Michael I. Norton
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Michael I. Norton has a total of 63 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dan Ariely
Duke University
7 shared publications- Samuel R. Sommers
Tufts University
5 shared publications - Lalin Anik
Duke University, Durham, NC, USA
4 shared publications - Dan Ariely
Duke University
3 shared publications - Leslie K. John
Harvard Business School, Boston, Massachusetts 02163
3 shared publications - Elizabeth W. Dunn
Department of Psychology University of British Columbia Vancouver BC CA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 April 2020
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 15 (4) , e0231794
Putting Within-Country Political Differences in (Global) Perspective
The current political discourse in the United States focuses on extreme political polarization as a contributor to ills ranging from government shutdowns to awkward family holidays. And indeed, a large body of research has documented differences between liberals and conservatives–primarily focused on Republicans and Democrats in the United States. We combine large international surveys and more fine-grained surveys of United States citizens to compare differences in opinion between Republicans and Democrats to the full range of world opinion on moral issues (N = 37,653 in 39 countries) and issues of free speech (N = 40,786 in 38 countries). When viewed in the full distribution, polarization between Democrats and Republicans appears relatively small, even on divisive issues such as abortion, sexual preference, and freedom of religious speech. The average Democrat-Republic overlap is greater than 70% of the country pair overlaps across eight moral issues, meaning that 70% of the country pairs are more dissimilar from each other than Democrats and Republicans are dissimilar; similarly, the average Democrat-Republic overlap is greater than 79% of the country pair overlaps across five freedom of speech issues. These results suggest that cross-cultural comparisons are useful for putting differences between political partisans within the same country in context.
- 23 April 2020
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 15 (4) , e0231794
Open AccessPutting Within-Country Political Differences in (Global) Perspective
The current political discourse in the United States focuses on extreme political polarization as a contributor to ills ranging from government shutdowns to awkward family holidays. And indeed, a large body of research has documented differences between liberals and conservatives–primarily focused on Republicans and Democrats in the United States. We combine large international surveys and more fine-grained surveys of United States citizens to compare differences in opinion between Republicans and Democrats to the full range of world opinion on moral issues (N = 37,653 in 39 countries) and issues of free speech (N = 40,786 in 38 countries). When viewed in the full distribution, polarization between Democrats and Republicans appears relatively small, even on divisive issues such as abortion, sexual preference, and freedom of religious speech. The average Democrat-Republic overlap is greater than 70% of the country pair overlaps across eight moral issues, meaning that 70% of the country pairs are more dissimilar from each other than Democrats and Republicans are dissimilar; similarly, the average Democrat-Republic overlap is greater than 79% of the country pair overlaps across five freedom of speech issues. These results suggest that cross-cultural comparisons are useful for putting differences between political partisans within the same country in context.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2019
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 4 (2) , 185-197
Rituals and Nuptials: The Emotional and Relational Consequences of Relationship Rituals
Four studies reveal the benefits of relationship rituals: couples with relationship rituals report more positive emotions and greater relationship satisfaction and commitment than those without them. We show that rituals are crucial for understanding consumption practices in romantic relationships. Using a sample of romantic dyads, we identify a novel moderating role of mutual agreement, such that both members of a couple must agree that they have a ritual: different couples can see the same consumption behavior (e.g., paying for a weekly date night) as either a ritual or a routine, and the benefits accrue only to those couples who jointly view it as a symbolically meaningful ritual. We contribute to the literature on rituals by empirically documenting the relationships between rituals, specific emotions, and relationship satisfaction, and by demonstrating that the same sequence of actions can have different psychological effects due to the role of mutual agreement. Finally, we contribute to research on consumers’ shared experiences by suggesting a novel mechanism for committing to such experiences: relationship rituals.
- 1 April 2019
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of the Association for Consumer Research
- Vol. 4 (2) , 185-197
Open AccessRituals and Nuptials: The Emotional and Relational Consequences of Relationship Rituals
Four studies reveal the benefits of relationship rituals: couples with relationship rituals report more positive emotions and greater relationship satisfaction and commitment than those without them. We show that rituals are crucial for understanding consumption practices in romantic relationships. Using a sample of romantic dyads, we identify a novel moderating role of mutual agreement, such that both members of a couple must agree that they have a ritual: different couples can see the same consumption behavior (e.g., paying for a weekly date night) as either a ritual or a routine, and the benefits accrue only to those couples who jointly view it as a symbolically meaningful ritual. We contribute to the literature on rituals by empirically documenting the relationships between rituals, specific emotions, and relationship satisfaction, and by demonstrating that the same sequence of actions can have different psychological effects due to the role of mutual agreement. Finally, we contribute to research on consumers’ shared experiences by suggesting a novel mechanism for committing to such experiences: relationship rituals.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 54 (1) , 144-155
Does “Liking” Lead to Loving? The Impact of Joining a Brand's Social Network on Marketing Outcomes
Does “liking” a brand on Facebook cause a person to view it more favorably? Or is “liking” simply a symptom of being fond of a brand? The authors disentangle these possibilities and find evidence for the latter: brand attitudes and purchasing are predicted by consumers' preexisting fondness for brands, and these are the same regardless of when and whether consumers “like” brands on social media. In addition, we explore possible second-order effects by examining whether “liking” brands might cause consumers' friends to view that brand more favorably. When consumers see that a friend has “liked” a brand, they are less likely to buy the brand relative to when they learn that a friend genuinely likes the brand in the offline sense, which is a more meaningful social endorsement. Taken together, five experiments and two meta-analyses (N > 14,000) suggest that turning “liking” into improved brand attitudes and increased purchasing by consumers and their friends may require more than just the click of a button.
- 1 February 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 54 (1) , 144-155
Does “Liking” Lead to Loving? The Impact of Joining a Brand's Social Network on Marketing Outcomes
Does “liking” a brand on Facebook cause a person to view it more favorably? Or is “liking” simply a symptom of being fond of a brand? The authors disentangle these possibilities and find evidence for the latter: brand attitudes and purchasing are predicted by consumers' preexisting fondness for brands, and these are the same regardless of when and whether consumers “like” brands on social media. In addition, we explore possible second-order effects by examining whether “liking” brands might cause consumers' friends to view that brand more favorably. When consumers see that a friend has “liked” a brand, they are less likely to buy the brand relative to when they learn that a friend genuinely likes the brand in the offline sense, which is a more meaningful social endorsement. Taken together, five experiments and two meta-analyses (N > 14,000) suggest that turning “liking” into improved brand attitudes and increased purchasing by consumers and their friends may require more than just the click of a button.
- 26 October 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 39, e162
Vicarious contagion decreases differentiation – and comes with costs
Baumeister et al. propose that individual differentiation is a crucial determinant of group success. We apply their model to processes lying in between the individual and the group – vicarious processes. We review literature in four domains – attitudes, emotions, moral behavior, and self-regulation – showing that group identification can lead to vicarious contagion, reducing individual differentiation and inducing negative consequences.
- 26 October 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 39, e162
Vicarious contagion decreases differentiation – and comes with costs
Baumeister et al. propose that individual differentiation is a crucial determinant of group success. We apply their model to processes lying in between the individual and the group – vicarious processes. We review literature in four domains – attitudes, emotions, moral behavior, and self-regulation – showing that group identification can lead to vicarious contagion, reducing individual differentiation and inducing negative consequences.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 August 2016
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 30 (3) , 189-212
Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting Egoistically
Research yields ample evidence that individual's behavior often reflects an apparent concern for moral considerations. A natural way to interpret evidence of such motives using an economic framework is to add an argument to the utility function such that agents obtain utility both from outcomes that yield only personal benefits and from acting kindly, honestly, or according to some other notion of “right.” Indeed, such interpretations can account for much of the existing empirical evidence. However, a growing body of research at the intersection of psychology and economics produces findings inconsistent with such straightforward, preference-based interpretations for moral behavior. In particular, while people are often willing to take a moral act that imposes personal material costs when confronted with a clear-cut choice between “right” and “wrong,” such decisions often seem to be dramatically influenced by the specific contexts in which they occur. In particular, when the context provides sufficient flexibility to allow plausible justification that one can both act egoistically while remaining moral, people seize on such opportunities to prioritize self-interest at the expense of morality. In other words, people who appear to exhibit a preference for being moral may in fact be placing a value on feeling moral, often accomplishing this goal by manipulating the manner in which they process information to justify taking egoistic actions while maintaining this feeling of morality.
- 1 August 2016
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 30 (3) , 189-212
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessMotivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting Egoistically
Research yields ample evidence that individual's behavior often reflects an apparent concern for moral considerations. A natural way to interpret evidence of such motives using an economic framework is to add an argument to the utility function such that agents obtain utility both from outcomes that yield only personal benefits and from acting kindly, honestly, or according to some other notion of “right.” Indeed, such interpretations can account for much of the existing empirical evidence. However, a growing body of research at the intersection of psychology and economics produces findings inconsistent with such straightforward, preference-based interpretations for moral behavior. In particular, while people are often willing to take a moral act that imposes personal material costs when confronted with a clear-cut choice between “right” and “wrong,” such decisions often seem to be dramatically influenced by the specific contexts in which they occur. In particular, when the context provides sufficient flexibility to allow plausible justification that one can both act egoistically while remaining moral, people seize on such opportunities to prioritize self-interest at the expense of morality. In other words, people who appear to exhibit a preference for being moral may in fact be placing a value on feeling moral, often accomplishing this goal by manipulating the manner in which they process information to justify taking egoistic actions while maintaining this feeling of morality.
- Open Access
- 4 September 2015
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Vol. 9, 473
How beliefs about self-creation inflate value in the human brain
Humans have a tendency to overvalue their own ideas and creations. Understanding how these errors in judgement emerge is important for explaining suboptimal decisions, as when individuals and groups choose self-created alternatives over superior or equal ones. We show that such overvaluation is a reconstructive process that emerges when participants believe they have created an item, regardless of whether this belief is true or false. This overvaluation is observed both when false beliefs of self-creation are elicited (Experiment 1) or implanted (Experiment 2). Using brain imaging data we highlight the brain processes mediating an interaction between value and belief of self-creation. Specifically, following the creation manipulation there is an increased functional connectivity during valuation between the right caudate nucleus, where we show BOLD activity correlated with subjective value, and the left amygdala, where we show BOLD activity is linked to subjective belief. Our study highlights psychological and neurobiological processes through which false beliefs alter human valuation and in doing so throw light on a common source of error in judgements of value.
- 4 September 2015
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Vol. 9, 473
Open AccessHow beliefs about self-creation inflate value in the human brain
Humans have a tendency to overvalue their own ideas and creations. Understanding how these errors in judgement emerge is important for explaining suboptimal decisions, as when individuals and groups choose self-created alternatives over superior or equal ones. We show that such overvaluation is a reconstructive process that emerges when participants believe they have created an item, regardless of whether this belief is true or false. This overvaluation is observed both when false beliefs of self-creation are elicited (Experiment 1) or implanted (Experiment 2). Using brain imaging data we highlight the brain processes mediating an interaction between value and belief of self-creation. Specifically, following the creation manipulation there is an increased functional connectivity during valuation between the right caudate nucleus, where we show BOLD activity correlated with subjective value, and the left amygdala, where we show BOLD activity is linked to subjective belief. Our study highlights psychological and neurobiological processes through which false beliefs alter human valuation and in doing so throw light on a common source of error in judgements of value.
- 1 January 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Behavioral Science & Policy
- Vol. 1 (2) , 33-41
Beyond good intentions: Prompting people to make plans improves follow-through on important tasks
- 1 January 2015
- Published by SAGE Publications in Behavioral Science & Policy
- Vol. 1 (2) , 33-41
Beyond good intentions: Prompting people to make plans improves follow-through on important tasks
- Top Cited Papers
- 17 November 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Vol. 9 (6) , 587-593
How Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A Universal Desire for More Equal Pay
Do people from different countries and different backgrounds have similar preferences for how much more the rich should earn than the poor? Using survey data from 40 countries (N = 55,238), we compare respondents’ estimates of the wages of people in different occupations—chief executive officers, cabinet ministers, and unskilled workers—to their ideals for what those wages should be. We show that ideal pay gaps between skilled and unskilled workers are significantly smaller than estimated pay gaps and that there is consensus across countries, socioeconomic status, and political beliefs. Moreover, data from 16 countries reveals that people dramatically underestimate actual pay inequality. In the United States—where underestimation was particularly pronounced—the actual pay ratio of CEOs to unskilled workers (354:1) far exceeded the estimated ratio (30:1), which in turn far exceeded the ideal ratio (7:1). In sum, respondents underestimate actual pay gaps, and their ideal pay gaps are even further from reality than those underestimates.
- 17 November 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Vol. 9 (6) , 587-593
Top Cited PapersHow Much (More) Should CEOs Make? A Universal Desire for More Equal Pay
Do people from different countries and different backgrounds have similar preferences for how much more the rich should earn than the poor? Using survey data from 40 countries (N = 55,238), we compare respondents’ estimates of the wages of people in different occupations—chief executive officers, cabinet ministers, and unskilled workers—to their ideals for what those wages should be. We show that ideal pay gaps between skilled and unskilled workers are significantly smaller than estimated pay gaps and that there is consensus across countries, socioeconomic status, and political beliefs. Moreover, data from 16 countries reveals that people dramatically underestimate actual pay inequality. In the United States—where underestimation was particularly pronounced—the actual pay ratio of CEOs to unskilled workers (354:1) far exceeded the estimated ratio (30:1), which in turn far exceeded the ideal ratio (7:1). In sum, respondents underestimate actual pay gaps, and their ideal pay gaps are even further from reality than those underestimates.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 1 (1) , 151-155
Unequality
Who should get what, and what are the consequences? Economic inequality in the United States has been rising for decades, yet only recently have behavioral scientists explored two central questions surrounding the optimal level of inequality. First, what are the effects of increased inequality on citizens’ decisions and behavior? Second, what do citizens believe the “ideal” level of inequality should be? Critical input comes from better understanding increased inequality’s impact on the overall health of the economy—such as labor productivity—and assessing citizens’ preferences for distributing assets—such as income and wealth. Inequality’s impacts and citizens’ preferences inform the likely effects (and likely voter acceptance) of policies that affect inequality, from taxation to spending on education and health care. Research reveals that Americans from all walks of life—rich and poor, liberal and conservative—endorse unequality: unequal outcomes (rich people have more than poor people) but far less inequality than the current state of affairs. For example, the actual pay ratio of CEOs to unskilled workers in the United States is 354:1, but Americans report an ideal ratio of 7:1—unequal, but more equal. Moreover, research shows that increasing inequality often has negative effects: decreasing motivation and labor productivity, impairing decision making, and increasing ethical lapses. In sum, behavioral research supports the benefits of policies aimed at achieving unequality.
- 1 October 2014
- Published by SAGE Publications in Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 1 (1) , 151-155
Open AccessUnequality
Who should get what, and what are the consequences? Economic inequality in the United States has been rising for decades, yet only recently have behavioral scientists explored two central questions surrounding the optimal level of inequality. First, what are the effects of increased inequality on citizens’ decisions and behavior? Second, what do citizens believe the “ideal” level of inequality should be? Critical input comes from better understanding increased inequality’s impact on the overall health of the economy—such as labor productivity—and assessing citizens’ preferences for distributing assets—such as income and wealth. Inequality’s impacts and citizens’ preferences inform the likely effects (and likely voter acceptance) of policies that affect inequality, from taxation to spending on education and health care. Research reveals that Americans from all walks of life—rich and poor, liberal and conservative—endorse unequality: unequal outcomes (rich people have more than poor people) but far less inequality than the current state of affairs. For example, the actual pay ratio of CEOs to unskilled workers in the United States is 354:1, but Americans report an ideal ratio of 7:1—unequal, but more equal. Moreover, research shows that increasing inequality often has negative effects: decreasing motivation and labor productivity, impairing decision making, and increasing ethical lapses. In sum, behavioral research supports the benefits of policies aimed at achieving unequality.
- 17 April 2014
- Published by Wiley in Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy
- Vol. 14 (1) , 339-351
The Not‐So‐Common‐Wealth of Australia: Evidence for a Cross‐Cultural Desire for a More Equal Distribution of Wealth
Recent evidence suggests that Americans underestimate wealth inequality in the United States and favor a more equal wealth distribution (Norton & Ariely, ). Does this pattern reflect ideological dynamics unique to the United States, or is the phenomenon evident in other developed economies—such as Australia? We assessed Australians’ perceived and ideal wealth distributions and compared them to the actual wealth distribution. Although the United States and Australia differ in the degree of actual wealth inequality and in cultural narratives around economic mobility, the Australian data closely replicated the United States findings. Misperceptions of wealth inequality as well as preferences for more equal distributions may be common across developed economies. In addition, beliefs about wealth distribution only weakly predicted support for raising the minimum wage, suggesting that attitudes toward inequality may not translate into preferences for redistributive policies.
- 17 April 2014
- Published by Wiley in Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy
- Vol. 14 (1) , 339-351
The Not‐So‐Common‐Wealth of Australia: Evidence for a Cross‐Cultural Desire for a More Equal Distribution of Wealth
Recent evidence suggests that Americans underestimate wealth inequality in the United States and favor a more equal wealth distribution (Norton & Ariely, ). Does this pattern reflect ideological dynamics unique to the United States, or is the phenomenon evident in other developed economies—such as Australia? We assessed Australians’ perceived and ideal wealth distributions and compared them to the actual wealth distribution. Although the United States and Australia differ in the degree of actual wealth inequality and in cultural narratives around economic mobility, the Australian data closely replicated the United States findings. Misperceptions of wealth inequality as well as preferences for more equal distributions may be common across developed economies. In addition, beliefs about wealth distribution only weakly predicted support for raising the minimum wage, suggesting that attitudes toward inequality may not translate into preferences for redistributive policies.