James Bohman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
James Bohman has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
García Jaramillo
Con la colaboración de Natalia Londoño (Universidad EAFIT Medellín Colombia
1 shared publicationTraducción De Leo- Nardo
Con la colaboración de Natalia Londoño (Universidad EAFIT Medellín Colombia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 June 2016
- Published by Universidad EAFIT in Co-Herencia
- Vol. 13 (24) , 105-143
La madurez de la democracia deliberativa
Reviso tres maneras diferentes como los ideales de la democracia deliberativa han cambiado a la luz de las preocupaciones prácticas sobre su viabilidad, es decir, haciendo cada vez más importante el problema de cómo este ideal puede acercarse a sociedades caracterizadas por profundos desacuerdos, problemas sociales de enorme complejidad e instrumentos inoperantes en sus instituciones existentes. En primer lugar, las teorías de la democracia deliberativa enfatizan el proceso mismo de la deliberación, y no sus condiciones y procedimientos ideales y contrafácticos. En segundo lugar, los demócratas deliberativos se interesan cada vez más en los problemas de la institucionalización, en hacer del voto, la regla de mayorías, la representación, los tribunales y el derecho constitucional, instituciones más deliberativas, en pro de una mayor democracia directa. En tercer lugar, los deliberativistas se ocupan de examinar y comparar los diferentes escenarios y procedimientos de la deliberación, señalando problemas empíricos y obstáculos que no siempre pueden anticiparse al recurrir únicamente a argumentos conceptuales.
- 1 June 2016
- Published by Universidad EAFIT in Co-Herencia
- Vol. 13 (24) , 105-143
Open AccessLa madurez de la democracia deliberativa
Reviso tres maneras diferentes como los ideales de la democracia deliberativa han cambiado a la luz de las preocupaciones prácticas sobre su viabilidad, es decir, haciendo cada vez más importante el problema de cómo este ideal puede acercarse a sociedades caracterizadas por profundos desacuerdos, problemas sociales de enorme complejidad e instrumentos inoperantes en sus instituciones existentes. En primer lugar, las teorías de la democracia deliberativa enfatizan el proceso mismo de la deliberación, y no sus condiciones y procedimientos ideales y contrafácticos. En segundo lugar, los demócratas deliberativos se interesan cada vez más en los problemas de la institucionalización, en hacer del voto, la regla de mayorías, la representación, los tribunales y el derecho constitucional, instituciones más deliberativas, en pro de una mayor democracia directa. En tercer lugar, los deliberativistas se ocupan de examinar y comparar los diferentes escenarios y procedimientos de la deliberación, señalando problemas empíricos y obstáculos que no siempre pueden anticiparse al recurrir únicamente a argumentos conceptuales.
- 2 January 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Horizons
- Vol. 17 (1) , 123-134
From Self-Legislation to Self-Determination: Democracy and the New Circumstances of Global Politics
It is a distinctive feature of the global political order that democracy is no longer confined to nation-states, characterized by extensive and overlapping constituencies. It is important to think of the significance of these developments for individuals’ self-determination, which may be undermined in different ways. Here it is argued that democracy must serve to delegate power to complex units of decision making which favour self-determination. Contestability is part of this form of self-determination, allowing forms of politics to emerge based on the democratic rights and powers of self-determining, non-dominated citizens.
- 2 January 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Critical Horizons
- Vol. 17 (1) , 123-134
From Self-Legislation to Self-Determination: Democracy and the New Circumstances of Global Politics
It is a distinctive feature of the global political order that democracy is no longer confined to nation-states, characterized by extensive and overlapping constituencies. It is important to think of the significance of these developments for individuals’ self-determination, which may be undermined in different ways. Here it is argued that democracy must serve to delegate power to complex units of decision making which favour self-determination. Contestability is part of this form of self-determination, allowing forms of politics to emerge based on the democratic rights and powers of self-determining, non-dominated citizens.
- 4 July 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Citizenship Studies
- Vol. 19 (5) , 520-534
Domination, global harms, and the problem of silent citizenship: toward a republican theory of global justice
- 4 July 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Citizenship Studies
- Vol. 19 (5) , 520-534
Domination, global harms, and the problem of silent citizenship: toward a republican theory of global justice
- 23 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 26 (2) , 175-187
Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology
With her conception of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker has opened up new normative dimensions for epistemology; that is, the injustice of denying one’s status as a knower. While her analysis of the remedies for such injustices focuses on the epistemic virtues of agents, I argue for the normative superiority of adapting a broadly republican conception of epistemic injustice. This argument for a republican epistemology has three steps. First, I focus on methodological and explanatory issues of identifying epistemic injustice and argue, against Fricker, that identity prejudice fails to provide a sufficient explanatory basis for the spread and maintenance of such systematic epistemic injustice. Second, this systemic basis can be found not so much in the psychological attitudes of individual knowers, but in the relations of domination among groups and individuals in a society. Third, if such a presence of domination plays a primary explanatory role in all forms of epistemic injustice, it is likely that those who suffer from epistemic injustice will also suffer other forms of injustice and loss of status via the exercise of other forms of power and exclusion.
- 23 April 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 26 (2) , 175-187
Domination, Epistemic Injustice and Republican Epistemology
With her conception of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker has opened up new normative dimensions for epistemology; that is, the injustice of denying one’s status as a knower. While her analysis of the remedies for such injustices focuses on the epistemic virtues of agents, I argue for the normative superiority of adapting a broadly republican conception of epistemic injustice. This argument for a republican epistemology has three steps. First, I focus on methodological and explanatory issues of identifying epistemic injustice and argue, against Fricker, that identity prejudice fails to provide a sufficient explanatory basis for the spread and maintenance of such systematic epistemic injustice. Second, this systemic basis can be found not so much in the psychological attitudes of individual knowers, but in the relations of domination among groups and individuals in a society. Third, if such a presence of domination plays a primary explanatory role in all forms of epistemic injustice, it is likely that those who suffer from epistemic injustice will also suffer other forms of injustice and loss of status via the exercise of other forms of power and exclusion.
- 22 September 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (5) , 435-449
Is Hegel a Republican? Pippin, Recognition, and Domination in thePhilosophy of Right
Robert Pippin's masterful account of rational agency in Hegel emphasizes important dimensions of freedom and independence, where putative independence is always bound up with a profound dependence on others. This insistence on the complex relationships between freedom, dependence and independence raise an important question that Pippin does not consider: is Hegel a republican? This is especially significant given the fact that modern republicanism has explored this same conceptual terrain. I argue that a form of republicanism is in fact an important aspect of Hegel's theory of freedom, and this should lead us to moderate Pippin's account of the conservative side of Hegel's conception of social dependence. These affinities mean that even if Hegel does not fully endorse contemporary versions of republicanism (such as that of Philip Pettit), he shares core features of the republican view of domination and freedom. In fact, Hegel is a republican to the extent that he shares what Pippin calls “that noble nineteenth century idea that my freedom depends upon the freedom of others”. Or, to put it in a more directly republican way typical of the eighteenth century, the freedom of each is dependent upon the freedom of all and thus freedom exists only if it is shared. As developed by Pippin, Hegel's conception of shared freedom is inadequate to the extent that it cannot give a full account of the possibilities of domination and dependence in modern institutions, I illustrate this difficulty through examples taken from Hegel's Philosophy of Right, including marriage, markets, and political deliberation.
- 22 September 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (5) , 435-449
Is Hegel a Republican? Pippin, Recognition, and Domination in thePhilosophy of Right
Robert Pippin's masterful account of rational agency in Hegel emphasizes important dimensions of freedom and independence, where putative independence is always bound up with a profound dependence on others. This insistence on the complex relationships between freedom, dependence and independence raise an important question that Pippin does not consider: is Hegel a republican? This is especially significant given the fact that modern republicanism has explored this same conceptual terrain. I argue that a form of republicanism is in fact an important aspect of Hegel's theory of freedom, and this should lead us to moderate Pippin's account of the conservative side of Hegel's conception of social dependence. These affinities mean that even if Hegel does not fully endorse contemporary versions of republicanism (such as that of Philip Pettit), he shares core features of the republican view of domination and freedom. In fact, Hegel is a republican to the extent that he shares what Pippin calls “that noble nineteenth century idea that my freedom depends upon the freedom of others”. Or, to put it in a more directly republican way typical of the eighteenth century, the freedom of each is dependent upon the freedom of all and thus freedom exists only if it is shared. As developed by Pippin, Hegel's conception of shared freedom is inadequate to the extent that it cannot give a full account of the possibilities of domination and dependence in modern institutions, I illustrate this difficulty through examples taken from Hegel's Philosophy of Right, including marriage, markets, and political deliberation.
- Open Access
- 23 January 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics & Global Politics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 71-84
A response to my Critics: Democracy across Borders
A response to my critics: Democracy across Borders
- 23 January 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics & Global Politics
- Vol. 3 (1) , 71-84
Open AccessA response to my Critics: Democracy across Borders
A response to my critics: Democracy across Borders
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 32 (3) , 375-381
Pluralism, Pragmatism and Self-knowledge
- 1 September 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 32 (3) , 375-381
Pluralism, Pragmatism and Self-knowledge
- 1 November 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Communication Theory
- Vol. 17 (4) , 348-355
Political Communication and the Epistemic Value of Diversity: Deliberation and Legitimation in Media Societies
- 1 November 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Communication Theory
- Vol. 17 (4) , 348-355
Political Communication and the Epistemic Value of Diversity: Deliberation and Legitimation in Media Societies
- 1 September 2005
- Published by Wiley in Ratio Juris
- Vol. 18 (3) , 293-314
From Demos to Demoi: Democracy across Borders
- 1 September 2005
- Published by Wiley in Ratio Juris
- Vol. 18 (3) , 293-314
From Demos to Demoi: Democracy across Borders