PFPeter Flaschel

Peter Flaschel

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Peter Flaschel has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    2D Chaos in the Interaction of Inflation and Unemployment: Moving Averages and the Modeling of High Frequency Macrodynamics

    by Peter Flaschel, Christian Proaño

    The paper argues that applicable macro is high frequency macro and the data generating process is therefore to be modeled in continuous time. It exemplifies this with a misuse of a 2D period model of monetarist type which becomes extremely overshooting, allowing for routes to “chaos,” when iterated at low frequencies. Instead of such low frequency procedures, we augment the model by a Keynesian feedback chain (the real rate of interest channel) to introduce local instability into the model. We also introduce heterogeneous opinion dynamics into it. The implied 4D dynamics are made bounded thereby, but seem to allow only complex limit cycles, with no transition towards strange attractors anymore.

  • Open Access

    Financial Markets, Banking and the Design of Monetary Policy: A Stable Baseline Scenario

    by Florian Hartmann, Peter Flaschel

    A baseline integration of commercial banks into the disequilibrium framework with behavioral traders of Charpe et al. (2011, 2012) is presented. At the core of the analysis is the impact the banking sector exerts on the interaction of real and financial markets. Potentially destabilizing feedback channels in the presence of imperfect macroeconomic portfolio adjustment and heterogeneous expectations are investigated. Given the possible financial market instability, various policy instruments have to be applied in order to guarantee viable dynamics in the highly interconnected macroeconomy. Among those are open market operations reacting to the state-of-confidence in the economy and Tobin-type capital gain taxes. The need for policy intervention is even more striking, as the banking sector is modeled in a rather stability enhancing way, fulfilling its fundamental tasks of term transformation of savings and credit granting without engaging in investment activities itself.


  • Reply to Bertram Schefold

    by Peter Flaschel, Reiner Franke, Roberto Veneziani

  • Macroeconomic Stabilization Policies in Intrinsically Unstable Macroeconomies

    by Carl Chiarella, Peter Flaschel, Carsten Köper, Christian Proaño, Willi Semmler

    Many monetary and fiscal policy measures have aimed at mitigating the effects of the financial market meltdown that started in the U.S. subprime sector in 2008 and has subsequently spread world wide as a great recession. Slowly some recovery appears to be on the horizon, yet it is worthwhile exploring the fragility and potentially destabilizing feedbacks of advanced macroeconomies in the context of a framework that builds on the ideas of Keynes and Tobin. This framework stresses the fragilities and destabilizing feedback mechanisms that are potential features of all major markets—those for goods, labor, and financial assets. We use a Tobin macroeconomic portfolio approach and the interaction of heterogeneous agents on the financial market to characterize the potential for financial market instability. Though the study of the latter has been undertaken in many partial models, we focus here on the interconnectedness of all three markets. Furthermore, we study what potential labor market, fiscal and monetary policies can have in stabilizing unstable macroeconomies. In order to study this problem we introduce, besides money, long term bonds and equity into the asset market. We in particular propose a countercyclical monetary policy that sells assets in the boom and purchases them in recessions. Modern stability analysis is brought to bear to demonstrate the stabilizing effects of the suggested policies. The policies suggested here could help the Fed in its search for an appropriate exit strategy after its massive intervention in the financial market.


  • Conclusions

    by Peter Flaschel, Alfred Greiner

    The conclusions summarize the main results. In particular, neither the Marx' reserve army mechanism nor mass unemployment as a disciplining device, as in Kalecki's work, are necessary for the functioning of a capitalistic system. The introduction of minimum and maximum real wages can attenuate the negative consequences of booms and recessions provided that markets, including the labor market, are sufficiently flexible implying that employers must not be constrained in their hiring and firing decisions. Further, lower and upper bounds for real wages can be seen as one ingredient of a flexicurity economy that intends to overcome the conflict between capital and labor. Thus, flexicurity capitalism can be considered as a Western type of competitive socialism, as envisaged by Schumpeter, that does not only successfully solve the coordination problem but also the incentive problem in the principal-agent scenario.

  • Unleashed Capitalism: The Starting Point for Societal Reform

    by Peter Flaschel, Alfred Greiner

    Chapter 4 contrasts the situation of an ideal flexicurity economy with what can be called a model of unleashed capitalism. There, labor market and goods market disequilibria are analyzed in combination with the rate of return and capital gain oriented portfolio choice of asset holders. Balanced growth paths for this type of economy are discussed, their limited stability, on the one hand, and the cumulative forces that work around them, on the other hand, which create large swings in economic activity of business-cycle and also of long-wave frequency. The effectiveness of counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy rules in such a framework are studied which could turn the persistent fluctuations of the economy into damped ones.

  • Schumpeter: Capitalism, Flexicurity, and Democracy?

    by Peter Flaschel, Alfred Greiner

    Chapter 3 starts from Schumpeter's investigation of the possibility of a Western type of competitive socialism that successfully not only solves the coordination problem, but also the incentive problem in the principal-agent scenario of a socialist economy. Viewed from today's perspective one has to question his solution of the coordination problem under socialism. Yet, a flexicurity reform of the labor market would not only integrate the concepts that are discussed in chapters 1 and 2, but would also make Schumpeter's type of socialism unnecessary for a proper working of the economy in democratic societies. Moreover, many aspects of capitalism, its microeconomic institutional experience of running small, medium-sized or large enterprises in particular, could just simply remain intact under such a new social structure of accumulation.

  • Kalecki: Full Employment Welfare Capitalism?

    by Peter Flaschel, Alfred Greiner

    Chapter 2 analyzes the internal relationship between capital and labor and their interaction in the production process within firms. It resorts to Kalecki's analysis of the ‘Political Aspects of Full Employment', which asserts that capitalist economies will enter a stagnant phase after prosperity phases, since industrial leaders do not like full employment policies and can indeed enforce tight fiscal and monetary policies and this even during the stagnant phase of the distributive cycle. The chapter illustrates that this conflict can be managed in an educated, social and democratic society and is not as ineluctable as it is suggested by Kalecki.

  • Marx: Socially Acceptable Capitalism?

    by Peter Flaschel, Alfred Greiner

    This chapter investigates the external relationship between capital and labor that underlies the formation of the wage-price spiral. The resulting distributive cycle is a long-phased one. It is demonstrated that booms and busts of the distributive cycle and the pronounced reserve army mechanism underlying it can be moderated in amplitude if both labor and capital can reach an appropriate consensus with respect to maximum real wages in the prosperity phase and with respect to minimum real wages in the stagnant phase.