Lech Garlicki
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 July 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 6 (3-4) , 509-530
Cooperation of courts: The role of supranational jurisdictions in Europe
The constitutional protection of individual rights has been in place, in developed democracies, for several decades. In all the countries that have adopted the idea of a written constitution, there is a set of constitutional provisions on rights and liberties, and there are mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of those rights and liberties by an independent judiciary. A constitution is no longer something that functions exclusively within the sphere of politics; rather, it is regarded as the Grundnorm, determining the legal system as a whole and, in particular, the status of the individual. While, in most European countries, the last word in constitutional interpretation is reserved to a separate constitutional court, all courts and judges have a right (as well as an obligation) to apply constitutional provisions as they arise in the context of ordinary legislation and administrative action. In effect, constitutions became “living instruments,” existing not only as written texts but also (and first of all) as sets of judicially created rules and principles.
- 7 July 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 6 (3-4) , 509-530
Open AccessCooperation of courts: The role of supranational jurisdictions in Europe
The constitutional protection of individual rights has been in place, in developed democracies, for several decades. In all the countries that have adopted the idea of a written constitution, there is a set of constitutional provisions on rights and liberties, and there are mechanisms for the protection and enforcement of those rights and liberties by an independent judiciary. A constitution is no longer something that functions exclusively within the sphere of politics; rather, it is regarded as the Grundnorm, determining the legal system as a whole and, in particular, the status of the individual. While, in most European countries, the last word in constitutional interpretation is reserved to a separate constitutional court, all courts and judges have a right (as well as an obligation) to apply constitutional provisions as they arise in the context of ordinary legislation and administrative action. In effect, constitutions became “living instruments,” existing not only as written texts but also (and first of all) as sets of judicially created rules and principles.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 5 (1) , 44-68
Constitutional courts versus supreme courts
Constitutional courts exist in most of the civil law countries of Westem Europe, and in almost all the new democracies in Eastem Europe; even France has developed its Conseil Constitutionnel into a genuine constitutional jurisdiction. While their emergence may be regarded as one of the most successful improvements on traditional European concepts of democracy and the rule of law, it has inevitably given rise to questions about the distribution of power at the supreme judicial level. As constitutional law has come to permeate the entire structure of the legal system, it has become impossible to maintain a firm delimitation between the functions of the constitutional court and those of ordinary courts. This article looks at various conflicts arising between the higher courts of Germany, Italy, Poland, and France, and concludes that, in both positive and negative lawmaking, certain tensions are bound to exist as a necessary component of centralized judicial review.
- 1 January 2007
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Constitutional Law
- Vol. 5 (1) , 44-68
Open AccessConstitutional courts versus supreme courts
Constitutional courts exist in most of the civil law countries of Westem Europe, and in almost all the new democracies in Eastem Europe; even France has developed its Conseil Constitutionnel into a genuine constitutional jurisdiction. While their emergence may be regarded as one of the most successful improvements on traditional European concepts of democracy and the rule of law, it has inevitably given rise to questions about the distribution of power at the supreme judicial level. As constitutional law has come to permeate the entire structure of the legal system, it has become impossible to maintain a firm delimitation between the functions of the constitutional court and those of ordinary courts. This article looks at various conflicts arising between the higher courts of Germany, Italy, Poland, and France, and concludes that, in both positive and negative lawmaking, certain tensions are bound to exist as a necessary component of centralized judicial review.