Hakan J. Holm
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Hakan J. Holm has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Erik Wengström
Lund University SE‐220 07 Lund Sweden
1 shared publication - Jean-Robert Tyran
Univ Vienna, Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication Margaret Samahita
Univ Coll Dublin, Geary Inst Publ Policy, Sch Econ, Dublin, Ireland
1 shared publication- Margaret Samahita
School of Economics, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland
1 shared publication - Ola Andersson
Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden
1 shared publication - Ola Andersson
Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Sweden; Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden; Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 11 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 96
No mood effects in the field: The case of car inspections
- 11 February 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Psychology
- Vol. 96
Open AccessNo mood effects in the field: The case of car inspections
- 18 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 122 (2) , 648-674
Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits
- 18 March 2019
- Published by Wiley in The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
- Vol. 122 (2) , 648-674
Risking Other People's Money: Experimental Evidence on the Role of Incentives and Personality Traits
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 148, 83-104
Curating social image: Experimental evidence on the value of actions and selfies
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 148, 83-104
Curating social image: Experimental evidence on the value of actions and selfies
- Open Access
Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden
This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.
Open AccessSpeech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden
This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.