential source of this bias, whether and why predictors overweight the atypical past behavior of individuals. The results suggest that predictors do indeed overweight the atypical past behavior of an individual. Atypical past behavior is more cognitively accessible than typical past behavior, which leads it to be overweighted in the impressions that serve as the basis for their predictions. Predictions for group members appear less susceptible to this bias, presumably because predictors are less likely to form a coherent impression of a group than an individual before making their predictions.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Specificity in Sensitization
- 1 January 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Motivated underpinnings of the impact bias in affective forecasting
- 1 January 2011
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Motivated underpinnings of the impact bias in affective forecasting
- 10 December 2010
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 330 (6010) , 1530-1533
Thought for Food: Imagined Consumption Reduces Actual Consumption
All in the Mind: Pavlov's experiments, in which dogs salivate in anticipation of food, mirror our own imagined experience; that is, thinking about the future consumption of chocolate enhances our desire for it and our motivation to obtain it. After several bites, however, our appetite usually wanes and the offer of a second bar is less appealing than the first. Morewedge et al. (p. 1530 ) show that the decrease in hedonic response can also be induced by having imagined eating the first bar of chocolate. In comparisons of subjects asked to imagine the repetitive consumption of candy or cheese, they observed a specific drop in the amount consumed when subjects were actually offered the previously imagined foods to eat.
- 10 December 2010
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Science
- Vol. 330 (6010) , 1530-1533
Thought for Food: Imagined Consumption Reduces Actual Consumption
All in the Mind: Pavlov's experiments, in which dogs salivate in anticipation of food, mirror our own imagined experience; that is, thinking about the future consumption of chocolate enhances our desire for it and our motivation to obtain it. After several bites, however, our appetite usually wanes and the offer of a second bar is less appealing than the first. Morewedge et al. (p. 1530 ) show that the decrease in hedonic response can also be induced by having imagined eating the first bar of chocolate. In comparisons of subjects asked to imagine the repetitive consumption of candy or cheese, they observed a specific drop in the amount consumed when subjects were actually offered the previously imagined foods to eat.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 October 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 14 (10) , 435-440
Associative processes in intuitive judgment
- 1 October 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 14 (10) , 435-440
Top Cited PapersAssociative processes in intuitive judgment
- 1 May 2009
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 138 (2) , 177-186
Duration sensitivity depends on stimulus familiarity.
When people are asked to assess or compare the value of experienced or hypothetical events, one of the most intriguing observations is their apparent insensitivity to event duration. The authors propose that duration insensitivity occurs when stimuli are evaluated in isolation because they typically lack comparison information. People should be able to evaluate the duration of stimuli in isolation, however, when stimuli are familiar and evoke comparison information. The results of 3 experiments support the hypothesis. Participants were insensitive to the duration of hypothetical (Experiment 1) and real (Experiment 2) unfamiliar experiences but sensitive to the duration of familiar experiences. In Experiment 3, participants were insensitive to the duration of an unfamiliar noise when it was unlabeled but sensitive to its duration when it was given a familiar label (i.e., a telephone ring). Rather than being a unique phenomenon, duration neglect (and perhaps other forms of scope insensitivity) appears to be a particular case of insensitivity to unfamiliar attributes.
- 1 May 2009
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 138 (2) , 177-186
Duration sensitivity depends on stimulus familiarity.
When people are asked to assess or compare the value of experienced or hypothetical events, one of the most intriguing observations is their apparent insensitivity to event duration. The authors propose that duration insensitivity occurs when stimuli are evaluated in isolation because they typically lack comparison information. People should be able to evaluate the duration of stimuli in isolation, however, when stimuli are familiar and evoke comparison information. The results of 3 experiments support the hypothesis. Participants were insensitive to the duration of hypothetical (Experiment 1) and real (Experiment 2) unfamiliar experiences but sensitive to the duration of familiar experiences. In Experiment 3, participants were insensitive to the duration of an unfamiliar noise when it was unlabeled but sensitive to its duration when it was given a familiar label (i.e., a telephone ring). Rather than being a unique phenomenon, duration neglect (and perhaps other forms of scope insensitivity) appears to be a particular case of insensitivity to unfamiliar attributes.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 138 (4) , 535-545
Negativity bias in attribution of external agency.
This research investigated whether people are more likely to attribute events to external agents when events are negative rather than neutral or positive. Participants more often believed that ultimatum game partners were humans rather than computers when the partners offered unusually unfavorable divisions than unusually favorable divisions (Experiment 1A), even when their human partners had no financial stake in the game (Experiment 1B). In subsequent experiments, participants were most likely to infer that gambles were influenced by an impartial participant when the outcomes of those gambles were losses rather than wins (Experiments 2 and 3), despite their explicitly equal probability. The results suggest a negative agency bias--negative events are more often attributed to the influence of external agents than similarly positive and neutral events, independent of their subjective probability.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
- Vol. 138 (4) , 535-545
Negativity bias in attribution of external agency.
This research investigated whether people are more likely to attribute events to external agents when events are negative rather than neutral or positive. Participants more often believed that ultimatum game partners were humans rather than computers when the partners offered unusually unfavorable divisions than unusually favorable divisions (Experiment 1A), even when their human partners had no financial stake in the game (Experiment 1B). In subsequent experiments, participants were most likely to infer that gambles were influenced by an impartial participant when the outcomes of those gambles were losses rather than wins (Experiments 2 and 3), despite their explicitly equal probability. The results suggest a negative agency bias--negative events are more often attributed to the influence of external agents than similarly positive and neutral events, independent of their subjective probability.