Andrew Abbott
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Andrew Abbott has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Glauco De Vita
Business School, Oxford Brookes University , Oxford , OX33 1HX , UK
10 shared publicationsPhilip Jones
9 shared publications- Philip Jones
Department of Economics, University of Bath, Bath, UK
5 shared publications Shasikanta Nandeibam
Department of Economics University of Bath Bath Bath and North East Somerset UK
5 shared publicationsLucy O'Shea
3 shared publications- Kevin Lawler
University of Kuwait
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 37 (3) , 915-930
Can Politics Explain Contracting Out?
The theoretical literature suggests that political ideology matters in the decision to contract out public sector services, whereas the empirical literature is divided. We seek to explain the divide in the empirical literature by providing a link from theory to our empirical analysis by describing the nature of political competition. Using the number of seats in English local government as a measure of political ideology, we find that those governments dominated by Conservative party members have a higher likelihood of contracting out, whereas the opposite is true for the Greens. We also investigate the marginal effect of a Conservative seat. Our results suggest that local governments are more likely to contract out waste management and recycling services, the greater the number of seats that are controlled by the right‐wing party (Conservatives). However, an additional Conservative seat seems to have a stronger positive influence when one of the other opposition parties (the Liberal Democrats) is controlling the local legislature rather than the Conservative themselves.
- 12 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 37 (3) , 915-930
Open AccessCan Politics Explain Contracting Out?
The theoretical literature suggests that political ideology matters in the decision to contract out public sector services, whereas the empirical literature is divided. We seek to explain the divide in the empirical literature by providing a link from theory to our empirical analysis by describing the nature of political competition. Using the number of seats in English local government as a measure of political ideology, we find that those governments dominated by Conservative party members have a higher likelihood of contracting out, whereas the opposite is true for the Greens. We also investigate the marginal effect of a Conservative seat. Our results suggest that local governments are more likely to contract out waste management and recycling services, the greater the number of seats that are controlled by the right‐wing party (Conservatives). However, an additional Conservative seat seems to have a stronger positive influence when one of the other opposition parties (the Liberal Democrats) is controlling the local legislature rather than the Conservative themselves.
- Open Access
Are government expenditures more cyclical the more they finance the provision of public goods?
The “publicness” of services provided by governments can be gauged with reference to the extent to which services are “non‐rival in consumption.” Services that are more “rival in consumption” (e.g., education and medical care) are more likely to be “parceled out” between citizens. With greater personal experience, voters are more likely to be aware of private‐good benefits and therefore are far more likely to perceive these services as part of a personal “endowment.” In economic downturns, they attach priority to sustaining expenditures on more “private” services and vote‐maximizing governments respond by diverting expenditure from “more public” to “more private” services. Consequently, government expenditures are more cyclical the more they finance non‐rival services. Predictions are tested with reference to government expenditures in 28 OECD countries between 1997 and 2019.
Open AccessAre government expenditures more cyclical the more they finance the provision of public goods?
The “publicness” of services provided by governments can be gauged with reference to the extent to which services are “non‐rival in consumption.” Services that are more “rival in consumption” (e.g., education and medical care) are more likely to be “parceled out” between citizens. With greater personal experience, voters are more likely to be aware of private‐good benefits and therefore are far more likely to perceive these services as part of a personal “endowment.” In economic downturns, they attach priority to sustaining expenditures on more “private” services and vote‐maximizing governments respond by diverting expenditure from “more public” to “more private” services. Consequently, government expenditures are more cyclical the more they finance non‐rival services. Predictions are tested with reference to government expenditures in 28 OECD countries between 1997 and 2019.
- Open Access
- 29 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy
- Vol. 12 (2) , 209-228
The cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions
This is the first paper to explore the determinants of the cyclicality of government environmental protection expenditures. Attention focuses on political pressures to increase expenditure on public-sector programmes. These pressures change systematically over the economic cycle. In economic upturns, voters experience ‘fiscal illusion’. Governments can exercise discretion to increase environmental expenditures. In recessions, voters are far more aware. Vote maximising governments divert expenditures away from the environment, toward programmes that deliver more private-good benefits. Predictions are tested with reference to 28 OECD countries’ expenditures between 1992 and 2012. The cyclicality of expenditures depends on government sensitivity to systematic changes in voter awareness.
- 29 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy
- Vol. 12 (2) , 209-228
Open AccessThe cyclicality of government environmental expenditure: political pressure in economic upturns and in recessions
This is the first paper to explore the determinants of the cyclicality of government environmental protection expenditures. Attention focuses on political pressures to increase expenditure on public-sector programmes. These pressures change systematically over the economic cycle. In economic upturns, voters experience ‘fiscal illusion’. Governments can exercise discretion to increase environmental expenditures. In recessions, voters are far more aware. Vote maximising governments divert expenditures away from the environment, toward programmes that deliver more private-good benefits. Predictions are tested with reference to 28 OECD countries’ expenditures between 1992 and 2012. The cyclicality of expenditures depends on government sensitivity to systematic changes in voter awareness.
- Open Access
- 16 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 186 (1-2) , 97-117
The cyclicality of government foreign-aid expenditure: voter awareness in “good” times and in “bad”
While it has been argued that the cyclicality of government spending likely depends on the intensities of political pressure to increase expenditure, in economic upturns and downturns, it is important to explore the determinants of changes in the strengths of those pressures. This paper is the first (to our knowledge) to focus on the relevance of systematic changes in voter awareness of government spending. Predictions of the impact of changes in awareness are tested with reference to 23 OECD donor countries’ foreign aid expenditures over the 1999–2015 period. The evidence offers insights into the discretion governments exercise when “fiscal illusion” increases and into the policy implications of systematic changes in voter awareness (in “good” times and in “bad”).
- 16 December 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 186 (1-2) , 97-117
Open AccessThe cyclicality of government foreign-aid expenditure: voter awareness in “good” times and in “bad”
While it has been argued that the cyclicality of government spending likely depends on the intensities of political pressure to increase expenditure, in economic upturns and downturns, it is important to explore the determinants of changes in the strengths of those pressures. This paper is the first (to our knowledge) to focus on the relevance of systematic changes in voter awareness of government spending. Predictions of the impact of changes in awareness are tested with reference to 23 OECD donor countries’ foreign aid expenditures over the 1999–2015 period. The evidence offers insights into the discretion governments exercise when “fiscal illusion” increases and into the policy implications of systematic changes in voter awareness (in “good” times and in “bad”).
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 205-233
Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand
- 1 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 205-233
Inconsistencies in the Finance of Public Services: Government Responses to Excess Demand
- 24 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 84 (2) , 484-503
Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
- 24 July 2017
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 84 (2) , 484-503
Incumbency and Distributive Politics: Intergovernmental Transfers in Mexico
- Open Access
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 136, 159-168
The Displacement Effect of Convenience: The Case of Recycling
- 1 June 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Economics
- Vol. 136, 159-168
Open AccessThe Displacement Effect of Convenience: The Case of Recycling
- 2 September 2015
- Published by Wiley in The World Economy
- Vol. 39 (5) , 621-635
Determinants of International Student Migration
This paper considers what factors determine the migration of overseas students, when students cross borders for higher education. We utilise a gravity model for international student mobility and derive estimates for a sample of 18 countries of destination and 38 countries of origin over the period 2005–11. Our results confirm that geographical distance and the presence of a common language are powerful in explaining bilateral student flows. Our most interesting finding is that time zone differences have a statistically significant and economically large effect in determining international student flows.
- 2 September 2015
- Published by Wiley in The World Economy
- Vol. 39 (5) , 621-635
Determinants of International Student Migration
This paper considers what factors determine the migration of overseas students, when students cross borders for higher education. We utilise a gravity model for international student mobility and derive estimates for a sample of 18 countries of destination and 38 countries of origin over the period 2005–11. Our results confirm that geographical distance and the presence of a common language are powerful in explaining bilateral student flows. Our most interesting finding is that time zone differences have a statistically significant and economically large effect in determining international student flows.
- 13 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Scottish Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 63 (2) , 177-193
Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: State Government Expenditure in the United States
A well‐established literature argues that fiscal illusion increases the level of government expenditure. This article focuses on the proposition that fiscal illusion also influences the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are formed with reference to government reliance on high income elasticities of indirect tax revenues and on intergovernmental transfers. Predictions are tested with reference to the expenditures of 36 states in the United States from 1980 to 2000. Government expenditures are more likely to be procyclical when citizens systematically underestimate the cost of taxation.
- 13 August 2015
- Published by Wiley in Scottish Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 63 (2) , 177-193
Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: State Government Expenditure in the United States
A well‐established literature argues that fiscal illusion increases the level of government expenditure. This article focuses on the proposition that fiscal illusion also influences the cyclicality of government expenditure. Predictions are formed with reference to government reliance on high income elasticities of indirect tax revenues and on intergovernmental transfers. Predictions are tested with reference to the expenditures of 36 states in the United States from 1980 to 2000. Government expenditures are more likely to be procyclical when citizens systematically underestimate the cost of taxation.