Yuezhi Zhao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Yuezhi Zhao has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jing Wu
School of Journalism and Communication, Peking University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 27 (2) , 97-111
Understanding China’s Developmental Path: Towards Socialist Rejuvenation?
As we arrive at a critical juncture in the contestations for a new global order in which China and communication intersect to assume pivotal roles, it has become more urgent than ever to understand China’s developmental path on its own terms. Such a task, however, is becoming increasingly challenging and politically-charged. Against the tide of describing reform-era China in terms of all forms of capitalism and thereby feeding into the long-discredited “end of history” discourse, this paper overviews political economic, ideological, and cultural changes under Xi Jinping’s New Era from a historical and endogenous perspective. Neither taking “socialism with Chinese characteristics” at face value nor ignoring it, the analysis demonstrates the enduring legacy of the Chinese communist revolution on China’s nation-building and developmental efforts, and the CCP’s abilities in creatively reclaiming this legacy and mobilising cultural resources to sustain its hegemony.
- 25 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 27 (2) , 97-111
Understanding China’s Developmental Path: Towards Socialist Rejuvenation?
As we arrive at a critical juncture in the contestations for a new global order in which China and communication intersect to assume pivotal roles, it has become more urgent than ever to understand China’s developmental path on its own terms. Such a task, however, is becoming increasingly challenging and politically-charged. Against the tide of describing reform-era China in terms of all forms of capitalism and thereby feeding into the long-discredited “end of history” discourse, this paper overviews political economic, ideological, and cultural changes under Xi Jinping’s New Era from a historical and endogenous perspective. Neither taking “socialism with Chinese characteristics” at face value nor ignoring it, the analysis demonstrates the enduring legacy of the Chinese communist revolution on China’s nation-building and developmental efforts, and the CCP’s abilities in creatively reclaiming this legacy and mobilising cultural resources to sustain its hegemony.
- Open Access
- 17 December 2018
- Published by Trent University Library & Archives in Media Theory
- Vol. 2 (2) , 154-163
Edward Herman and Manufacturing Consent in China
Boosted by a Chinese translation of Manufacturing Consent in 2011, “manufacturing consent†and “propaganda model†have become fairly well-known terms in the Chinese communication studies field. Actual understandings and invocations of these ideas, however, are complex and multifaceted. Graduate students tend to have a superficial understanding of these ideas without a grasp of Herman and Chomsky’s broader critique of the political economy of global communication. State propaganda officials and communication strategists tend to accept these concepts for their demystification of the US media system on the one hand, and use Manufacturing Consent as a “how to†guide to enhance the effectiveness of Chinese official communication on the other. While there are also examples of more substantive expositions of Herman and Chomsky’s ideas on their own terms, a strong liberal perspective continues to take the US media as a normative model for China and ignore works such as Manufacturing Consent. As China expands its global reach, how Chinese scholars come to terms with Western critical communication scholarship and develop their own indigenous critique of the political economy of global communication has emerged as an issue of both theoretical and practical importance.
- 17 December 2018
- Published by Trent University Library & Archives in Media Theory
- Vol. 2 (2) , 154-163
Open AccessEdward Herman and Manufacturing Consent in China
Boosted by a Chinese translation of Manufacturing Consent in 2011, “manufacturing consent†and “propaganda model†have become fairly well-known terms in the Chinese communication studies field. Actual understandings and invocations of these ideas, however, are complex and multifaceted. Graduate students tend to have a superficial understanding of these ideas without a grasp of Herman and Chomsky’s broader critique of the political economy of global communication. State propaganda officials and communication strategists tend to accept these concepts for their demystification of the US media system on the one hand, and use Manufacturing Consent as a “how to†guide to enhance the effectiveness of Chinese official communication on the other. While there are also examples of more substantive expositions of Herman and Chomsky’s ideas on their own terms, a strong liberal perspective continues to take the US media as a normative model for China and ignore works such as Manufacturing Consent. As China expands its global reach, how Chinese scholars come to terms with Western critical communication scholarship and develop their own indigenous critique of the political economy of global communication has emerged as an issue of both theoretical and practical importance.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 20 (4) , 17-29
China’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Imperatives, Impediments and Irreconcilable Tensions?
From establishing Confucius Institutes all over the world to mounting an advertising blitz in New York’s Times Square, the Chinese state’s multifaceted endeavour to strengthen its “soft power” has been highly visible and the subject of much recent political, journalistic, and scholarly attention. This paper locates the Chinese state’s “soft power” quest within historical and geopolitical contexts and explores the profound contradictions in its underpinning political economy and cultural politics. While this campaign’s state, industry, professional and moral imperatives appear self-evident and there are converging elite and popular interests in the project, its structural impediments seem to be insurmountable. Furthermore, there are irreconcilable tensions between a drive to pursue an elitist, technocratic, and cultural essentialist approach to global communication and a capacity to articulate and communicate an alternative global political and social vision that appeals to the vast majority of the world population in a deeply divided and crises-laden domestic and global order.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 20 (4) , 17-29
China’s Quest for “Soft Power”: Imperatives, Impediments and Irreconcilable Tensions?
From establishing Confucius Institutes all over the world to mounting an advertising blitz in New York’s Times Square, the Chinese state’s multifaceted endeavour to strengthen its “soft power” has been highly visible and the subject of much recent political, journalistic, and scholarly attention. This paper locates the Chinese state’s “soft power” quest within historical and geopolitical contexts and explores the profound contradictions in its underpinning political economy and cultural politics. While this campaign’s state, industry, professional and moral imperatives appear self-evident and there are converging elite and popular interests in the project, its structural impediments seem to be insurmountable. Furthermore, there are irreconcilable tensions between a drive to pursue an elitist, technocratic, and cultural essentialist approach to global communication and a capacity to articulate and communicate an alternative global political and social vision that appeals to the vast majority of the world population in a deeply divided and crises-laden domestic and global order.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 19 (2) , 101-117
Your Show’s Been Cut
This paper examines the increasingly important communication politics between the media and intellectual fields in China’s brave new media world. It starts by outlining key factors that have shaped the evolving post-1989 politics of intellectual publicity in China. It then describes a deep “liberal versus new left” division within the Chinese intellectual field and the ascending power of the Nanfang Weekend and liberal intellectual alliance within China’s CCP-controlled media system. In a subsequent case study, I analyse how the destructive logics of media sensationalism, academic corruption, ideological polarisation, and “liberal media instrumentalism” have intersected to spectacularise intellectual in-fights and distract both the media and the academy from engaging the public around the urgent political economic and social issues of the day.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 19 (2) , 101-117
Your Show’s Been Cut
This paper examines the increasingly important communication politics between the media and intellectual fields in China’s brave new media world. It starts by outlining key factors that have shaped the evolving post-1989 politics of intellectual publicity in China. It then describes a deep “liberal versus new left” division within the Chinese intellectual field and the ascending power of the Nanfang Weekend and liberal intellectual alliance within China’s CCP-controlled media system. In a subsequent case study, I analyse how the destructive logics of media sensationalism, academic corruption, ideological polarisation, and “liberal media instrumentalism” have intersected to spectacularise intellectual in-fights and distract both the media and the academy from engaging the public around the urgent political economic and social issues of the day.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 19 (2) , 5-22
Introduction to “Communication and Class Divide China”
This introduction aims to accomplish two tasks. It first addresses the most important recent development in Chinese political communication by analysing the domestic and transnational dimensions of a multifaceted and high-stake communication war over the unfolding political drama centring on the explosive downfall of CCP Politburo member Bo Xilai and the crackdown on his “Chongqing Model” of development. It then uses this analysis as a backdrop to contextualise and introduce some of the main insights of the articles in this special issue on the one hand, and mobilises these insights to shed new light on the communication politics surrounding the Bo saga on the other. Communication, social consciousness, and class conflict over the future directions of China’s transformation during the current turbulent period of globalised informational capitalism lies at the centre of this article and the entire special issue.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 19 (2) , 5-22
Introduction to “Communication and Class Divide China”
This introduction aims to accomplish two tasks. It first addresses the most important recent development in Chinese political communication by analysing the domestic and transnational dimensions of a multifaceted and high-stake communication war over the unfolding political drama centring on the explosive downfall of CCP Politburo member Bo Xilai and the crackdown on his “Chongqing Model” of development. It then uses this analysis as a backdrop to contextualise and introduce some of the main insights of the articles in this special issue on the one hand, and mobilises these insights to shed new light on the communication politics surrounding the Bo saga on the other. Communication, social consciousness, and class conflict over the future directions of China’s transformation during the current turbulent period of globalised informational capitalism lies at the centre of this article and the entire special issue.
- 12 August 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Chinese Journal of Communication
- Vol. 3 (3) , 266-289
China's pursuits of indigenous innovations in information technology developments: hopes, follies and uncertainties
Although the Chinese state has allowed US-based transnational corporations to play an instrumental role in China's information technology (IT)-led development strategy, a dominant segment of Chinese political and technological leadership has always been wary of the negative political, economic and cultural implications of continued American domination in digital technological developments. Chinese efforts at asserting greater control over a rapidly evolving networked communication infrastructure have been multifaceted. Significantly, the past few years have seen an escalation of domestic discourses on “network sovereignty” and “indigenous innovations” or the mastery of core technologies at the industrial development strategy and technological policy levels. An elite consensus has crystallized around the mobilization of national resources to catch up with the United States in hardware and software IT developments, particularly to achieve potential leadership in next-generation network technologies. However, China's quest for technological leadership in the network age continues to be constrained by a range of domestic political economic forces on one hand, and mediated by the paradoxical dynamics of interstate cooperation and rivalry in the political economy of global communication on the other. The growing transnational nature of the capitalist accumulation process, of which China's deepened global integration through its rapidly expanding and increasingly market-driven information industry has been a critical component, has further complicated these endeavors.
- 12 August 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Chinese Journal of Communication
- Vol. 3 (3) , 266-289
China's pursuits of indigenous innovations in information technology developments: hopes, follies and uncertainties
Although the Chinese state has allowed US-based transnational corporations to play an instrumental role in China's information technology (IT)-led development strategy, a dominant segment of Chinese political and technological leadership has always been wary of the negative political, economic and cultural implications of continued American domination in digital technological developments. Chinese efforts at asserting greater control over a rapidly evolving networked communication infrastructure have been multifaceted. Significantly, the past few years have seen an escalation of domestic discourses on “network sovereignty” and “indigenous innovations” or the mastery of core technologies at the industrial development strategy and technological policy levels. An elite consensus has crystallized around the mobilization of national resources to catch up with the United States in hardware and software IT developments, particularly to achieve potential leadership in next-generation network technologies. However, China's quest for technological leadership in the network age continues to be constrained by a range of domestic political economic forces on one hand, and mediated by the paradoxical dynamics of interstate cooperation and rivalry in the political economy of global communication on the other. The growing transnational nature of the capitalist accumulation process, of which China's deepened global integration through its rapidly expanding and increasingly market-driven information industry has been a critical component, has further complicated these endeavors.
- 12 April 2010
- Published by SAGE Publications in Global Media and Communication
- Vol. 6 (1) , 5-32
Chinese modernity, media and democracy
- 12 April 2010
- Published by SAGE Publications in Global Media and Communication
- Vol. 6 (1) , 5-32
Chinese modernity, media and democracy
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 10 (4) , 53-74
Transnational Capital, the Chinese State, and China’s Communication Industries in a Fractured Society
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation has significantly accelerated the country's integration with global capitalism through its bureaucratically-controlled and market-driven communication industries. The specific terms and conditions of this integration has meant that a newly reconstituted power bloc — consisting of the bureaucratic capitalists of a reformed Party state, transnational corporate capital, and an emerging urban middle class, whose members are the favoured consumers of both domestic and transnational capital — has assumed hegemonic dominance of the communicative processes both in and out of China. At the same time, this process has been highly contentious, and continues to be mediated by both nationalistic and leftist ideolo/gical legacies of the Chinese state and emerging forms of social and cultural contestation. This paper examines this integration from a transnational and transcultural political economic perspective. It begins with a critique of the Chinese nationalist and democracy frameworks in analyzing this integration, and then moves on to analyze the structural and ideological dimensions of China's semi-integrated communication industries and markets and identify new patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the distribution of communicative power. At the centre of this analysis lie tensions between national and class interests; betvveen the imperatives of capital accumulation and the communication needs of an increasingly fractured society; and, betvveen horizontal and vertical communication among different social groups in a globalising context.
- 1 January 2003
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 10 (4) , 53-74
Transnational Capital, the Chinese State, and China’s Communication Industries in a Fractured Society
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation has significantly accelerated the country's integration with global capitalism through its bureaucratically-controlled and market-driven communication industries. The specific terms and conditions of this integration has meant that a newly reconstituted power bloc — consisting of the bureaucratic capitalists of a reformed Party state, transnational corporate capital, and an emerging urban middle class, whose members are the favoured consumers of both domestic and transnational capital — has assumed hegemonic dominance of the communicative processes both in and out of China. At the same time, this process has been highly contentious, and continues to be mediated by both nationalistic and leftist ideolo/gical legacies of the Chinese state and emerging forms of social and cultural contestation. This paper examines this integration from a transnational and transcultural political economic perspective. It begins with a critique of the Chinese nationalist and democracy frameworks in analyzing this integration, and then moves on to analyze the structural and ideological dimensions of China's semi-integrated communication industries and markets and identify new patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the distribution of communicative power. At the centre of this analysis lie tensions between national and class interests; betvveen the imperatives of capital accumulation and the communication needs of an increasingly fractured society; and, betvveen horizontal and vertical communication among different social groups in a globalising context.
- 1 January 2001
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 8 (2) , 21-44
Media and Elusive Democracy in China
This paper delineates the multiple meanings of democracy and offers a social historical analysis on media and democratisation in China. Notwithstanding conventional perceptions about a disjuncture between economic liberalisation and political repression in China, the suppression of popular quests for political participation and the deprivation of media freedom for a majority of the Chinese population preceded waves of capitalistic developments in post-Mao China. The notion of democracy, meanwhile, has undergone significant transformations. Many activists in the late 1970s advocated popular and participatory democracy. By 1989, democracy had taken an elitist and liberal character among its advocates. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese discourses on democracy have assumed more complicated dimensions with accelerated capitalist developments, deepened social stratification, and the replacement of students and intellectuals by disenfranchised workers, peasants, and Falun Gong practitioners as the main forces of social contestation. Many regime protesters no longer appeal to the liberal democratic discourse. Some reformers, meanwhile, embrace liberal democracy as a means of popular containment. Today, China’s state-controlled and commercialised media are deeply embedded in the established market authoritarian social order. While the Party makes every effort to prevent horizontal communication between disenfranchised groups and established intellectuals confine their debates to elite journals and cyberspaces, the role of Chinese workers and peasants and their voices remain a key problematic for media and democratisation in China.
- 1 January 2001
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Javnost - The Public
- Vol. 8 (2) , 21-44
Media and Elusive Democracy in China
This paper delineates the multiple meanings of democracy and offers a social historical analysis on media and democratisation in China. Notwithstanding conventional perceptions about a disjuncture between economic liberalisation and political repression in China, the suppression of popular quests for political participation and the deprivation of media freedom for a majority of the Chinese population preceded waves of capitalistic developments in post-Mao China. The notion of democracy, meanwhile, has undergone significant transformations. Many activists in the late 1970s advocated popular and participatory democracy. By 1989, democracy had taken an elitist and liberal character among its advocates. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese discourses on democracy have assumed more complicated dimensions with accelerated capitalist developments, deepened social stratification, and the replacement of students and intellectuals by disenfranchised workers, peasants, and Falun Gong practitioners as the main forces of social contestation. Many regime protesters no longer appeal to the liberal democratic discourse. Some reformers, meanwhile, embrace liberal democracy as a means of popular containment. Today, China’s state-controlled and commercialised media are deeply embedded in the established market authoritarian social order. While the Party makes every effort to prevent horizontal communication between disenfranchised groups and established intellectuals confine their debates to elite journals and cyberspaces, the role of Chinese workers and peasants and their voices remain a key problematic for media and democratisation in China.