Virginie Boinet
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Virginie Boinet has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christopher Martin
Martin: Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, United Kingdom. Phone +44‐1895‐266644, Fax +44‐1895‐269770
1 shared publication - Michael G. Arghyrou
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Aberconway Building, Colum Dr, Cardiff CF10 3EU, UK
1 shared publication Nicola Spagnolo
Brunel University
1 shared publication- Oreste Napolitano
Department of Business and Economic Studies, University of Naples ‘Parthenope’, Naples, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 30 (1) , 38-56
Non-linear and non-symmetric exchange-rate adjustment: Evidence from medium- and high-inflation countries
- 1 March 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 30 (1) , 38-56
Non-linear and non-symmetric exchange-rate adjustment: Evidence from medium- and high-inflation countries
- 1 July 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of World Economics
- Vol. 141 (2) , 357-368
Was the Currency Crisis in Argentina Self-Fulfilling?
- 1 July 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of World Economics
- Vol. 141 (2) , 357-368
Was the Currency Crisis in Argentina Self-Fulfilling?
- 19 September 2003
- Published by Wiley in Bulletin of Economic Research
- Vol. 55 (4) , 347-355
Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency Crisis
This paper shows that, in a fixed exchange‐rate system with an escape clause, delegating the decision on the magnitude of realignment to an inflation‐averse central banker reduces the range of realignment costs for which the policy‐maker necessarily devalues. Stressing the influence of devaluation expectations on currency crises, it is also shown that this strategy of delegation reduces the width of the multiple equilibria zone within which self‐fulfilling crises occur, thus promoting further the exchange‐rate system's stability. The higher the central banker's degree of inflation aversion, the greater is this reduction.
- 19 September 2003
- Published by Wiley in Bulletin of Economic Research
- Vol. 55 (4) , 347-355
Partial Delegation in a Model of Currency Crisis
This paper shows that, in a fixed exchange‐rate system with an escape clause, delegating the decision on the magnitude of realignment to an inflation‐averse central banker reduces the range of realignment costs for which the policy‐maker necessarily devalues. Stressing the influence of devaluation expectations on currency crises, it is also shown that this strategy of delegation reduces the width of the multiple equilibria zone within which self‐fulfilling crises occur, thus promoting further the exchange‐rate system's stability. The higher the central banker's degree of inflation aversion, the greater is this reduction.