Arthur B. Markman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Arthur B. Markman has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dedre Gentner
Northwestern University
2 shared publications- Eric Dietrich
Binghamton University
1 shared publication - Takashi Yamauchi
Department of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027www.columbia.edu/~abm16
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 February 1998
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 21 (5) , 637-638
All information processing entails computation, or, If R. A. Fisher had been a cognitive scientist . . .
We argue that the dynamical and computational hypotheses are compatible and in fact need each other: they are about different aspects of cognition. However, only computationalism is about the information-processing aspect. We then argue that any form of information processing relying on matching and comparing, as cognition does, must use discrete representations and computations defined over them.
- 1 February 1998
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 21 (5) , 637-638
All information processing entails computation, or, If R. A. Fisher had been a cognitive scientist . . .
We argue that the dynamical and computational hypotheses are compatible and in fact need each other: they are about different aspects of cognition. However, only computationalism is about the information-processing aspect. We then argue that any form of information processing relying on matching and comparing, as cognition does, must use discrete representations and computations defined over them.
- 1 February 1998
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 21 (4) , 477-478
Boundary conditions and the need for multiple forms of representation
Multidimensional space representations like those posited in Edelman's target article are not sufficient to capture all similarity phenomena. We discuss phenomena that are compatible with models of similarity that assume structured relational representations. An adequate model of similarity and perception will require multiple approaches to representation.
- 1 February 1998
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 21 (4) , 477-478
Boundary conditions and the need for multiple forms of representation
Multidimensional space representations like those posited in Edelman's target article are not sufficient to capture all similarity phenomena. We discuss phenomena that are compatible with models of similarity that assume structured relational representations. An adequate model of similarity and perception will require multiple approaches to representation.
- 1 December 1997
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 21 (4) , 373-418
Constraints on analogical inference
- 1 December 1997
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 21 (4) , 373-418
Constraints on analogical inference
- 1 September 1997
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (5) , 363-367
The Effects of Alignability on Memory
According to structure-mapping theory, the process of comparison is one of alignment and mapping between representational structures. This process induces a focus on commonalities and alignable differences (i.e., those related to the commonalities). Nonalignable differences (i.e., those not related to the commonalities) are held to be neglected. The theory thus predicts increased focus on the corresponding information, whether these are commonalities or differences. In this article, we explore the implications of this claim for memory: Specifically, we test the prediction that alignable differences are more likely to be processed and stored than nonalignable differences. We present a study in which people made similarity comparisons between pairs of pictures and then were probed for recall. The recall probes were figures taken from the pictures and were either alignable or nonalignable differences between the pairs. The alignable differences were better memory probes than the nonalignable differences, suggesting that people were more likely to encode and store the corresponding information than the noncorresponding information.
- 1 September 1997
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (5) , 363-367
The Effects of Alignability on Memory
According to structure-mapping theory, the process of comparison is one of alignment and mapping between representational structures. This process induces a focus on commonalities and alignable differences (i.e., those related to the commonalities). Nonalignable differences (i.e., those not related to the commonalities) are held to be neglected. The theory thus predicts increased focus on the corresponding information, whether these are commonalities or differences. In this article, we explore the implications of this claim for memory: Specifically, we test the prediction that alignable differences are more likely to be processed and stored than nonalignable differences. We present a study in which people made similarity comparisons between pairs of pictures and then were probed for recall. The recall probes were figures taken from the pictures and were either alignable or nonalignable differences between the pairs. The alignable differences were better memory probes than the nonalignable differences, suggesting that people were more likely to encode and store the corresponding information than the noncorresponding information.
- 1 June 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 3 (2) , 227-230
Structural alignment in similarity and difference judgments
Similarity is a central construct in models of cognitive processing, and as such has been the focus of psychological inquiry. This work has revealed that similarity and difference judgments are not always inverses. One explanation for this effect is that similarity judgments focus on matching relations between the items, while difference judgments focus on the mismatching attributes. A second explanation is that both similarity and difference judgments involve a process of structural alignment, and that they use the output of this process differently. These views are contrasted by using the one-shot mapping technique that places attribute similarity and relational similarity in competition. The results suggest that similarity and difference judgments both involve structural alignment.
- 1 June 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 3 (2) , 227-230
Structural alignment in similarity and difference judgments
Similarity is a central construct in models of cognitive processing, and as such has been the focus of psychological inquiry. This work has revealed that similarity and difference judgments are not always inverses. One explanation for this effect is that similarity judgments focus on matching relations between the items, while difference judgments focus on the mismatching attributes. A second explanation is that both similarity and difference judgments involve a process of structural alignment, and that they use the output of this process differently. These views are contrasted by using the one-shot mapping technique that places attribute similarity and relational similarity in competition. The results suggest that similarity and difference judgments both involve structural alignment.
- 1 March 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 24 (2) , 235-249
Commonalities and differences in similarity comparisons
Similarity is a central component of many cognitive processes. Current research suggests that similarity is well characterized as a comparison of structured representations. This process yields commonalities, differences related to the commonalities (alignable differences), and differences not related to the commonalities (nonalignable differences). In the first study, further evidence for this tripartite distinction is provided in a commonality and difference listing study involving pairs of pictures. This study indicates that alignable differences rather than nonalignable differences are central to the comparison process by virtue of their connection to the commonalities. The second study further demonstrates that alignable differences count more against the similarity of a pair than do nonalignable differences. We end by discussing implications of the distinction between alignable and nonalignable differences for other cognitive processes involving comparisons.
- 1 March 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 24 (2) , 235-249
Commonalities and differences in similarity comparisons
Similarity is a central component of many cognitive processes. Current research suggests that similarity is well characterized as a comparison of structured representations. This process yields commonalities, differences related to the commonalities (alignable differences), and differences not related to the commonalities (nonalignable differences). In the first study, further evidence for this tripartite distinction is provided in a commonality and difference listing study involving pairs of pictures. This study indicates that alignable differences rather than nonalignable differences are central to the comparison process by virtue of their connection to the commonalities. The second study further demonstrates that alignable differences count more against the similarity of a pair than do nonalignable differences. We end by discussing implications of the distinction between alignable and nonalignable differences for other cognitive processes involving comparisons.