Toshio Yamagishi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Toshio Yamagishi has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Mizuho Shinada
4 shared publicationsYutaka Horita
4 shared publicationsNobuhiro Mifune
Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University, Hokkaido, Japan; and
3 shared publicationsShigehito Tanida
3 shared publications- Haruto Takagishi
Tamagawa University Brain Science Institute, Tokyo, Japan
2 shared publications - Hirofumi Hashimoto
Department of Social Psychology Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology The University of Tokyo
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Japanese Psychological Association in The Japanese journal of psychology
- Vol. 81 (2) , 114-122
Adaptive foundation of group-based reciprocity
A one-shot sequential prisoner's dilemma game with an in-group and an out-group member was conducted to test the group heuristic hypothesis for the in-group bias in minimal groups. Eighty-nine participants played the role of a second player and faced a fully cooperative first player. The results showed that in-group bias occurred only in the common knowledge condition in which the first player and the second player mutually knew each other's group membership, but not in the private knowledge condition in which the first player did not know the second player's group membership. These results provide support for the group heuristic hypothesis that in-group bias is an adaptive strategy in an assumed generalized exchange system to avoid a bad reputation as a defector.
- 1 January 2010
- Published by The Japanese Psychological Association in The Japanese journal of psychology
- Vol. 81 (2) , 114-122
Open AccessAdaptive foundation of group-based reciprocity
A one-shot sequential prisoner's dilemma game with an in-group and an out-group member was conducted to test the group heuristic hypothesis for the in-group bias in minimal groups. Eighty-nine participants played the role of a second player and faced a fully cooperative first player. The results showed that in-group bias occurred only in the common knowledge condition in which the first player and the second player mutually knew each other's group membership, but not in the private knowledge condition in which the first player did not know the second player's group membership. These results provide support for the group heuristic hypothesis that in-group bias is an adaptive strategy in an assumed generalized exchange system to avoid a bad reputation as a defector.
- 1 January 2010
- Vol. 31 (5) , 616-21
Stress hormones predict hyperbolic time-discount rates six months later in adults.
Stress hormones have been associated with temporal discounting. Although time-discount rate is shown to be stable over a long term, no study to date examines whether individual differences in stress hormones could predict individuals' time-discount rates in the relatively distant future (e.g., six month later), which is of interest in neuroeconomics of stress-addiction association. We assessed 87 participants' salivary stress hormone (cortisol, cortisone, and alpha-amylase) levels and hyperbolic discounting of delayed rewards consisting of three magnitudes, at the time-interval of six months. For salivary steroid assays, we employed a liquid chromatography/ mass spectroscopy (LC/MS) method. The correlations between the stress hormone levels and time-discount rates were examined. We observed that salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) levels were negatively associated with time-discount rates in never-smokers. Notably, salivary levels of stress steroids (i.e., cortisol and cortisone) negatively and positively related to time-discount rates in men and women, respectively, in never-smokers. Ever-smokers' discount rates were not predicted from these stress hormone levels. Individual differences in stress hormone levels predict impulsivity in temporal discounting in the future. There are sex differences in the effect of stress steroids on temporal discounting; while there was no sex defference in the relationship between sAA and temporal discounting.
- 1 January 2010
- Vol. 31 (5) , 616-21
Stress hormones predict hyperbolic time-discount rates six months later in adults.
Stress hormones have been associated with temporal discounting. Although time-discount rate is shown to be stable over a long term, no study to date examines whether individual differences in stress hormones could predict individuals' time-discount rates in the relatively distant future (e.g., six month later), which is of interest in neuroeconomics of stress-addiction association. We assessed 87 participants' salivary stress hormone (cortisol, cortisone, and alpha-amylase) levels and hyperbolic discounting of delayed rewards consisting of three magnitudes, at the time-interval of six months. For salivary steroid assays, we employed a liquid chromatography/ mass spectroscopy (LC/MS) method. The correlations between the stress hormone levels and time-discount rates were examined. We observed that salivary alpha-amylase (sAA) levels were negatively associated with time-discount rates in never-smokers. Notably, salivary levels of stress steroids (i.e., cortisol and cortisone) negatively and positively related to time-discount rates in men and women, respectively, in never-smokers. Ever-smokers' discount rates were not predicted from these stress hormone levels. Individual differences in stress hormone levels predict impulsivity in temporal discounting in the future. There are sex differences in the effect of stress steroids on temporal discounting; while there was no sex defference in the relationship between sAA and temporal discounting.
- 1 January 2010
- Vol. 31 (6) , 837-41
Salivary testosterone levels and autism-spectrum quotient in adults.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between salivary testosterone levels and autistic traits in adults. A total of 92 male and female adults participated in the present study. Their salivary testosterone level (T) and score of Japanese version of Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) were assessed to examine the relationship between salivary testosterone level and autistic traits in adults. We observed a positive correlation between T and AQ in a group of both sexes. The correlation disappeared when we conducted correlation analysis by sex. However, although there was no sex difference in the score of the subscale of attention switching, attention switching was related to T. Although the relationship between T and AQ may mainly result from sex differences, the subscale of attention switching may be modulated by testosterone.
- 1 January 2010
- Vol. 31 (6) , 837-41
Salivary testosterone levels and autism-spectrum quotient in adults.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between salivary testosterone levels and autistic traits in adults. A total of 92 male and female adults participated in the present study. Their salivary testosterone level (T) and score of Japanese version of Autism-spectrum Quotient (AQ) were assessed to examine the relationship between salivary testosterone level and autistic traits in adults. We observed a positive correlation between T and AQ in a group of both sexes. The correlation disappeared when we conducted correlation analysis by sex. However, although there was no sex difference in the score of the subscale of attention switching, attention switching was related to T. Although the relationship between T and AQ may mainly result from sex differences, the subscale of attention switching may be modulated by testosterone.
- Open Access
- 14 July 2009
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 106 (28) , 11520-11523
The private rejection of unfair offers and emotional commitment
In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that certain players of an economic game reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases rather than decreases inequity. A substantial proportion (30–40%, compared with 60–70% in the standard ultimatum game) of those who responded rejected unfair offers even when rejection reduced only their own earnings to 0, while not affecting the earnings of the person who proposed the unfair split (in an impunity game). Furthermore, even when the responders were not able to communicate their anger to the proposers by rejecting unfair offers in a private impunity game, a similar rate of rejection was observed. The rejection of unfair offers that increases inequity cannot be explained by the social preference for inequity aversion or reciprocity; however, it does provide support for the model of emotion as a commitment device. In this view, emotions such as anger or moral disgust lead people to disregard the immediate consequences of their behavior, committing them to behave consistently to preserve integrity and maintain a reputation over time as someone who is reliably committed to this behavior.
- 14 July 2009
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 106 (28) , 11520-11523
Open AccessThe private rejection of unfair offers and emotional commitment
In a series of experiments, we demonstrate that certain players of an economic game reject unfair offers even when this behavior increases rather than decreases inequity. A substantial proportion (30–40%, compared with 60–70% in the standard ultimatum game) of those who responded rejected unfair offers even when rejection reduced only their own earnings to 0, while not affecting the earnings of the person who proposed the unfair split (in an impunity game). Furthermore, even when the responders were not able to communicate their anger to the proposers by rejecting unfair offers in a private impunity game, a similar rate of rejection was observed. The rejection of unfair offers that increases inequity cannot be explained by the social preference for inequity aversion or reciprocity; however, it does provide support for the model of emotion as a commitment device. In this view, emotions such as anger or moral disgust lead people to disregard the immediate consequences of their behavior, committing them to behave consistently to preserve integrity and maintain a reputation over time as someone who is reliably committed to this behavior.
- 5 August 2008
- Published by Wiley in Asian Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 11 (3) , 196-207
Exchanges of group‐based favours: Ingroup bias in the prisoner's dilemma game with minimal groups in Japan and New Zealand
Japanese (N = 48) and New Zealander (N = 55) participants were first assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoner's dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one another's group memberships (mutual‐knowledge condition). In the unilateral‐knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual‐knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral‐knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual‐knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partner's cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual‐knowledge condition emerged only among those who identified with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group.
- 5 August 2008
- Published by Wiley in Asian Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 11 (3) , 196-207
Exchanges of group‐based favours: Ingroup bias in the prisoner's dilemma game with minimal groups in Japan and New Zealand
Japanese (N = 48) and New Zealander (N = 55) participants were first assigned to one of two minimal groups, and then played a prisoner's dilemma game twice with an ingroup member and twice with an outgroup member. In one of the two games they played with an ingroup (or outgroup) member, participants and their partner knew one another's group memberships (mutual‐knowledge condition). In the unilateral‐knowledge condition, only the participants knew the group membership of their partner, but the partner did not know the group membership of the participant. Ingroup bias in cooperation emerged only in the mutual‐knowledge condition in both countries; in the unilateral‐knowledge condition no ingroup bias emerged. Mediational analyses found that, in accord with predictions, cooperation in the mutual‐knowledge condition is mediated by expectation of the partner's cooperation. Ingroup bias in the mutual‐knowledge condition emerged only among those who identified with the ingroup. Results provide support for a group heuristics account of ingroup favouritism in the minimal group. According to this account, participants who face minimal groups activate an ecologically adaptive heuristic of unilaterally cooperating with members of the same group, expecting indirect repayment from others in the same group.
- 1 February 2008
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 20 (1) , 5-30
Does Shared Group Membership Promote Altruism?
Two explanations of why shared group membership promotes cooperation in social dilemmas were compared. According to the fear—greed model of social identity proposed by Simpson (2006), shared group membership reduces greed but not fear and, thus, should promote altruistic behavior toward in-group members in the absence of fear. According to the group heuristic model proposed by Yamagishi and colleagues, altruistic behavior toward in-group members is a `ticket' to enter a generalized exchange system; people are not predicted to behave altruistically when it is made salient that no system of generalized exchange operates in the group. We tested these models in a dictator game experiment with two conditions. In the common knowledge condition, either model predicts greater altruism toward in-group recipients. In the unilateral knowledge condition — when the dictator knows the group membership of the recipient, but the recipient does not know the membership of the dictator — the fear—greed model predicts greater altruism toward ingroup recipients. In contrast, the group heuristic model does not predict such in-group bias in altruism. The results of the experiment support the group heuristic model.
- 1 February 2008
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 20 (1) , 5-30
Does Shared Group Membership Promote Altruism?
Two explanations of why shared group membership promotes cooperation in social dilemmas were compared. According to the fear—greed model of social identity proposed by Simpson (2006), shared group membership reduces greed but not fear and, thus, should promote altruistic behavior toward in-group members in the absence of fear. According to the group heuristic model proposed by Yamagishi and colleagues, altruistic behavior toward in-group members is a `ticket' to enter a generalized exchange system; people are not predicted to behave altruistically when it is made salient that no system of generalized exchange operates in the group. We tested these models in a dictator game experiment with two conditions. In the common knowledge condition, either model predicts greater altruism toward in-group recipients. In the unilateral knowledge condition — when the dictator knows the group membership of the recipient, but the recipient does not know the membership of the dictator — the fear—greed model predicts greater altruism toward ingroup recipients. In contrast, the group heuristic model does not predict such in-group bias in altruism. The results of the experiment support the group heuristic model.
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Evolution and Human Behavior
- Vol. 28 (5) , 330-339
Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Elsevier in Evolution and Human Behavior
- Vol. 28 (5) , 330-339
Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
- 1 August 2007
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 19 (3) , 259-291
The Social Exchange Heuristic: Managing Errors in Social Exchange
We extend the logic of Haselton and Buss's (2000) error management theory to the domain of social exchange and propose that a psychological mechanism, referred to as the social exchange heuristic (SEH), produces certain cognitive biases that affect how individuals manage these errors. We predicted that the SEH would remain dormant in individuals who failed to realize that they were in a situation that involved social exchange. In the first experiment (n = 78), PD players who had a chance, before they played the game, to think both about the nature of the game they were playing and about their partner's choice were less cooperative compared to players of the standard one-shot PDG. In the second experiment (n = 105), PD players were again less cooperative when they made their decision before they were matched with a particular partner than after they had been matched with a partner. Results strongly suggest the operation of a SEH.
- 1 August 2007
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 19 (3) , 259-291
The Social Exchange Heuristic: Managing Errors in Social Exchange
We extend the logic of Haselton and Buss's (2000) error management theory to the domain of social exchange and propose that a psychological mechanism, referred to as the social exchange heuristic (SEH), produces certain cognitive biases that affect how individuals manage these errors. We predicted that the SEH would remain dormant in individuals who failed to realize that they were in a situation that involved social exchange. In the first experiment (n = 78), PD players who had a chance, before they played the game, to think both about the nature of the game they were playing and about their partner's choice were less cooperative compared to players of the standard one-shot PDG. In the second experiment (n = 105), PD players were again less cooperative when they made their decision before they were matched with a particular partner than after they had been matched with a partner. Results strongly suggest the operation of a SEH.
- 22 December 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 28 (6) , 836-837
Preferences, beliefs, and heuristics
Alternative interpretations are proposed for the finding that market integration is positively related to fair behavior in experimental games. Market activities may produce market relevant concepts and stories that interpret experimental games as incidences of social exchange, and thus may enhance the relevance of (1) market-related preferences or (2) a decision heuristic designed for social exchange.
- 22 December 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 28 (6) , 836-837
Preferences, beliefs, and heuristics
Alternative interpretations are proposed for the finding that market integration is positively related to fair behavior in experimental games. Market activities may produce market relevant concepts and stories that interpret experimental games as incidences of social exchange, and thus may enhance the relevance of (1) market-related preferences or (2) a decision heuristic designed for social exchange.
- 1 August 2005
- Published by Wiley in Asian Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 8 (2) , 173-190
Comparisons of Australians and Japanese on group-based cooperation
- 1 August 2005
- Published by Wiley in Asian Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 8 (2) , 173-190
Comparisons of Australians and Japanese on group-based cooperation