Alberto Zazzaro
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Alberto Zazzaro has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Pietro Alessandrini
Università Politecnica delle Marche
6 shared publications - Andrea Presbitero
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, USA
4 shared publications - Domenico Scalera
University of Sannio
2 shared publications - Luca Papi
Department of Economics and Social Sciences (DISES), Università Politecnica delle Marche, Ancona, Italy
2 shared publications - Michele Fratianni
Indiana University
2 shared publications - Alessandro Gambini
Università Politecnica delle Marche, Mo.Fi.R. (Money and Finance Research Group), CeMaFiR (Centre for Macroeconomics and Finance Research), Ancona, Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Sanctions and public opinion : the case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes
Economic sanctions usually fail, sometimes even provoking the opposite of the intended outcome. Why are sanctions so often ineffective? One prominent view is that sanctions generate popular support for the targeted government; an outcome referred to as the rally-around-the-flag effect. But despite substantial anecdotal evidence, the lack of suitable data gathered during sanction events has prevented direct study of the rally-around-the-flag effect. We address this gap using a panel household survey in Ukraine that collected data on political and economic preferences before and after a major trade dispute with the Russian Federation. The dispute led to a cut in gas exports to Ukraine and dramatically increasing gas prices for consumers. Our findings show that people more directly affected by the sharp increase in gas prices were substantially more likely to change their political views in a "pro-Western" direction and in support of a more open democratic system. We identify a similar effect regarding economic policies, leading to more than a doubling in the likelihood of supporting liberal market views. Suggestive but less conclusive evidence also suggests that Ukrainians who were more directly affected by the dispute were more likely to support joining the European Union.
Open AccessSanctions and public opinion : the case of the Russia-Ukraine gas disputes
Economic sanctions usually fail, sometimes even provoking the opposite of the intended outcome. Why are sanctions so often ineffective? One prominent view is that sanctions generate popular support for the targeted government; an outcome referred to as the rally-around-the-flag effect. But despite substantial anecdotal evidence, the lack of suitable data gathered during sanction events has prevented direct study of the rally-around-the-flag effect. We address this gap using a panel household survey in Ukraine that collected data on political and economic preferences before and after a major trade dispute with the Russian Federation. The dispute led to a cut in gas exports to Ukraine and dramatically increasing gas prices for consumers. Our findings show that people more directly affected by the sharp increase in gas prices were substantially more likely to change their political views in a "pro-Western" direction and in support of a more open democratic system. We identify a similar effect regarding economic policies, leading to more than a doubling in the likelihood of supporting liberal market views. Suggestive but less conclusive evidence also suggests that Ukrainians who were more directly affected by the dispute were more likely to support joining the European Union.
- Open Access
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Duncker & Humblot GmbH in Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital
- Vol. 49 (4) , 535-561
Banks, Regions and Development After the Crisis and Under the New Regulatory System
One of the most evident consequences of the Great Financial Crisis has been a rapid expansion of banking regulation. We argue that the burden of the new regulatory system is asymmetric, driving small banks to the “too-small-to-survive” zone, while reinforcing the “too-big-to-fail” protection for big banks. The asymmetric effect on banking structure produces related asymmetries on firms and regional economies, in light of the fact that small firms and peripheral regions are highly dependent on bank credit and need strategic proximity of banking structures. Finally, our review of the literature on different countries and on different periods of time, including the financial crisis years, suggests the importance of a differentiated banking model when firms and regions are heterogeneous. There is no obvious optimal size of bank. Banken, Regionen und Entwicklung nach der Krise im Rahmen des neuen regulatorischen Systems Zusammenfassung Eine der offensichtlichsten Auswirkungen der globalen Finanzkrise ...
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Duncker & Humblot GmbH in Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital
- Vol. 49 (4) , 535-561
Open AccessBanks, Regions and Development After the Crisis and Under the New Regulatory System
One of the most evident consequences of the Great Financial Crisis has been a rapid expansion of banking regulation. We argue that the burden of the new regulatory system is asymmetric, driving small banks to the “too-small-to-survive” zone, while reinforcing the “too-big-to-fail” protection for big banks. The asymmetric effect on banking structure produces related asymmetries on firms and regional economies, in light of the fact that small firms and peripheral regions are highly dependent on bank credit and need strategic proximity of banking structures. Finally, our review of the literature on different countries and on different periods of time, including the financial crisis years, suggests the importance of a differentiated banking model when firms and regions are heterogeneous. There is no obvious optimal size of bank. Banken, Regionen und Entwicklung nach der Krise im Rahmen des neuen regulatorischen Systems Zusammenfassung Eine der offensichtlichsten Auswirkungen der globalen Finanzkrise ...
- 20 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in IMF Economic Review
- Vol. 63 (3) , 644-691
IMF Lending and Banking Crises
- 20 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in IMF Economic Review
- Vol. 63 (3) , 644-691
IMF Lending and Banking Crises
- 10 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Small Business Economics
- Vol. 40 (4) , 977-1007
Long-lasting bank relationships and growth of firms
- 10 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Small Business Economics
- Vol. 40 (4) , 977-1007
Long-lasting bank relationships and growth of firms
- 6 January 2011
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 11 (1)
The Impact of Antitrust Fines on the Formation of Collusive Cartels
The literature on collusive cartels has mainly focused on the impact of antitrust fines on the sustainability of cartels, in infinitely repeated games. This approach, however, does not allow us to study the effect of antitrust fines on the incentives to form cartels in the first place. In this paper, we adopt a coalitional game approach to modeling collusive agreements, showing that antitrust fines may drive firms from partial cartels to a monopolistic cartel. Moreover, by introducing uncertainty on market demand, we show that the socially optimal competition policy can call for a finite or even zero antitrust penalty, even if there are no enforcement costs. We provide a sufficient condition for these results to apply to any coalitional game of cartel formation with symmetric firms. Then, we discuss the extension to asymmetric firms and dynamic collusion.
- 6 January 2011
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
- Vol. 11 (1)
The Impact of Antitrust Fines on the Formation of Collusive Cartels
The literature on collusive cartels has mainly focused on the impact of antitrust fines on the sustainability of cartels, in infinitely repeated games. This approach, however, does not allow us to study the effect of antitrust fines on the incentives to form cartels in the first place. In this paper, we adopt a coalitional game approach to modeling collusive agreements, showing that antitrust fines may drive firms from partial cartels to a monopolistic cartel. Moreover, by introducing uncertainty on market demand, we show that the socially optimal competition policy can call for a finite or even zero antitrust penalty, even if there are no enforcement costs. We provide a sufficient condition for these results to apply to any coalitional game of cartel formation with symmetric firms. Then, we discuss the extension to asymmetric firms and dynamic collusion.
- 10 November 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 195-219
Do Male and Female Loan Officers Differ in Small Business Lending? A Review of the Literature
- 10 November 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 195-219
Do Male and Female Loan Officers Differ in Small Business Lending? A Review of the Literature
- 30 December 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Economic Geography
- Vol. 10 (6) , 845-881
Bank size or distance: what hampers innovation adoption by SMEs?
A growing body of research is focusing on banking organizational issues, emphasizing the difficulties encountered by the hierarchically organized banks in lending informationally opaque borrowers. While the two extreme cases of hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations are typically contrasted, what shapes the degree of hierarchy and how to measure it remain fairly vague. In this article, we compare bank size and functional distance between bank branches and headquarters as possible sources of organizational friction studying their impact on the likelihood of small firms introducing innovations. Our results show that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) located in provinces where the local banking system is functionally distant are less inclined to introduce process and product innovations, while the market share of large banks is only slightly correlated with firms' propensity to introduce new products.
- 30 December 2009
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Economic Geography
- Vol. 10 (6) , 845-881
Bank size or distance: what hampers innovation adoption by SMEs?
A growing body of research is focusing on banking organizational issues, emphasizing the difficulties encountered by the hierarchically organized banks in lending informationally opaque borrowers. While the two extreme cases of hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations are typically contrasted, what shapes the degree of hierarchy and how to measure it remain fairly vague. In this article, we compare bank size and functional distance between bank branches and headquarters as possible sources of organizational friction studying their impact on the likelihood of small firms introducing innovations. Our results show that small and medium enterprises (SMEs) located in provinces where the local banking system is functionally distant are less inclined to introduce process and product innovations, while the market share of large banks is only slightly correlated with firms' propensity to introduce new products.
- 17 August 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-232
The Anticompetitive Effects of the Antitrust Policy
- 17 August 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 213-232
The Anticompetitive Effects of the Antitrust Policy
- 30 April 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 75-108
Geographical Organization of Banking Systems and Innovation Diffusion
- 30 April 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 75-108
Geographical Organization of Banking Systems and Innovation Diffusion